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TOPICAL ISSUES OF PHILOSOPHICAL ANTHROPOLOGY

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INCOMPATIBILITY OR CONVERGENCE: HUMAN LIFE AS CAPITAL

The purpose of the study is to identify a common theoretical basis for the study of human life as capital and unconditional higher value. **Theoretical basis** is based on the value-laden and revised structural constructivism, provided by the French philosopher and sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, critical analysis of the concepts of capital as the embodiment of social expectations, the biological concept of the value of human life, as well as the concepts of its sanctity. **Originality.** It is proved that one should not consider the value of human life as capital only but instead takes into account its different value interpretations, especially when forming the social identity of a person. Moreover, in each of the value systems, the value of human life can be recognized as unconditional, which does not prevent the coexistence of such different value interpretations within the framework of one social identity, which then inevitably becomes a multiple social identity. **Conclusions.** Human life cannot be considered as a result of integrating economic expectations into the concept of "advertising" capital: first, expectations may well be inadequate; second, expectations by themselves are not directly related to capital; third, expectations do not necessarily lead to development; fourth, one should clearly distinguish between the spontaneous "expectations" and the values that express people's strong motivation as members of social communities. The multiplicity of possible cultural conditions that affirm the unconditional value of life indicates that this unconditionality is always relevant rather than absolute. The multiple social identities could be used to add value to the protection of human life, the affirmation of multiple social identities is a means of affirming the unconditional value of human life – it is unconditional in several alternative ways.

Keywords: human life; person; capital; unconditional higher value; sanctity of life; multiple social identity

Introduction

In recent years, there has been an active exploration of human life as an applied value. Sociologists derive a happiness index for the countries (Helliwell, Layard, & Sachs, 2019), and consider this happiness index as capital, which is viewed as a more important indicator of a country's economic success than a gross domestic product or even an index of social capital development. Thus, human science data, including anthropological characteristics, are increasingly important for defining the goals of economic science. On the other hand, in the field of medicine and law, the concept of the sanctity of human life is gradually gaining its instrumentality and pragmatics, whereas it was previously viewed more as a religious term with a transcendental orientation. The sanctity of life, in recognition of its unconditional supreme value, loses its absolute and uncompromising purity, but instead, this increasingly unrealizable ideal is correcting by medical, legal, and other practices to a greater and greater degree of humanization. In both cases, it is not so much about the moral justification of human life as value, but about a rational pragmatic approach to it. At the same time, the view of life as capital is the view of human being as

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an instrument, whereas the view of human life as sanctity is the recognition of human as an aim. These two approaches appear to be incompatible with theory, but in practice, capital is increasingly viewed not only as a means, while even as a value, human life is not always an aim. All this requires a theoretical understanding that philosophy can provide. The preservation of human life must become not an abstract metaphysical problem, but an anthropologically sound practical approach.

Purpose

The purpose of the study is to identify a common theoretical basis for the study of human life as capital and unconditional higher value.

Statement of basic materials

Human life as capital is considered first and foremost by economists, among whom are thinkers of the philosophical level, such as John Maynard Keynes (1971-1989). The influence of his concept not only on the development of economic theory and practice, but also on social philosophy and understanding of human nature has been made by Ukrainian philosopher Tatiana Bilous (2018). Her analysis revealed both the strengths and weaknesses of a view of human life as capital. Critics of trying to reduce human capital to happiness capital are presented by Gary Lit (2019), Director and Consultant in GL Training and Consultancy with business in the Asia-Pacific Region, Singapore. The connection between human expectations and social identity is analyzed by Ukrainian philosopher Volodymyr Khmil and Ukrainian psychologist Ihor Popovych (Khmil, & Popovych, 2019). Human life as a value is deeply analyzed by the German philosopher Heinrich Rickert (1998). A comprehensive analysis of human as a value compared to other animals is provided by Jean-Marie Schaeffer (2007) and Peter Singer (2018). David Albert Jones (2016), Director of the Anscombe Bioethics Centre, Oxford, criticizes attempts to treat the sanctity of life as a principle. Jeff McMahan (2002) analyzes various ethical arguments for and against the killing. All this needs a new perspective from the standpoint of social constructivism, in a version of value-laden and revised structural constructivism, provided by the French philosopher and sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1987).

Human life as capital

As far as the economy of the country could be only to a certain extent successfully stimulated by artificial measures, as well as with regard to human capital – attempts by means of external intervention to make a person more productive have their limits. In the economy, advertising can help boost sales, but production (except for the production of advertising) does not benefit strategically from increased advertising impact. Similarly, the external stimulation of human capital cannot replace the internal causes of its development: a person must have life need to produce better and more creatively, whereas advertising develops not basic needs, but only derivative, non-binding desires of people.

This "promotional" approach to capital development is worthy of criticism. It is often justified by the Keynesian position, which views the state of the economy as typically volatile, and therefore it seems to be stimulated through regulation of human behavior.

Analyzing the views of the British economist and philosopher John Maynard Keynes and his followers, Ukrainian philosopher Tatiana Bilous states:

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The economic behavior of market players is determined by the expectations of the future based on what happened to them in the past, i.e. according to trust and confidence, which has formed in the past. "Unreliability" or "uncertainty" is Keynes' operating concept: many dramas of economic reality can be explained by considering that people are inherently uncertain about the future. (authors' transl.) (Bilous, 2018, p. 84)

In general, it could be true. However, when the whole economic system is viewed as driven not by objective demand parameters, but by artificially created consumer needs, that is, it is the substitution of real market demand for "demand expectations" and real profit for "profit expectations".

Bilous (2018) stated: "...production output based on *expected* demand... Apart from the interest rate, which really only slightly affects the level of savings, the desire to invest in production determines the *expected* profit" (p. 79). It is easy to imagine how quickly an economy, or even an individual business, would go bankrupt if it were really guided by such economic views. Tatiana Bilous (2018) admits that "modern economists are not looking for Keynes's recipes for economic growth" (authors' transl.) (p. 85) – and it is not surprising.

Keynes's theory is seen more as a component of crisis management – that is, it helps in the short run – as long as "expectations" weigh. The attempt to build an economic system not on rational economic orientation for profit, but on the basis of actual economic behavior deserves philosophical criticism.

First, expectations may well be inadequate. Expectations can be lowered – and this is unpleasant, leads to under-profits, but this is not lethal to the economy. But expectations can be inflated – and significantly inflated. Then, an economy built on inadequate expectations is very likely to suffer significant losses, and a number of businesses will inevitably go bankrupt. At that time, they started to create badly grounded economic projects that at some point turned into scams – the type of construction of the Panama Canal. The economic crisis of 2008 was also largely a chain effect precisely because expectations were built in the chain: some were based on others and those, in turn, were still on third, and all these reinsurance chains did not always carry with them real economic calculations. Excessive expectations are therefore very likely simply false economic expectations based more on high hopes than on accurate calculations.

Second, expectations by themselves are not directly related to capital. They do not relate to the classical notions of capital – the latter is formed by real labor and real satisfaction of market demand. However, even if we talk about symbolic capital, the expectations here are too ambiguous. Symbolic capital, however, is based on knowledge and values, not simply on influences on other people. It is knowledge and values that add to the effects of stability, but influences do not create new knowledge and values. No matter how attractive the images and symbols are, they can only provoke the search for true knowledge and encourage the formation of experiences of new values. However, such stimulating signals could be provided by other images and symbols, both in parallel and in the mode of displacement of those images and symbols that have recently appeared unsurpassed.

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Third, expectations do not necessarily lead to development – not only in form but also in content. For example, advertising does not necessarily stimulate capital development. Advertising, as a rule, encourages people to seek what they do not already have and, in principle, do not need it. On the other hand, advertising can also have the opposite purpose: to teach people to be happy with what they already have and to persuade them that they no longer need more (Lit, 2019). The economy uses more often the former, politics the second. However, both methods of motivation can be used both to artificially stimulate capital development and to artificially curb this development. In the latter case, economists talk about an "overheated" economy, and politicians talk about the deception of citizens by means of utopias (usually by opponents of these politicians) and the need to return to political "realism".

Finally, fourth and foremost (though not least), one should clearly distinguish between the spontaneous "expectations" that express people's changing and conjunctural appraisals of current events, and the values that express people's strong motivation as members of social communities.

Ukrainian philosopher Volodymyr Khmil and Ukrainian psychologist Ihor Popovych also stated that "social expectations are directly dependent on the prerequisites for the existence of collective identity. They may depend on the aggregate historical, community experience, the demands of power, party ideology or religious faith – how we experience the world and how we conceive it" (Khmil, & Popovych, 2019, p. 61).

Capital is, after all, a value, or more precisely, integrated values. Capital of a social community is made up of its values, all other kinds of capital of this community – economic, cultural, all kinds of social capital – grow out of it. The values of all social communities in society form in their competition, their mutual complement, intersection, and splicing among themselves the social capital of this society, its national wealth, the diversity of its symbolic manifestations. And expectations emerge as more or less accidental manifestations and as more or less accidental combinations of these values, which are formed in more or less accidental circumstances of the life of particular persons. The values of social communities set the expectations of individuals with horizons of meaningfulness, and thus provide them with meaningful content, but expectations of individuals could not form the values of communities because of random and arbitrary character of expectations.

Thus, as economic behavior must be subordinated to the economic strategy and not vice versa, so must the development of human capital be based on what we believe to be important to preserve and develop in human, not that we can squeeze as much as possible out of the human as a resource here and now. The value of human life must be based on a clear understanding of what we can really do and how we really could creatively develop a person, and not on metaphysical ideas and fantasies, on adapting to the realities of the world, rather than blindly denying them. Such an adaptation, however, can be successful if it is sensible and value-based, and it is not necessary to reject the will and emotions in dialogue with the world. The value of human life is sanctity, however, not absolute and exclusive, but sanctity that is possible through the recognition of the sanctity of all living and the entire world (Schaeffer, 2007).

Human life as the unconditional higher value

Indeed, one should not oppose the sanctity of life to the miserable and wicked world, as some religious adherents and even some scholars and philosophers misinterpret the religious position (Singer, 2018). Holiness must indeed be opposed to sin – but to a greater extent, not ontologically, but in value and pragmatism: as two opposing strategies of behavior.

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David Albert Jones, Director of the Anscombe Bioethics Centre, Oxford, is quite close to this position. He insists:

Understood as the name of an established 'principle' the 'sanctity of life' is virtually an invention of the late twentieth century. The language came to prominence as the label of a position that was being rejected: it is the name of a caricature. Hence there is no locus classicus for a definition of the terms and different authors freely apply the phrase to divergent and contradictory positions. (authors' transl.) (Jones, 2016, p. 185)

When referring to human life as sanctity, the religious understanding of this quality has become less and less evident in recent times. But without accepting God as the source and guarantor of this sanctity, it becomes a metaphor that is much less trusting than what they really want to say when they use the term "sanctity": human life is an unconditional higher value for human being.

There are a number of questions about life as a value, some of which were answered by a German philosopher of the early 20th century, Henrich Rickert. Life from a natural point of view is of no value – even if we say that evolution has its natural result in higher forms of life and, in particular, human life, it is not about proper value but about what is actually a result of natural necessity.

Rickert (1998) stated: "After all, physics merely states what is or teaches causal connections. It shows that a certain event has a certain impact. There is no rationing in this. It is exclusively about the inevitable (Müssen), and it seems to make sense meaningless" (p. 377). Normativity, like purpose, arises at higher and more complex levels of determination:

It is only necessary – and more often than not – to distinguish between three different types of causal, conditional, and teleological relationships, and what is particularly important is that one should not think that a teleological relationship is already emerging from a mere transformation of a causal relationship into a conditional relationship. (authors' transl.) (Rickert, 1998, p. 377)

The technician introduces the goal into the physical laws and thus sets certain norms, norms for the physical objects, in order to achieve this goal, i.e. creation from the physical things of the technique. But the physician also introduces into biology goals that biology does not have: nature does not provide treatment, it has the only natural selection.

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According to Rickert (1998), both physics and biology, "both sciences, properly understood, operate quite independently of values. Both of these do not in themselves create any norms" (authors' transl.) (p. 380). From this, in particular, follows the correction of the idea of the alleged biological justification of human life as the highest value:

Modern biology puts human on a par with other living beings. It therefore deprives it of its exclusive status as the "highest point of development" because it is one of the living creatures and the other, whereby a person may deserve such an exclusive status, does not apply to biology at all. (authors' transl.) (Rickert, 1998, p. 383)

Rickert (1998) further clarifies this view: "We have the so-called 'value of life', therefore, not as its own value (Eigenwert), but as its conditional value (Bedingungswert)" (authors' transl.) (p. 391). Life is only a condition that enables values, including the value of life itself: "It always acquires values only because we, by means of self-sufficient, value-based values, make it good" (authors' transl.) (Rickert, 1998, p. 392). Such self-sufficient values for Rickert are the values of culture.

Thus, when one asserts that human life is of the highest value, or of unconditional value, it thereby implicitly introduces a certain cultural condition that does not recognize other cultural conditions: religious, medical, ethical, aesthetic, etc. It is clear, however, that the sheer multiplicity of such possible cultural conditions that affirm the unconditional value of life indicates that this unconditionality is always relevant rather than absolute. That is, within a certain system of concepts, a certain value system that emerges as a coordinate system, human life emerges as a higher value (Danylova, 2017). However, the arguments that they provide, the criteria, as they apply, in another coordinate system, with other basic concepts and values, are unlikely to work at all or produce a much weaker result. For example, the sanctity of life in terms of religion is something rather conditional on medicine or the arts. But the opportunity to save a life, which is the highest criterion for the physician, may not work and may not be convincing compared to the possibility of accepting a martyr's death for the faith, or a wonderful death as the artistic apogee of life for the artist. Thus, the unconditional value of life is still conditional, but more precisely conditioned by a certain value system, and by life itself is really meant by the transcendental bliss (religion), perfect beauty (art), health (medicine (Moulin, 2016)), etc.

Thus, human life as an economic value can also be regarded as unconditional – but only in the system of economic values. Human life is indeed capital, but not just capital, and it has an unconditional value not only as capital. Thus, the juxtaposition of the view of human life as capital for the interpretation of human life as an unconditional highest value is conditional itself: in both cases, these are different ways of imparting cultural value to human life. In particular, whether to consider the human body as biological capital is also a matter of value. Moreover, only the person has the right to view his own body as biological capital, and society and social institutions (state, church, morals, medicine, economy, etc.) can only partially restrict this right, but not assign it to themselves.

Multiple social identity as an opportunity to reconcile different interpretations of human life

The way in which one determines the value of one's life or how other people value it can be modeled through the application of a multiple social identity principle, which makes it possible to explain how alternative ways of determining the value of life coexist (Boichenko, Shevchenko, & Pituley, 2019).

In each individual case, while establishing its social identity, the individual also adopts a certain hierarchy of social values. By acting in accordance with these values, each person affirms the truth and importance of his or her own life and that of other people, in accordance with the higher values of a particular hierarchy that is characteristic of a particular social community. If the argument for the value of living within a particular value hierarchy in the life world of a particular social community is unconvincing to the individual, then it can turn to the arguments offered by another hierarchy and another community. It is at such moments that one can say that a person chooses human life as a value not passively, because of its existing social identity, but actively – in changing or complicating his or her social identity for the sake of a more reliable justification of the value of human life (Jankurová, & Děd, 2015).

However, the opposite strategy cannot be ruled out as well, when a person starts looking for arguments against the preservation of human life for some reason and changes his or her social identity in an effort to devalue human life (McMahan, 2002). So, in the history of mankind, some individuals have renounced religion or adopted another religion to justify murder. Similarly, large social communities were changing their way of economic behavior along with changing religions. However, such a socio-suicidal strategy can hardly create a tradition, because, in one way or another, a person who devalues human life devalues himself, and thus destroys the perspective for him or her and others.

If multiple social identities are used to add value to the protection of human life, then the affirmation of multiple social identities is a means of affirming the unconditional value of human life – it is unconditional in several alternative ways (Spivak, & Kovalenko, 2018). This can be compared to the multitude of proofs of God's existence – it is clear that none of them by definition can be exhaustive and self-sufficient, but their multiplicity testifies not only to a persistent desire to prove such value, but also to the fact that this value objectively has many of their manifestations.

Capital emerges as a way of existence of value through its growth by itself. However, the value can be positive and unconditional without such expansionism. There is a value of human life that is important in that it is present at all – for example, conscience: it is unlikely that conscience should be talked about in terms of progress, the main thing is that it is in principle and that it is actively sought for advice rather than waiting for its reproach. On the other hand, health is also an unconditional value, however, it increases mainly in the first half of human life, and further, it does not continue to increase and inevitably diminishes. However, even less health is better than not having it, so keeping at least part of own health is already an unconditional value.

Originality

It is proved that one should not consider the value of human life as capital only, but instead takes into account its different value interpretations, especially when forming the social identity of a person. Moreover, in each of the value systems, the value of human life can be recognized as unconditional one, which does not prevent the coexistence of such different value interpretations within the framework of one social identity, which then inevitably becomes a multiple social identity.

Conclusions

Human life cannot be considered as a result of integrating economic expectations into the concept of "advertising" capital for the following reasons: first, expectations may well be inadequate; second, expectations by themselves are not directly related to capital; third, expectations do not necessarily lead to development – not only in form but also in the content; fourth, one should clearly distinguish between the spontaneous "expectations" that express people's changing and conjunctural appraisals of current events and the values that express people's strong motivation as members of social communities.

The multiplicity of possible cultural conditions that affirm the unconditional value of life indicates that this unconditionality is always relevant rather than absolute. That is, within a certain system of concepts, a certain value system that emerges as a coordinate system, human life emerges as a higher value.

The multiple social identities could be used to add value to the protection of human life, the affirmation of multiple social identities is a means of affirming the unconditional value of human life – it is unconditional in several alternative ways. If the argument for the value of living within a particular value hierarchy in the life world of a particular social community is unconvincing to the individual, then it can turn to the arguments offered by another hierarchy and another community.

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НЕСУМІСНІСТЬ ЧИ КОНВЕРГЕНЦІЯ: ЛЮДСЬКЕ ЖИТТЯ ЯК КАПІТАЛ

Метою дослідження є виявлення спільної теоретичної основи для вивчення людського життя як капіталу і безумовної вищої цінності. **Теоретичний базис** дослідження базується на ціннісно-переглянутому структурному конструктивізмі, наданому французьким філософом та соціологом П'єром Бурдьє, критичному аналізу концепцій капіталу як втілення соціальних очікувань, біологістичної концепції цінності людського життя, а також концепцій його святості. **Наукова новизна.** Доведено, що не варто розглядати цінність людського життя лише як капіталу, натомість слід враховувати різні його ціннісні інтерпретації, особливо – під час формування соціальної ідентичності особистості. Причому в кожній з ціннісних систем цінність людського життя може бути визнана як безумовна, що не перешкоджає співіснуванню таких різних її ціннісних інтерпретацій в рамках однієї соціальної ідентичності, яка тоді неминуче стає множинною соціальною ідентичністю. **Висновки.** Людське життя не можна розглядати як результат інтегрування економічних очікувань у концепт "рекламного" капіталу: по-перше, очікування цілком можуть бути неадекватними; по-друге, самі по собі очікування не мають прямого стосунку до капіталу; по-третє, очікування зовсім не обов'язково ведуть до розвитку; по-четверте, слід чітко відрізняти стихійні "очікування" від цінностей, які виражають стійку мотивацію людей як членів соціальних спільнот. Множинність можливих культурних умов, які утворюють безумовність цінності життя, свідчить про те, що ця безумовність завжди є релевантною, а не абсолютною. Множинну соціальну ідентичність можна використовувати для того, щоб краще захистити людське життя, додати йому цінності, а утвердження множинної соціальної ідентичності постає як спосіб підтвердження безумовної цінності людського життя у варіативні способи.

Ключові слова: життя людини; особистість; капітал; безумовна вища цінність; святість життя; множинна соціальна ідентичність

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НЕСОВМЕСТИМОСТЬ ИЛИ КОНВЕРГЕНЦИЯ: ЧЕЛОВЕЧЕСКАЯ ЖИЗНЬ КАК КАПИТАЛ

Целью исследования является выявление общей теоретической основы для изучения человеческой жизни как капитала и безусловной высшей ценности. **Теоретический базис** исследования базируется на ценностно-пересмотренном структурном конструктивизме, предоставленном французским философом и социологом Пьером Бурдьє, критическом анализе концепций капитала как воплощении социальных ожиданий, биологистической концепции ценности человеческой жизни, а также концепций его святости. **Научная новизна.** Доказано, что не стоит рассматривать ценность человеческой жизни только как капитал, взамен следует учитывать различные его ценностные интерпретации, особенно – при формировании социальной идентичности личности. Причем в каждой из ценностных систем ценность человеческой жизни может быть признана как безусловная, что не препятствует сосуществованию таких разных ее ценностных интерпретаций в рамках одной социальной идентичности, которая тогда неизбежно становится множественной социальной идентичностью. **Выводы.** Человеческую жизнь нельзя рассматривать как результат интегрирования экономических ожиданий в концепт "рекламного" капитала: во-первых, ожидания вполне могут быть неадекватными; во-вторых, сами по себе ожидания не имеют прямого отношения к капиталу; в-третьих, ожидания совсем не обязательно ведут к развитию; в-четвертых, следует четко отличать стихийные "ожидания" от ценностей, которые выражают устойчивую мотивацию людей как членов социальных сообществ. Множественность возможных культурных условий, утверждающих безусловность ценности жизни, свидетельствует о том, что эта безусловность всегда является релевантной, а не абсолютной. Множественную социальную идентичность можно использовать для того, чтобы лучше защитить

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человеческую жизнь, придать ей ценность, а утверждение множественной социальной идентичности выступает как способ подтверждения безусловной ценности человеческой жизни вариативными способами.

Ключевые слова: жизнь человека; личность; капитал; безусловная высшая ценность; святость жизни; множественная социальная идентичность

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V. V. LIAKH^{1*}, M. V. LUKASHENKO^{2*}^{1*}H. Skovoroda Institute of Philosophy, the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine (Kyiv, Ukraine), e-mail vvlvv2012@ukr.net, ORCID 0000-0003-4683-0838^{2*}Vasyl' Stus Donetsk National University (Vinnytsia, Ukraine), e-mail marina.look@gmail.com, ORCID 0000-0001-5430-0808**PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS OF A PERSON'S SELF-REFLECTION
IN THE CONTEXT OF INTERNAL DIALOGUE
(BASED ON "THE DISPUTE OF A MAN WITH HIS BA")**

Purpose. The study is aimed at considering self-reflection through an analysis of the features of internal dialogue in ancient texts (XXII-XXI centuries BC) in order to identify signs of human's mythological and philosophical thinking. **Theoretical basis** of the work is the contemplation of a person's self-reflection in the context of his internal dialogue, through which his own human existence, his subjective and creative comprehension of the world manifest. New meanings are created and shared with others in this mental space, in particular, in crisis periods of personal and social life. Therefore, the ancient Egyptian vision of man's nature, consciousnesses and dialogism of the Self is viewed through the prism of modern philosophical concepts and as the basis for the emergence of a philosophical worldview itself. **Originality.** The analysis from the viewpoint of the philosophical anthropology in the text "The Dispute of a Man with His Ba" showed the opportunity of considering it not only in the context of internal dialogue, but also as a confirmed internal dialogue, which expresses itself in external speech. Comparing the mythical thinking of a man in his cohesiveness with others and the philosophical thinking of a dialogical Self, the authors come to the conclusion that it is necessary to distinguish between internal dialogues with oneself and with the introjects of others, which can be either Double or Interlocutor. It has been revealed that internal dialogues in ancient times played an important role both in structuring social chaos and in overcoming personal crisis states (from existential to clinical states of altered consciousness). This is precisely from such self-reflection that philosophy emerges as a certain discourse and a new type of thinking. **Conclusions.** The analysis of the text "The Dispute of a Man with His Ba" speaks about the emergence of philosophical discourse in the XXII-XXI centuries BC, on the basis of which we can conclude concerning the earlier, in comparison with K. Jaspers's definition, the transition of mankind from the cognitive revolution to a new phase of the development.

Keywords: self-reflection; internal dialogue; philosophical type of thinking; "Axial Age"; crisis states; Ba; Interlocutor; dialogical Self

Introduction

The question of man's attainment of "true self-consciousness" was considered by K. Jaspers (1949) as one of the criteria for determining the Axial Age of history, to which all ancient cultures seemed to be hidden under a veil of otherness (Jaspers, 1994, p. 37). That is, in the period between 800 and 200 years BC a man became what he is today, it was then seemingly human being to be formed and manifested. Or, as the philosopher wrote in "The Meaning and Purpose of History", the presence of such earlier works of the II-III millennium BC, which we have nowadays "A Debate Between a Man *Tired of Life and His Soul*" (German version of the title of the work), the Babylonian penitential psalms, the epic of Gilgamesh, etc., do not change the general evaluation of the world history, because they did not have a significant influence on the transformation of human consciousness. However, today researchers are questioning the expediency in the accentuation of Axial Age as a common root of modern civilizations, namely as a demythologizing revolution that caused changes in human consciousness and perception of their existence. In particular, they point out that such an approach appears as the creation of another myth (Smith, 2015). Therefore, in our opinion, it is worth considering the features of

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human self-reflection to the Axial Age (XXII-XXI centuries BC) through the criteria defined by K. Jaspers (1994), namely: awareness of human existence as a whole, himself and boundaries of his existence (p. 33) on the example of "The Dispute of a Man with His Ba".

This ancient Egyptian text was written in the form of an internal dialogue, which appears as part of the inner nature of a man, and which repeatedly manifested itself in philosophical texts and became the subject of scientific research. However, its philosophical and anthropological analysis in terms of reducing the frequency of using the method of introspection in modern philosophy has both theoretical and practical significance. In particular, to understand human self-consciousness, altered mental states, communicative competence of a person, coping strategies to overcome difficult life circumstances, etc. Consideration of features of the internal dialogue of a man in external speech, who lived more than 4 thousand years ago, will clarify the vision of the dialogic structure of "Self" of a man (G. Hermans), the multiplicity of consciousness through the prism of the artistic image in his inner world (M. Bakhtin) by searching for own life position (W. Bibler). Exactly in such context one of the oldest texts, survived to the present day – "The Dispute of a Man with His Ba" – has not yet been considered in the scientific literature. Both intra-personal communication and philosophical self-reflection were recorded in it.

Ancient Egyptian text, other versions in the translation of the title: "The Man Who Was Tired of Life", "The Dialogue of a Man and His Ba (or Soul)" is almost the only philosophical work among the written artifacts of Ancient Egypt and the only one written in the form of a dialogue between man and his Ba (Endel, 2001, p. 3). It is a dialogue of a disappointed man who thinks about death. It was written in the acute time of social transformations of the First Transition Period when there was the origin of the literature of pessimism; A. Erman – the researcher-translator of this text – defined this in the XIX century. Research devoted to "The Dispute of a Man with His Ba" began after its acquisition by the Royal Prussian Museum in 1843 at Sotheby's (Papyrus Berlin 3024) and continues to this day. So, until recently it was believed that we had received an incomplete text without a beginning, written in hieratic script. However, in 2003 R. Parkinson identified Papyrus Amherst III as a fragment of the Papyrus Berlin 3024, and in 2015 M. Escolano-Poveda (2017) found another missing fragment of it in the Museum Biblic of Mallorca (Spain) (p. 16). Today this work is the object of study for researchers in various fields of science (S. Akimov, A. Bolshakov, M. Lutsyuk, S. Spirina, V. Furkalo, M. Endel, J. P. Allen, J. Assmann, Y. Chobanov, M. Escolano-Poveda, B. Ouellet, R. B. Parkinson, and L. Baylis, D. Trimijopulos, S. Vittori, L. V. Žabkar, etc.), it will help to actualize its philosophical and anthropological reception.

Purpose

Respectively, the purpose of this work is to conduct a philosophical and anthropological analysis of human self-reflection in the context of his internal dialogue on the example of the ancient Egyptian text "The Dispute of a Man with His Ba". To achieve this purpose it is necessary to perform the following objectives: 1) to consider the ideas of the ancient Egyptians about human nature, its constructs; 2) to describe in consonance with them the types of internal dialogue and its goal; 3) to identify the features of self-reflection associated with the emergence of a philosophical type of thinking.

Statement of basic materials

Appealing to the "The Dispute of a Man with His Ba", which is a recorded externalized internal dialogue of an ancient man, is attributable to the possibility of philosophical and anthropological comparison of the internal dialogue of a man in different historical epochs, in particular in the context of "Axial Age". K. Jaspers (1994), defining the state of consciousness of a man in Axial Age, emphasized that he through reflection realizes the horror of life and his own helplessness, "standing over the abyss, raises radical questions, demands liberation and salvation", "understanding his own boundaries, he sets himself higher aims, cognizes absoluteness in the depths of self-consciousness and in the clarity of the transcendent world" (p. 33). In the writing "On the Meaning of History", K. Jaspers (1996) noted that "man seeks and finds himself through questions and answers, which we name philosophizing" (p. 194).

Thus, we are talking about the fact that in ancient times the human consciousness began to realize its own self-awareness. However, such a restructuring of consciousness also caused great concern, because these were changes bordering on spiritual chaos, attempts to overcome this chaos were embodied in the formation of new world religions, philosophical and ethical categories of thought, which still largely determine people's lives. Simultaneously, the calm stability of the mythological time receded into the past, the struggle of various types of rationality began, in particular, the logos against the myth, enhancing the ethical side of religion and leaving the myth as a background.

Therefore, we took into account the hypotheses of identity and nonidentity of modern and ancient consciousness. Based on the content and form of a selected text, we assume, the author has both an internal dialogue in internal speech and internal dialogue in external speech. According to the views of the ancient Egyptians on human nature, its essences are naming (Ren), body (Sah), shadow (Shuyet), heart (Ib), spirit (Akh), soul (Ba) and double (Ka). In such a case, understanding the vision of these personal constructs corresponds to the position of M. Bakhtin, who analyzed the author's consciousness not as a form of one "Self", but as the interaction of many consciousnesses. Not the coexistence of images of many people in the light of one consciousness, but emphasizing their adequacy and equality, it is consistent with the modern studies of Meijers and Hermans:

The composite concept 'dialogical self' transcends this dichotomy by bringing the external to the internal and, in reverse, transporting the internal to the external. This allows people to study the self as a society of 'I-positions' and, on the other hand, to consider society as populated, stimulated, and renewed by the selves of its individual participants. In this way, the Theory abandons any self-society dualism and any conception that regards the self as essentialized and encapsulated in and of itself.

(Meijers, & Hermans, 2017, p. 7)

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Since internal dialogues differ with respect to whom the person is addressing, intrapersonal communication can be combined into two groups: dialogue with oneself and introject of another person. In our opinion, conversations with Ba and Ka correspond to them, on which we will focus on.

Let us consider the first type of dialogue, which manifests an awareness of oneself and their own boundaries and life in general. Ba is an internal interlocutor who can be seen as the embodiment of the contradiction that exists within the thinking person (Bolshakov, 2001). As a representative of the plan of God that is associated with a man, he cares about his afterlife rather than his earthly life (Spirina, 2006, p. 140). As conscience, intellectual ability (Hays, 2015, p. 77). Or as an entity, a component of the living, separated by death and depicted as a falcon with a human head (Endel, 2001). As a state available after death, which a Wiseman can cause while he is still alive, if he encounters a difficult situation to solve (Chobanov, 2015, p. 92). As an inner force that manifests itself in states of altered consciousness under the influence of illness, stress, or alcohol (Žabkar, 1968, p. 118). Ba is that integral human individuality, the inner invisible characteristic, which can be described only in words but is not characterized by images. Even more, words create the world of Ba, but not describe, because the essentially non-pictorial Ba belongs to transcendental otherness (Bolshakov, 2001, p. 152). J. Assmann (1998) connects the meaning of the Egyptian word "Ba" with "manifestation" (for example, the concept of God), emphasizing that it is exclusively and unambiguously connected with the paradigm of manifestation of latent force that animates (p. 138).

Thus, Ba is intrinsically connected with a man but is not a man himself. This is the existential Self, which determines the awareness of the meaning and significance of being in extreme life situations, therefore it may have a different opinion that is different from everyday one. In line with the visions of ancient Egyptians, he (Ba) remains in the burial chamber after man's death and at the same time has the opportunity to move freely during the day. Interestingly, in the internal dispute Ba proclaims statements that do not correspond to the generally accepted canons of that time in the vision of death and immortality. He expresses his own views, the thoughts of a man himself, who sees changes for the worse in the world. For example, Ba is convinced that a person's name remains after death regardless of the funeral ritual, so it is necessary to enjoy life and get rid of constant worries. On the contrary, a person believes that without proper burial his name will be lost, and the only thing he wants now is death (Vittori, 2018, p. 183). This allows some researchers to interpret human words attesting to suicidal thoughts.

However, in this case, such an understanding is not so unambiguous and convincing, because we can assume that there is a context of illness, or approaching death, which is the ultimate situation in human life. Based on the found fragments of the beginning in the text, it can be understood that we are talking about a Wiseman named Hetty (Spirina, 2006, p. 138). The text notes that this man is recovering from a serious illness, but still lying exhausted by injustice and experiencing grief from the loss of his wife and property. He is surrounded by listeners, including a woman named Anhet (Escolano-Poveda, 2017, p. 36). That is, in this way we get a framework for a confirmed internal dialogue in external speech. This, pursuant to the theological principles of dialogism and trinitarianism, emphasizes that "the confirmation of the dialogue is considered no less important than its continuation, consistent with the asymmetry of intra-trinity communication from the standpoint of ontological positioning of Persons" (Ishchuk, 2018, p. 142). Anhet is the third person to witness Hetty's dialogue with his Ba. This

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creates a situation of triple reflection when the object of meta-cognition is the process of cognition of self-knowledge.

In the mystical meeting of a man and his Ba B. Ouellet (2004, p. vi) sees ontophany, a manifestation of a holistic "Self". Action and change of styles within one text indicate the dynamics of changes in the internal state from the delirium of existential crisis to self-integration. This contributes to the daily practice of piety both in the joys of life and after it. Therefore, a wise person, thinking about the future amenities that will be used by his Ba after death, strengthens them when alive (Žabkar, 1968, p. 118).

Y. Chobanov makes another hypothesis, emphasizing that this dialogue is conducted by a Wiseman who is aware of the social crisis but is not in a state of despair or on the verge of suicide. He suffers because he fears that his life is deviating, "distracted" from the principle of Maat (world order, truth, harmony, ethical norms). Such thoughts about death can deprive him of a favorable fate in the afterlife, because of this he will meet there again with death (Chobanov, 2015, p. 91). Due to the lack of social order, evil enters the world of people without hindrance, filling it: "Brothers are malicious. We, though friends, despise each other", "Loose hearts", "Well neglected. Rage has captured everyone", "We reconciled with evil. Good is neglected everywhere", "In despair a man because of evil is unkind. But everyone is only laughed at by terrible villainies" and others. Accordingly, until a person gets rid of it, Ba will "distract" him. Therefore, it is necessary to find a way out of the vicious circle. For the disappointed, it is a variant of confession, an attempt to acknowledge, name the problem and cleanse oneself of it by turning inward, through internal dialogue with one's Ba. He must take on the pain and overcome the evil.

This aim of internal dialogue reminds P. Feyerabend's ideas about the anarchist theory of cognition. Conforming to it, the ancient Egyptian Wiseman from a new angle is looking for the structure in the social chaos of the crisis transition period, which he observes. He is that genius who, thanks to temporary solitude, inner dialogue, can see the structure where others see uncertainty and then convey its vision to other people in the text. It is precisely such a dialogue between the genius and his Ba that avoids the one-sidedness and limitation caused by feelings and what is already known, i.e. cognitive prejudices. In this context, the words of a person who expresses the despair of losing internal dialogue become clear: "It is stronger than me now. My Ba does not speak to me. It's so hard that it reminds me of someone's disdain". In M. Bakhtin's opinion, the main reason for a person's loss of himself is self-closure, separation from others. This is what happens when the bonds between the consciousness of Me and You are broken. That is, the whole content of consciousness is dialogized since internal experiences are formed in the process of "meeting" with another. This may be also related to the second group of internal dialogues, which also help to realize being, oneself, own boundaries and boundaries of the other.

The second type of conversation is an internal dialogue with an imaginary interlocutor who is different from ourselves, that is, with the image of another person. In our opinion, it can be correlated with a conversation with Ka, which is missing in the text "The Dispute of a Man with His Ba", but which is mentioned in other ancient Egyptian texts. Ka, like another interlocutor, allows a person to construct an image of another person even when he is absent, and to have an mental dialogue with him. He is a double of man, his image, which is thought by others. When someone pictured the image of another or saw it in a dream, he saw this with the inner vision of the real existing Ka of that person. After the man's death Ka does not disappear, so memories of the deceased and imaginary communication with him remain possible for a long time. Ka doesn't

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die while a man is remembering. To stop the time of oblivion, the ancient Egyptians mummified bodies, made their images and illustrations in the form of pictures of future life. Everyone who remembered the deceased became involved in the sacred ritual.

A. Bolshakov's book "Man and His Double" (2001) is a work in which the existing views on Ka were systematized and the common in the vision of the most respected researchers was highlighted. The above analysis provides a theoretical basis for understanding the features of internal dialogues with the introject of another. Thus, Ka is seen not as a part of a man, but as a common thing that combines the personalized "life force" of V. Christens and A. Herman, the "genius" of Steindorf, the "double" of G. Maspero and the "individuality" of A. Wiedemann. This is the holistic image of a person with his features that appear before our eyes when we remember him, looking at the portrait. The World-Double is "created" by images, but not localized in the room where they are placed. Drawings served as a stimulus to recollection, which the ancient Egyptians interpreted as "reviving" the memory of a person, as a perception of a real existing object of the external world that is in front of the eyes. It is related to the person but is not him. This is his Double.

However, the inner dispute with Ka of another person may be different. First, we can distinguish between the dialogue and metalogue from Ka: the dialogue in understanding the distribution of logos, and metalogue as a conversation with an imaginary person in order to express their own judgments and search causes and aims of the event, which is understood from the meta position. Secondly, one should distinguish between the dialogue with Ka, whom a person perceives as his own Double, and Ka as an Interlocutor. At self-absorption, the person will induce Ka of another man only with his own reflection, and at the attitude to the interlocutor, there is an exit in his life, constant work over himself for his sake.

If the first known artifact of the recorded philosophical metalogue is the self-reflection of the "disappointed" Hetty, the other known philosophical dialogues date back to what K. Jaspers called "Axial". This is one and a half thousand years closer to our time. Thus, the Book of Ecclesiastes also has the character of a dialogue with the interlocutor, which can be both "internal" and "external". Some of its fragments are based on the principle of quotations when the answer is given to well-known at that time ideas and do not require reference to the author. This book also contains contradictions in judgments, particularly on the subject of death.

Another, perhaps the most famous author of dialogues and the maieutic method of conversation, which helps in the birth of truth, is the ancient Greek philosopher Socrates. According to the disciples, he was accompanied since childhood by daemon – a certain embodiment of the true objective divine reality in the inner world of a man. This daemon, as the inner voice of conscience, helped him to understand complex moral and ethical situations by determining what should be avoided or what should be abandoned (this makes him partially similar to Ba).

That is, our ideas of the ancient Egyptians about human nature, the conversation of the Wiseman with his own Ba, only Gods had him according to the earlier ideas, analysis of the confirmed internal dialogue "disappointed" in external speech allows us to state that myths were already being transformed at that time, their symbolism and understanding at greater depths. This corresponds to the signs of Axial Age defined by K. Jaspers but does not coincide with its framework. The self-reflection of the "Disappointed" demonstrates the blurring of the traditional principles of life, to his anxiety about the contradictions and antinomies that arise in the process of this transition. This deep concern is conveyed in the text by a person who is not introverted,

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but who is not sure that he knows and understands himself, and therefore opens to the new and can understand what no one has questioned before, that is, to feel being, although not completely, as the question remains (Jaspers, 1994, p. 34). This is the beginning of philosophical thinking, the search for truth, seeking support within oneself, which, in the end, indicates the birth of a developed personality.

Originality

The analysis from the standpoint of philosophical anthropology in the text "The Dispute of a Man with His Ba" showed the possibility to consider it not only in the context of internal dialogue but also as a confirmed internal dialogue, which is manifested in external speech. Comparing the mythical thinking of a man in his unity with others and the philosophical thinking of the dialogical Self, the authors conclude that a distinction should be made between internal dialogues with oneself and with other people's introjects, which can be either Double or Interlocutor. It is found that internal dialogues in old times played an important role both in structuring social chaos and in overcoming personal crisis states (from existential to clinical states of altered consciousness). Exactly from such self-reflection that philosophy grows as a certain discourse and a new type of thinking.

Conclusions

The obtained results demonstrate the existence of self-reflection at the early stages of human development and, accordingly, the philosophical understanding of human existence and the realization of its search for salvation and freedom in boundary situations. It is necessary to recognize the authentic vision of dialogic Self by the ancient Egyptians, their use of the method of dialogue to overcome crisis states, structuring the situation perceived as chaos, and searching for a new vision of the world. This allows us to conclude that in the XXII-XXI centuries BC a philosophical discourse appears and the shift in human development, which K. Jaspers described as the period of "Axial Age". But in contrast to its dating to the period of "Axial Age", we must state the earlier transition of mankind to a new phase of development.

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ФІЛОСОФСЬКИЙ АНАЛІЗ САМОРЕФЛЕКСІЇ ЛЮДИНИ В КОНТЕКСТІ ЇЇ ВНУТРІШНЬОГО ДІАЛОГУ (НА ПРИКЛАДІ "РОЗМОВИ РОЗЧАРОВАНОГО ЗІ СВОЇМ БА")

Мета. Дослідження спрямовано на осмислення саморефлексії крізь аналіз особливостей внутрішнього діалогу в давніх текстах (XXII-XXI ст. до н. е.) з метою вияву ознак міфологічного і філософського мислення людини. **Теоретичним базисом** роботи є розгляд саморефлексії людини в контексті її внутрішнього діалогу, крізь який проявляється власне людське буття, її суб'єктивно-творче осмислення світу. В цьому ментальному просторі відбувається творення нових смислів та поділення ними з іншими людьми, зокрема, в кризові періоди особистісного і соціального життя. Відтак давньоєгипетське бачення природи людини, її свідомостей та діалогічності Я розглядається крізь призму сучасних філософських концепцій та як підґрунтя виникнення власне філософського світогляду. **Наукова новизна.** Аналіз з позиції філософської антропології тексту "Розмова розчарованого зі своїм Ба" засвідчив можливість розглянути його не лише в контексті внутрішнього діалогу, а і як підтверджений внутрішній діалог, що проявляється у зовнішньому мовленні. Зіставляючи міфічне мислення людини в її єдності з іншими та філософське мислення діалогічного Я, автори доходять висновку, що слід розрізняти внутрішні діалоги із самим собою та з інтродуктами інших людей, які можуть бути або Двійником, або Співрозмовником. Виявлено, що внутрішні діалоги вже в давні часи виконували важливу роль як у структуруванні соціального хаосу, так і в подоланні особистісних кризових станів (від екзистенційних до клінічних станів зміненої свідомості). Саме з такої саморефлексії виростає філософія як певний дискурс і новий тип мислення. **Висновки.** Проведений аналіз тексту "Розмови розчарованого зі своїм Ба" свідчить про появу філософського дискурсу в XXII-XXI ст. до н. е., на підставі чого можна зробити висновок про більш ранній, порівняно з визначенням К. Ясперсом, перехід людства від когнітивної революції до нової фази розвитку.

Ключові слова: саморефлексія; внутрішній діалог; філософський тип мислення; "осьовий час"; кризові стани; Ба; Співрозмовник; діалогічне Я

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ФИЛОСОФСКИЙ АНАЛИЗ САМОРЕФЛЕКСИИ ЧЕЛОВЕКА В КОНТЕКСТЕ ЕГО ВНУТРЕННЕГО ДИАЛОГА (НА ПРИМЕРЕ "РАЗГОВОРА РАЗОЧАРОВАННОГО СО СВОИМ БА")

Цель. Исследование направлено на рассмотрение саморефлексии через анализ особенностей внутреннего диалога в древних текстах (XXII-XXI ст. до н. э.) с целью выявления признаков мифологического и философского мышления человека. **Теоретическим базисом** работы есть рассмотрение саморефлексии человека в контексте его внутреннего диалога, через который проявляется собственно человеческое бытие, его субъективно-творческое осмысление мира. В этом поле происходит создание новых смыслов и их разделение с другими, в частности, в кризисные периоды личной и социальной жизни. Так, древнеегипетское видение природы человека, его сознаний и диалогичности Я рассматривается сквозь призму современных философских концепций и как основа возникновения собственно философского мировоззрения. **Научная новизна.** Анализ с позиции философской антропологии текста "Разговора разочарованного со своим Ба" свидетельствует о возможности рассматривать его не только в контексте внутреннего диалога, но и как подтверждённый внутренний диалог, который проявляется во внешней речи. Сопоставляя мифическое мышление человека в его единстве с другими и философское мышление диалогического Я, авторы приходят к выводу, что следует отличать внутренние диалоги с самим собой и с интродуктами других, которые могут быть или Двойником, или Собеседником. Виявлено, что внутренние диалоги уже в древние времена выполняли важную роль как в структурировании социального хаоса, так и в преодолении личностных кризисных

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состояний (от экзистенциальных до клинических состояний изменённого сознания). Именно из такой саморефлексии вырастает философия как определённый дискурс и новый тип мышления. **Выводы.** Проведённый анализ текста "Разговора разочарованного со своим Ба" свидетельствует о появлении философского дискурса в XXII-XXI в. до н. э., что является более ранним, по сравнению с определённым К. Ясперсом, переходом человечества от когнитивной революции к новой фазе развития.

Ключевые слова: саморефлексия; внутренний диалог; философский тип мышления; "осевое время"; кризисные состояния; Ба; Собеседник; диалогическое Я

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UDC 141.3V. Y. POPOV^{1*}, E. V. POPOVA^{2*}^{1*}Vasyl' Stus Donetsk National University (Vinnytsia, Ukraine), e-mail popovmak@ukr.net, ORCID 0000-0003-3097-7974^{2*}Vinnytsia Mykhailo Kotsiubynskyi State Pedagogical University (Vinnytsia, Ukraine), e-mail popovaelena2667@gmail.com, ORCID 0000-0002-0157-4642**THE CONCEPT "SINN DES LEBENS" IN PHILOSOPHY AND PSYCHOLOGY**

Purpose. The paper considered the explication of the concept of "Sinn des Lebens" within the framework of Western philosophy and psychology of the XIX-XXI centuries. On the basis of this, the role of this concept in contemporary theoretical discussions and psychological and psychotherapeutic practices is understood. **Theoretical basis.** The authors believe that understanding the concept of "Sinn des Lebens" is possible only based on the synthesis of modern analytical philosophy methods with the methodological guidelines of modern psychology, in particular logotherapy. **Originality.** The authors have proved that the problem of "meaning of life" is not an "eternal problem" of philosophy, but arises only in the early nineteenth century as a reflection on European secularization and widespread individualistic values and becomes extremely relevant gaining different interpretations at the beginning of the twentieth century based on the crisis of the sensory values of modern man. **Conclusions.** The concept of "Sinn des Lebens" originated in the philosophy of the German Romantics and gained philosophical significance only in the works by Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. Russian philosophy and literature (especially L. Tolstoy) give priority to the meaning of life in ethical and anthropological studies, focusing on its religious intentions. Analytical philosophy and existentialism appear to be diametrically opposed to the life-purpose anthropological problems, but they attempt to solve this problem by understanding the absurdity of human existence and language from different angles of view. The most reasonable concept of meaning in psychology can be considered Frankl's logotherapy, which, despite certain drawbacks, remains the most significant in modern Western psychology. Modern philosophical studies on the problems of the meaning of life, despite their prudent analyticity and systematic nature, have not found credible criteria and means of human life self-reflection yet and have further incentives to develop their methodological and philosophical considerations. However, the diversity of interpretations of the concept of "meaning of life" that exists in modern scientific literature needs further reflection.

Keywords: Sinn des Lebens; meaning of life; significance; meaninglessness; analytical philosophy; existentialism; absurdity; psychoanalysis; logotherapy; existential frustration; supernaturalism; naturalism; nihilism

Introduction

One of the most important and fundamental problems of philosophy is the problem of understanding the meaning of life. Its formulation and definite solutions are sought in the book of Ecclesiastes and Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, and in the ancient Egyptian "Songs of the Harpist" and "Confessions" by Augustine Aurelius. Meanwhile, the very expression "meaning of life (Sinn des Lebens)" appeared relatively recently: only in the middle of the nineteenth century, and gained its popularity only in the last century, and it would be futile work to search for it in ancient manuscripts.

The emergence of the philosophical and later psychological reflection of the "meaning of life" is associated with the loss of that meaning by people in life itself. According to modern Ukrainian scientists O. Bazaluk and T. Blazhevych (2015), at the beginning of the XXI century there was a fundamentally new understanding of the essence of man. But the past twentieth century, with its radical individualization and increasing human role on the one hand and the anti-human practice of wars, concentration camps and systematic human rights violations by totalitarian regimes on the other, contributed to the actualization of the meaning of human life. At the begin-

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ning of the 21st century we have a mass influx of philosophical, psychological, religious and paranoid popular literature on this subject in all countries of the world. Recent publications include M. Morioka (2015), P. Watson (2014), T. Eagleton and T. Metz (2013, 2019). At the same time, a rather contradictory situation has arisen about the problem itself: some researchers consider it a pseudoproblem and ironically refer to it as a topic "for crazy people or comedians", while others emphasize that it is the most fundamental problem of philosophy and psychology. Ukrainian researcher L. Safonik (2016), believes that "reflections on the meaning of life are fundamental in the creative inheritance of most thinkers of the past and present". We would rather share the opinion of another domestic researcher, Elvira Chukhray (2015), who thinks that the "problem of the 'meaning of life'... is not an 'eternal' problem, but solely the generation of the post-Enlightenment era". However, in her article, this opinion is not sufficiently substantiated, fragmented and unfortunately not widely spread among the Ukrainian philosophical community.

Purpose

The paper considered the explication of the concept of "Sinn des Lebens" within the framework of Western philosophy and psychology of XIX-XXI centuries. On the basis of this, the role of this concept in contemporary theoretical discussions and psychological and psychotherapeutic practices is understood.

Statement of basic materials

The meaning of life was considered a pseudo-problem in traditional and Christian anthropological thought. Aristotle and Epicurus, Thomas Aquinas and Baruch Spinoza wrote about "the purpose of life", "the good life", "living in unity with God", "living in harmony with nature", etc. Augustus' "sensus vitae laudare Dei" prevailed in it, despite deep reflections and existential anguish (Michel Montaigne, Blaise Pascal and others).

For the first time, the term "meaning of life (Sinn des Lebens)" was introduced at the end of the eighteenth century by the German romantics Novalis and Friedrich Schlegel. Romanticism, trying to grasp the mysteries of life on the basis of mystical sensory experiences, calls for a return to the immediate naturalness of sensuality, an appeal to poetry, which should become the voice of the universal, its divine mystery and immersion. They contrast the everyday "phenomenon of life" with its deep "sense" and "spirit". Based on this contrast, F. Schlegel (2014) writes, in particular, about the "meaning and orientation of inner life". However, the romance concept of "meaning of life" does not acquire conceptual definition, but has the character of intellectual artistic intuition.

It acquires a greater conceptual load from Arthur Schopenhauer, who speaks directly of the "meaning and purpose of life" (der Sinn und Zweck des Lebens). Unlike romantics who have sought to find a deep-seated "meaning of life", it offers a more radical concept of peace and life that is devoid of any meaning. Schopenhauer, in his main work, *The World as Will and Imagination* (Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung), however, in the second volume, published in 1844, speaks of a "sense of life" that has not an intellectual but mostly a moral dimension. In particular, he writes:

Erwägen wir, nach außen blickend, daß ho bios brachys, hê de technê mak-

ra (vita brevis, ars longa), und betrachten, wie die größten und schönsten

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Geister, oft wann sie kaum den Gipfel ihrer Leistungsfähigkeit erreicht haben, imgleichen große Gelehrte, wann sie eben erst zu einer gründlichen Einsicht ihrer Wissenschaft gelangt sind, vom Tode hinweggerafft werden; so bestätigt uns auch Dieses, daß der Sinn und Zweck des Lebens kein intellektueller, sonderneinmoralischer ist. (Schopenhauer, 2009)

But Schopenhauer's use of the concept of "meaning of life" was rather episodic, although his sensological reflections on life had a great influence on F. Nietzsche, as the latter has repeatedly mentioned in his earlier works.

The meaning of life as a problem is gaining momentum in the context of the emergence of the latest European anthropology, related primarily to S. Kierkegaard's pre-existentialism and Nietzsche's philosophy. In one of his first works, "Enten-eller (Either/Or)" (1843), Kierkegaard probably proclaims the meaninglessness of human life for the first time in European philosophy and raises the problem of its meaning. In particular, he makes the following statement:

What is the meaning of life? – People, in fact, can be divided into two classes: those who work in order to live and those who do not need to. But not in the work of the first-class people the meaning of life! Assuming this, a colossal contradiction will emerge: the constant extraction of conditions will answer the question of the meaning of what is stipulated by it! The life of another class, too, has no meaning other than consuming ready conditions. To say that the meaning of life in death is again a contradiction. (authors' transl.) (Kierkegaard, 1992)

The problem of the meaning of life was solved by Kierkegaard on the basis of a kind of Christian absurdity, incomprehensible and unacceptable to most contemporaries. It is true to note that during his short life, the Danish thinker was known except for a small circle of Copenhagen friends or opponents, his literary and philosophical works never found his admirers either at home or abroad. The first who really "made" Kierkegaard an outstanding thinker was Danish critic and writer Georg Brandes. Brandes wrote a separate monograph on Kierkegaard (1877) in which he calls his half-forgotten fellow countryman the greatest Scandinavian thinker. It is in his letter of 1888 that he specifically draws Nietzsche's attention to Kierkegaard's philosophy.

The Nietzschean "Gott starb: nun wollen wir – daß der Übermensch lebe" – has become the cornerstone of modern anthropology. It is in the context of the proclaimed "death of God" and the loss of confidence in the moral foundations that have prevailed in the European mind for

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more than one and a half millennia that the painful search for new "meanings" begins, including the lost meaning along with the secularization of the "meaning of life". Particularly acute problem "Sinn des Lebens" was posed by Nietzsche in the infamous work "The Anti-Christ" (1888). In accusing the Apostle Paul of misinterpreting the "good news" of Christ, he writes that the Apostle, by his faith in the immortality of the soul and by giving values only to the other, distorted the sense of true life. When the meaning of life is seen not in life itself, – the thinker noted, – but in the "otherworldly", in the void, it means that life is deprived of any meaning at all. He believed that Paul, with the "logical cynicism of the rabbi", led him to embody the idea: "To live in this way, so that there is no point to life any more, this now becomes the 'meaning' of life..." (Nietzsche, 1999).

Indeed, the conceptualization of this concept is not related to Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, but to the academic "philosophy of life" of Wilhelm Dilthey. He makes the "Leben" category the central category of his philosophy. He regards Leben as an interaction of living beings, localized in the spatial-temporal organization of processes. In them, the interconnection of life processes can be grasped only by the category of "value", namely the value of the individual components of life for understanding the whole, in the same way that any stage in human life becomes understandable only when its dependence on everyone else is understood. Value (Bedeutung) is an all-encompassing category that embraces life and its meaning. Dilthey argues that understanding the whole meaning of life arises from the meaning of individual events in the process of life. That is, the meaning of life according to Dilthey is the totality of the meanings that we attach to individual experiences, giving them a common meaning (Sinn). Dilthey (1954) writes: "And just as words are linked in a sentence to understand them, this is how the meaning of life emerges from the interplay of experiences". Yet, in the philosophy of Dilthey we do not find a clear distinction between the concepts of "meaning (Sinn)" and "meaning (Bedeutung)", which are sometimes correlated as a whole and a part, sometimes considered synonymous.

The problem of the meaning of life, which is formulated in the German philosophical tradition, as well as in the Russian one, largely derived from it, acquires a kind of literary and philosophical embodiment. In a pointed form, it was first put by its great Russian writer Lev Tolstoy in his anti-Church Confession (1879–1880, published in 1884). Carefully searching for the meaning of life, the great thinker, together with Schopenhauer, comes to the thought of the absence of any meaning in a person who knows about his mortality and identifies four ways out of this situation (the path of seeming ignorance, epicureanism, strength and energy and "weakness"). But it was the fourth time that Tolstoy opened up the possibility of overcoming sensory loss. He finds this meaning in faith: and he writes: "Looking around on the whole of mankind I saw that people live and declare that they know the meaning of life. I looked at myself – I had lived as long as I knew a meaning of life. To other people, to me, the meaning of life and the possibility of life was given to me by faith" Tolstoy (1983) criticizes the Russian Orthodox Church for its wickedness and servility to the imperial power. His faith is based on a new understanding of the Gospel, non-violence and love for all people. It is this kind of faith that can give meaning to life for the modern man. However, as Tolstoy argued, "the essence of every faith consists in its giving life a meaning which death does not destroy".

The preaching of Leo Tolstoy provoked a rapid and ambiguous reaction in the Russian cultural and intellectual society of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and drew attention to the problem of the meaning of life in Russian philosophy. In particular, from religious and philosophical positions, Vladimir Solovyov ("The Justification of the Good", 1897), Evgenii

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Troubetzkoy ("The Meaning of Life", 1918) and Semyon Frank ("The Meaning of Life", 1925) try to solve it. Particularly interesting is the latest work written by Frank in the context of emigration based on an understanding of the tragic experience of the revolution and the civil war in Russia. On the basis of the bitter lessons of the beginning of the Bolshevik experiment, he strongly opposes the identification of the "meaning of life" for the purpose of life, especially such as the worship to some higher ideal. According to Frank, it is meaningless to have a life devoted to future generations or a certain idea. The meaning of a person's life, "found through joint participation in a great common cause that should save the world, is unfounded", he writes (authors' transl.) (Frank, 1994). Moreover, a person who aims to change the world profoundly takes possession of sinful pride, a person ready for the purpose of realizing "good" intentions to destroy the world. The true meaning of life, the Russian religious philosopher sees in believing in God and love for man, and the condition to acquire it – in "inner religious activity, struggle with oneself" (Frank, 1994).

Russian philosophical thought also had a profound effect on 20th-century European philosophy. In particular, it is known that the recognized classic of analytical philosophy Ludwig Wittgenstein admired the teachings of L. Tolstoy. He once wrote in his diary: «"Confession" (*referring to the work of Tolstoy – V. P. & E. P.*) must be part of your new life». Indeed, Wittgenstein in his Blue Book pays much attention to Tolstoy's reasoning for finding the meaning of life. Based on his previous statements in the Logico-Philosophical Treatise ("The solution of the problem of life is seen in the vanishing of the problem"), he considers these searches hopeless, but they cannot be ignored. In her latest post-mortem work, Wittgenstein goes further and argues that the meaning of a word depends on the context, that is, its use in language. The meaning of life, therefore, is in life itself, that is, it lives in the heart of life itself. However, towards the end of his life, he leans into the theological version and writes in his diaries "The meaning of life, i.e. the meaning of the world, we can call God" and "To believe in God means to see that life has a meaning" (Wittgenstein, 1960).

However, not all analysts who consider themselves to be followers of Wittgenstein share these views. Moreover, his teachers and associates, the founders of this philosophical tradition, Bertrand Russell and George Moore did not share his religious beliefs, inclining to agnosticism. The problem of the meaning of life has almost disappeared from the columns of analytical journals and monographs until the very end of the last century. For Willard Quine, John Austin, or John Sori, the very question is meaningless. It is only in the late 1990s that analytic philosophy is experiencing a real renaissance of this problem, which we will analyse below.

Over the course of almost a hundred years of suppression of the life meaning problem in English philosophy, it has become the object of much speculation by existentialism, philosophical anthropology, psychoanalysis, and more. In particular, the existentialism with the mouth of one of its classics, Albert Camus, declared it the main problem of philosophy. His work *The Myth of Sisyphus* begins with the words: "There is but one truly serious philosophical problem, and that is suicide. Judging whether life is or is not worth living amounts to answering the fundamental question of philosophy" (Camus, 1955). The question of "sens de la vie" becomes a kind of signature of French existential philosophy.

In the article "A Century of Fear" for his magazine "Combat" Albert Camus (2006) with the beginning of the Cold War in 1948 wrote that "The seventeenth century was the century of mathematics, the eighteenth that of the physical sciences, and the nineteenth that of biology. Our twentieth century is the century of fear". Indeed, the twentieth century was not only a time of

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great scientific and technical achievements, the acquisition of some prosperity in most countries, but also of two world wars, the domination of totalitarian regimes, repression and concentration camps. To overcome fears of the average person (as well as to successfully manipulate the "masses") the most popular science is psychology. That is, the twentieth century, by analogy with Camus, can be called a century of psychology. And the "eternal" problem of philosophy on the meaning of human life quite rightly goes to the psychological nomenclature.

Although at the dawn of its development, in the early psychoanalysis of the positivist-minded Sigmund Freud, it had rather a skeptical evaluation. In one of his letters to his student Princess Marie Bonaparte, he wrote: "... when one constantly thinks of the meaning of life, he is ill. Philosophy about the meaning of life is only a favorable form of sublimation" (authors' transl.) (Freud, 2000). In a treatise by "Das Unbehagen in der Kultur (Civilization and Its Discontents)", published in 1930, the patriarch of psychoanalysis tries to solve (more precisely, eliminate) this problem more academically and diligently. In particular, he writes: "Once again, only religion can answer the question of the purpose of life. One can hardly be wrong in concluding that the idea of life having a meaning stands and falls with the religious system..." (Freud, 2002).

Thus, like the philosopher-analysts, Freud simply eliminates the problem of the meaning (purpose) of life from consideration, as it simply does not make sense outside of religious beliefs, he tries to replace it with the problem of the purpose of life that ordinary people pose to themselves, the question what they demand from life and what they want to achieve in it. Freud's answer is entirely in the spirit of utilitarianism by Jeremy Bentham, who is known to have believed that man is governed by two rulers: pleasure and pain. Freud believed that most people strive after happiness in their life, which "aims, on the one hand, at an absence of pain and displeasure, and, on the other, at the experiencing of strong feelings of pleasure". In the narrow sense, happiness is the maximum pleasure.

Thus, the views of classical psychoanalysis on the problem of the meaning of life had nothing fundamentally new and were fully embedded in its causal scheme of determination of the human psyche. An alternative to these views was the ideas of Alfred Adler, the founder of the Second Vienna Psychoanalytic School. In his later (1929-1934) work, he puts forward his conception of the meaning of life, the basis of which is already a teleological model of human behavior. ("The psychic life of man is determined by his goal"). A special place in the development of this issue is the book "Der Sinn des Lebens (The Meaning of Life)", written in the United States, but published before pre-Anschluss Austria in 1933. It can be seen as a kind of answer in the polemics with Freud.

Adler distinguishes between the individual meaning of life and that which is recognized by the community (Sinne des Gemeinschaftsgefühls verlangt). The individual meaning of life is the key to understanding the whole personality. A. Adler connects the individual meaning or opinion (Meinung) with the individual solution to three global problems: work, friendship, and love, and what solution to them a person finds. At the same time, he believed that each person finds his or her own solution to these problems, and therefore his or her own unique meaning of life. At the same time, recognizing the uniqueness of the meanings of the lives of individuals and the right to exist for everyone, he believes that not all of them are true or genuine. The psychological criterion of "truthfulness" is their generality for a particular community (Gemeinschaft). On the contrary, deviant persons have only limited meanings that lock themselves into them. Adler (1973) writes: "Meaning is only possible in communication: a word which meant something to one per-

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son only would really be meaningless. It is the same with our aims and actions; their only meaning is their meaning for others. (Gemeinschaft)".

Adler's dynamic-teleological approach to the problem of the meaning of life is in line with the tradition of natural-science evolutionist thinking. He regards the sense of community as innate, and the ideal brotherhood of all mankind is "the ultimate result of evolution" (Adler, 1973). Unlike logotherapy (which we will look at later), Adler understanding is focused primarily on the social embodiment of meaning, on the pragmatic value of "mental health", which is limited to practical life goals and does not take into account the fundamental orientation of the meanings of human self-esteem. According to Adler, the person primarily strives for the main goal – perfection. Overcoming an innate sense of inferiority, they create the meaning of life.

Adler's understanding of religion is associated with the "concretization of the idea of perfection", that is, God is not really existing, He is only the idea, the supreme and most perfect idea of humanity. As an idea of perfection, God responds to man's innate desire for perfection and his deep yearning for it, and leads man to this cherished purpose. The utopian goal of achieving a "sense of community" has messianic features: "There is every reason to expect that after a long time, humanity will go to a new level, and the power of a sense of community will overcome all external obstacles. Then it will also be easy for a person to express his sense of community as well as to breathe" (authors' transl.) (Adler, 1973).

Adler did not live to see the Holocaust, especially since he had already lived in the United States in 1926, so he did not have to see the utopia of his own ideas about the common sense of life for all mankind. As for Victor Frankl, the founder of logotherapy (the so-called Third Vienna Psychoanalytic School), he had to suffer his idea of the meaning of life in the terrible physical and psychological conditions of the Third Reich death camps.

It is in concentration camp situations where all the personalities were unmasked and all the dangerous and meaningless boldly acted in their sinister and inexorable disclosure, people for the most part turn into half-dead machines that lose any desire except purely physiological ones. Only the desire to pursue a goal that would make sense of their existence helped the prisoners survive.

In his most famous book, "... trotzdem Ja zum Leben sagen: Ein Psychologe erlebt das Konzentrationslager (Yes to Life in Spite of Everything: a psychologist's experiences of the concentration camp)" Frankl describes his experience of being in inhumane conditions of existence. The second part of the book sets out the basics of his teaching, later called logotherapy. According to a Viennese scientist, the former prisoner of Auschwitz, Dachau and Teresenstadt, the driving force behind all human existence, his motivation and purpose, is to search for some meaning of life, as well as its further realization.

Later in his rather brief but conceptual work, "The Will to Meaning", Frankl (1962) proclaims his famous formula: "The loss of the meaning of life is a major problem in modern society, all other problems are merely derivatives of it" (authors' transl.). This loss is the main cause of the development of depression, alcoholism, drug addiction and increased aggression both in the individual and in society as a whole. He calls it an "existential vacuum" and aims to overcome it.

Frankl believed that the center of personality is a person's innate motivation to find the meaning of his life. Even when a person commits suicide, they believe in the meaning, if not of life, of death. It is the life, not a man, that raises the question of its own meaning. Making some sense is a definite imperative that needs to be realized. The psychologist asserts the plurality of senses of

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existence: "Everyone has his own specific vocation or mission in life to carry out a concrete assignment which demands fulfillment. Therein he cannot be replaced, nor can his life be repeated. Thus, everyone's task is as unique as is his specific opportunity to implement it". Therefore, "man should not ask what the meaning of life is, but rather he must recognize that it is he who is asked" (Frankl, 1962).

Frankl's logotherapy techniques should help those who have become frustrated in their lives without having sustainable life priorities and beliefs. His followers have created treatment courses that are based on finding and giving patients a sense of their existence. The attitudes of logotherapists to religion are interesting. Logotherapy is in no way a religion, it can be practiced by psychologists of different beliefs. But logotherapy should respect patients' religious meanings. At the same time, it is necessary to differentiate between the functions of a doctor and a priest. "Although the purpose of psychotherapy is spiritual healing, religion is the salvation of the soul". Frankl, who was respectful of all religious traditions, was convinced that in the future, everyone would have their own religion based on their own dialogue with God.

Finally, Frankl, along with the notion of "meaning", introduces a new concept of "super-meaning". For Frankl, the super-meaning will be forever beyond our comprehension, since we are all mortal. He writes:

This ultimate meaning necessarily exceeds and surpasses the finite intellectual capacities of man; in logotherapy, we speak in this context of a super-meaning. What is demanded of man is not, as some existential philosophers teach, to endure the meaninglessness of life, but rather to bear his incapacity to grasp its unconditional meaningfulness in rational terms.

Logos is deeper than logic. (Frankl, 1962)

The idea that there is a "super -meaning" – the ultimate meaning of life – even if we cannot fully understand it, seems to allow us to assert that the meanings we find in our own lives are an actual part of reality and not a product our own ideas.

The Frankl's doctrine of the meaning of life can be considered the most influential in the humanistic direction of Western psychology. Along with logotherapy, it includes such popular schools as existential psychology (J. Bugental, R. May), personal psychology (G. Allport transpersonal psychology (later A. Maslow, S. Groff), client-centered therapy (K. Rogers) and many others. In almost all of these conceptual approaches, the problem of the meaning of life takes one of the leading places.

Sensitive issues remain the focus of contemporary logotherapy representatives, who are mostly associated with the Victor Frankl Logotherapy Institutes, located around the world, with their main location in Vienna. The Logotherapy community holds regular conferences and congresses, one of the latest was held in Moscow in August 2018. One of the most interesting was the speech of Professor Dr. Carl Becker from Japan. In it, he emphasized that

Victor Frankl's idea that the search for meaning for a person is a priority over sexual attraction or the desire for power, goes beyond the psychotherapeutic concepts of Freud and Adler. However, with superfluous simplification, such a search for meaning may fail to result in a prioritized focus on itself or grow in the event of raising one's self in nationalist / populist ideas to even more destructive prejudices. Victor warned of such dangers, but in our time of widespread consumerism/ populism/ nationalism, we must again pay tribute to values that lie beyond personal "psychological well-being". (Becker, 2018)

At the same time, the problem of the meaning of life at the end of the 20st – the beginning of the 21st centuries had already transcended humanistic psychology and again became the subject of controversy in various philosophical directions. Peter Watson (2014) in his book "The Age of Nothing. How We Have Sought to Live Since the Death of God" pointing to the actualization of this problem at the beginning of the new millennium, specifies ten English-language philosophical books published only in 2000-2010. They present different perspectives on this problem. Thus, the British neo-Marxist Terry Eagleton believes that the statement of the problem of the meaning of life has a number of other questions and therefore it is best to leave it alone, so as not to give a chance for religious-fundamentalist and mystical-occult interpretations of it. At the same time, the American philosopher Robert C. Solomon calls the "meaning of life" the big question, which is the most difficult to answer, the most relevant and at the same time the most unclear. Herewith, it can be rationally understood by the means of modern analytical philosophy.

South African philosopher Thaddeus Metz sums up the first results of the life purpose philosophical disputes. He wrote the article The Meaning of Life in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, a number of articles on the subject, and several monographs. In declaring his affiliation with the analytical philosophy, he first of all tries to find out the essence of the concept of "meaning of life". He distinguishes between meaning of life (MofL) and meaning in life (MinL). MofL is global or cosmic in scope and often intertwined with ideas such as God, transcendence, religion. MinL is focused on personal meaning; the meaning of our individual lives as situated in a web of human effort and relationships, human anxieties and problems. Metz believes that MofL and MinL are closely related, although "full of meaning", "meaningful", etc., is always just a "human person's life" for Metz.

He asks the question: "Is there a sense of life at all and what defines it?" Depending on the answer to it, all philosophical views are divided into naturalism, if the answer to the first question is affirmative and anti-naturalism (nihilism), if the answer is negative. In the first case, we ask the question about the basis of our answer or what determines the meaning of life. If the source is of a "supernatural" origin – Metz speaks of Supernaturalism with its two varieties:

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God-Centered Views or Soul-Centered Views. If it is created by humans, we can speak of Naturalism with its three varieties: objective naturalism, subjective naturalism and hybrid naturalism. In the first case, the meaning of life is universal, in the second it is purely personal, in the third it combines these two features. Metz proclaims himself an advocate of objective naturalism. His beliefs are based on the common sense of people who firmly believe in the existence of "meaning in life" even in the absence of any supernatural guarantors. It is on this belief in the "rational human nature" that the concept of the meaning of life is based as a source of meaning.

Metz's views have been criticized by representatives of various philosophical movements, especially by his critic, the Japanese thinker Masahiro Morioka, who believes that each person acquires his or her own meaning of life in life if it is lived honestly and sincerely. Questions about the "meaning of life" arise only when a person despairs of the purpose of his own existence and loses value in life. The Japanese thinker affirms the value of every life and human right to have his or her own meaning in life and proclaims the "a solipsistic and affirmation-based approach to meaning in life" (Morioka, 2015). In our opinion, this approach is in the highest degree in line with the principles of modern bioethics, which proclaims the value of human life as the higher value, the well-known Schweitzer's "reverence for life". Therefore the diversity of interpretations of the concept of "meaning of life", which exists in modern philosophy and psychology, needs further reflection.

Originality

The authors argue that the problem of "meaning of life" is not an "eternal problem" of philosophy, but arises only in the early nineteenth century as a reflection on European secularization and widespread individualistic values and becomes relevant gaining different interpretations at the beginning of the twentieth century based on the crisis of the sensory values of modern man.

Conclusions

1. The concept of "Sinn des Lebens" originated in the philosophy of the German Romantics and gained philosophical significance only in the works of Schopenhauer, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche.
2. Russian philosophy and literature (especially L. Tolstoy) give priority to the meaning of life in ethical and anthropological studies, focusing on its religious intentions.
3. Analytical philosophy and existentialism appear to be diametrically opposed to the meaning of life-anthropological problems, but they attempt to solve this problem by understanding the absurdity of human existence and language from different angles of view.
4. Frankl's logotherapy is the most reasonable concept of meaning in psychology, which, despite certain drawbacks, remains the most significant in modern Western psychology.
5. Modern philosophical studies on the problems of the meaning of life, despite their prudent analyticity and systematic nature, have not found credible criteria and means of human life self-reflection yet and have further incentives to develop their methodological and philosophical considerations.

However, the diversity of interpretations of the concept of "meaning of life" that exists in modern scientific literature needs further reflection.

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КОНЦЕПТ "SINN DES LEBENS" В ФІЛОСОФІЇ ТА ПСИХОЛОГІЇ

Мета. Головною метою статті є експлікація концепту "сенси життя" в межах західної філософії та психології XIX – початку XXI сторіччя. На підставі цього здійснюється осмислення ролі цього поняття в сучасних теоретичних дискусіях та психологічних та психотерапевтичних практиках. **Теоретичний базис.** Автори вважають, що розуміння концепту "Sinn des Lebens" можливо лише на основі синтезу методів сучасної аналітичної філософії з методологічними настановами сучасної психології, зокрема логотерапії. **Наукова новизна.** Авторами доведено, що, проблема "сенсу життя" не є "вічною проблемою" філософії, а виникає лише на початку XIX сторіччя як рефлексія на європейську секуляризацію та широке розповсюдження індивідуалістичних цінностей та набуває надзвичайної актуальності та різних інтерпретацій на початку XXI сторіччя на підставі кризи сенсожиттєвих цінностей сучасної людини. **Висновки.** Концепт "Sinn des Lebens" виникає в філософії німецьких романтиків та набуває філософської значущості лише в творах Шопенгауера, К'єркегора та Ніцше. Російська філософія та література (особливо Л. Толстой) надають проблемі сенсу життя пріоритетного значення в етико-антропологічних студіях, зосереджуючи увагу на її релігійних інтенціях. Аналітична філософія та екзистенціалізм видаються діаметрально протилежними позиціями щодо смисложиттєвих антропологічних проблем, проте вони намагаються вирішити цю проблему шляхом осмислення абсурдності людського існування та мови під різними кутами зору. Найбільш обґрунтованою концепцією сенсу в психології може вважатися логотерапія Франкла, яка, не зважаючи на певні вади, залишається найбільш вагомим і в сучасній західній психології. Сучасні філософські студії щодо проблем сенсу життя, незважаючи на вдавану аналітичність і систематичність, ще не знайшли надійних критеріїв та засобів людського життєвого самоосмислення й мають подальші стимули для розвитку своїх методологічних та світоглядних міркувань. Втім, розмаїття інтерпретацій концепту "сенси життя", яке існує в сучасній науковій літературі, потребує подальшого осмислення.

Ключові слова: Sinn des Lebens; сенси життя; значення; безсенсиовність; аналітична філософія; екзистенціалізм; абсурд; психоаналіз; логотерапія; екзистенційна фрустрація; супернатуралізм; натуралізм; нігілізм

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КОНЦЕПТ "SINN DES LEBENS" В ФИЛОСОФИИ И ПСИХОЛОГИИ

Цель. Главной целью статьи является экспликация концепта "смысл жизни" в рамках западной философии и психологии XIX – начала XXI века. На основании этого осуществляется осмысление роли этого понятия в современных теоретических дискуссиях и психологических и психотерапевтических практиках. **Теоретический базис.** Авторы считают, что понимание концепта "Sinn des Lebens" возможно только на основе синтеза методов современной аналитической философии с методологическими установками современной психологии, в частности логотерапии. **Научная новизна.** Авторами доказано, что проблема "смысла жизни" не является "вечной проблемой" философии, а возникает лишь в начале XIX века как рефлексия на европейскую секуляризацию и широкое распространение индивидуалистических ценностей и приобретает чрезвычайную актуальность и различные интерпретации в начале XXI века на основании кризиса смысло-жизненных ценностей современного человека. **Выводы.** Концепт "Sinn des Lebens" возникает в философии немецких романтиков и приобретает философскую значимость только в произведениях Шопенгауэра, Кьеркегора и Ницше. Русская философия и литература (особенно Л. Толстой) придают проблеме смысла жизни приоритетное значение в этико-антропологических исследованиях, сосредоточивая внимание на ее религиозных интенциях. Аналитическая философия и экзистенциализм выдаются диаметрально противоположными позициями по смысло-жизненным антропологическим проблемам, однако они пытаются решить эту проблему путем осмысления абсурдности человеческого существования и языка под разными углами зрения. Наиболее обоснованной концепцией смысла в психологии может считаться логотерапия Франкла, которая, несмотря на определенные недостатки, остается наиболее весомой и в современной западной психологии. Современные философские исследования по проблемам смысла жизни, несмотря на кажущуюся аналитичность и систематичность, еще не нашли надежных критериев и средств человеческого жизненного осмысления и имеют дальнейшие стимулы для развития своих методологических и мировоззренческих соображений. Впрочем, разнообразие интерпретаций концепта "смысл жизни", которое существует в современной научной литературе, требует дальнейшего осмысления.

Ключевые слова: Sinn des Lebens; смысл жизни; значение; бессмысленность; аналитическая философия; экзистенциализм; абсурд; психоанализ; логотерапия; экзистенциальная фрустрация; супернатурализм; натурализм; нигилизм

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O. V. MARCHENKO^{1*}, L. V. MARTSENIUK^{2*}^{1*}Dnipropetrovsk State University of Internal Affairs (Dnipro, Ukraine), e-mail Lina728@ukr.net, ORCID 0000-0002-2069-9942^{2*}Dnipro National University of Railway Transport named after Academician V. Lazaryan (Dnipro, Ukraine), e-mail rwinfrom1@ukr.net, ORCID 0000-0003-4121-8826**HUMAN DESTRUCTIVENESS IN THE EXISTING PRACTICES OF LATE MODERNISM VIOLENCE: POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE DIMENSIONS**

Purpose. Research of the phenomenon of human destructiveness in the context of metaphysical images and violence practices of late Modernism. **Theoretical basis.** The problem is that the philosophical reflection of violence as objectified, realized destructiveness of man is usually contextual in nature and is on the periphery of understanding its external manifestations. Accordingly, anthropological crisis remains behind the scenes, as evidenced by the devaluation of the humanistic potential of modern culture. That is why one should turn the focus from the obvious, objectively conditioned incarnations of violence in the XXI century (armed conflicts, local wars, terrorist acts) to the internal factors that are in the realm of existential. The departure from the consideration of violence as an abstract, faceless or ideologically colored evil allowed us to focus on man, his way of thinking, life and social orientations, feelings and internal contradictions, which find their expression in one or another form of destructiveness. **Originality.** Based on the works of M. Scheler and E. Fromm defining for philosophical anthropology and psychoanalysis, for the first time the conceptualization of positive and negative forms of manifestation of human destructiveness against the background of sociocultural transformations of late Modernism was carried out. It has been proved that its ontological principles are rooted in specifically human existence and relations with other members of society, while anthropological ones are directly connected with the endless struggle of the life, the vital with the spirit in man. **Conclusions.** Violence is a tool and a product of man's transition to more mature and complex forms of existence. The interdependence of the violence and nonviolence practices ensures the progressive movement of humanity towards society humanization. This progress is accompanied by a natural internal conflict of personality, which can be both progressive and regressive. At the metaphysical level, destructiveness appears as a connection between the entropy of world existence as a whole and the instability of human existence itself, which is a complexly organized and open to the world system. Self-transcendence as an anthropological prerequisite for human destructiveness has a dual nature and combines negative and positive characteristics, the content and significance of which were revealed in the study. The authors are convinced that there is no other way to overcome the negative, malignant destructiveness, except for the incessant, daily gathering of life meanings around them and their development. After all, the loss of such core structures of the existence as the meaning, purpose and value of life has become a truly global problem for the modern world. Emphasis is placed on the need to keep in harmony the trinity of body-soul-spirit, which will allow a person in any social transformation to preserve and increase his integrity.

Keywords: man; destructiveness; violence; era of late Modernism; self-transcendence

Introduction

Comprehension of violence as a phenomenon of human existence is inseparable from the knowledge of man himself. Changing only its form – from archaic incursion and sacrifices to high-tech wars and acts of terrorism – violence remains an inherent attribute of human existence. At the same time, in the scientific discourse related to the issue of violence as a social phenomenon, the image of a man mostly remains behind the scenes. It is giving way to more important political actors in terms of scale and degree of influence on the course of history. Philosophical thought and society as a whole, despite the passage of centuries, continue to search for a man like Diogenes. The question formulated by I. Kant in his time: "What is man?" as the key one for philosophy, in fact, informed humanity of the disappearance of the classical world and the beginning of the dehumanization era.

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If we analyze how modern philosophy characterizes modernity itself, the predominance of the pathos of anxiety, negativism, confusion or militant nihilism becomes obvious. Anthropological crisis, technicalization of thinking, crisis of legitimacy, uprising of masses, crisis of self-identity, existential vacuum – all these are signs inherent in humanity in the XXI century. The manifestation of the anthropological crisis is aggression, and the events of recent decades – terrorist acts, outbreaks of local armed conflicts and "color" revolutions – indicate a growing social tension in societies. This tendency is inherent in countries, regardless of territorial affiliation. The anthropological crisis caused by a malignant mutation of the human genotype itself went unnoticed by economic, political and environmental crises. The impetus for this crisis was the modernization shock that arose as a result of the disintegration of traditional patriarchal culture and unleashed destructive anti-social impulses.

The actualization of the projects of the so-called post-crisis societies testifies to the growing metaphysical weakness of man and his loss of control over his own evolution, over his way of life. Without thinking about the consequences of information technology revolutions, humanity has created an artificial environment for its existence, a kind of lifeless reality. The obviousness of the crisis is that meanings have been pushed out of human life, and any axiology is already perceived as superfluous. The transformation and loss of such core structures of existence as the meaning, purpose and value of life have become truly global problems for the modern world. The search for new pleasures, which are unable to satisfy the inner spiritual "hunger", leads to increase in society crime level, terrorism and extremism, suicide, aggression in general. These tendencies are especially evident in the youth environment.

The desire for disintegration and self-destruction is one of the specific features of public consciousness at the stage of transition to a new level of complexity. S. Freud (1987) explained this phenomenon in his essay "Civilization and Its Discontents". He emphasizes the desire of mankind to avoid the horrors of history through the mythologizing of the mind. "The death instinct", according to S. Freud, is only a philosophical path, which is resorted to by both individual and collective consciousness. Post-Darwinian psychoanalytic studies of the reasons for humanity's desire for war, for the highest assertion of identity at the cost of destroying its own kind, are still relevant today.

Modern researchers warn that violence takes on new, hybrid forms. Thus, T. Fry points the changing nature of the aggression manifestations in society, in particular its specific characteristics, temporal and spatial scales. In his book "Unstaging War, Confronting Conflict and Peace" (Fry, 2019), he argues that the pluralism of war has destroyed the usual binary link between war and peace. In fact, the conflicts themselves, as manifestations of open aggression with the use of weapons, are no longer an obvious fact. There is an interiorization of violence, a shift in the processes of corrective restraint of arbitrariness from the external to the internal dimension. The explanation for this process lies in one of the cognitive attributes of *Homo sapiens* – the ability to indoctrinate. In other words, to construct such a disposition that ensures the acceptance of group characteristics and identification with them. And this, in turn, contributes to the consolidation and demarcation of "we – they". The state uses this biological mechanism, instilling in social groups an identity of devotion through the systematic repetition of certain moral and religious imperatives. According to Freud, due to this influence on consciousness a stable structure of conscience or super-ego is formed. This feeds the repressive format of culture as one that transmits its violence inside the individual and, thus, assumes no responsibility for him. As a result, we have a cultured person who using self-violence forbids himself what culture (most likely, dominant groups, the state) considers harmful.

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In our time, indoctrination has become total due to the ubiquitous media and the active development of technologies of psychological impact on the individual. As an example, we can recall how quickly the formation of the "Aryan nation" and *homo soveticus* took place. Or, as in the XXI century, yesterday law-abiding citizens (including a significant number of Europeans) join the ranks of Islamic "martyrs". All this is clear evidence of the vulnerability of the inner world of modern man. Accordingly, external, public manifestations of violence decrease in their quantitative indicators, because its main array, like an iceberg, is hidden in the depths of the spiritual life of already supercivilized individual.

That is why in order to explain and in advance neutralize such violence outbreaks in the modern world, it is extremely important to shift the emphasis in finding the most optimal ways to counteract these phenomena. Namely, from the obvious preconditions – poverty, lack of opportunities for economic development, political instability – to domestic ones. This is an anthropological crisis, as evidenced today by the devaluation of the humanistic potential of modern culture and the assertion of the destructive nature of man. The situation of human death, which follows the death of God, seems increasingly inevitable, poses a direct threat to the existence of natural and cultural worlds as such. The actualization of this issue is worth noticing in the works of modern researchers of the violence phenomenology: M. Barber (2019); Baron et al. (2019); J. Dodd (2017); J. Davidovic (2016); M. Staudigl (2019).

Analysis of the conceptual and theoretical basis of research on violence in classical philosophy and modern scientific discourse, gives grounds to argue that in fact this issue itself is overloaded with socio-political meanings. This greatly complicates the conceptualization of the anthropological dimension of the violence phenomenon, and as a result, we are unable to see the forest behind the trees. Accordingly, one of the main shortcomings of modern philosophical and socio-humanitarian studies of the phenomenon of violence is still explicit or indirect schematism. It is explained by the ideologemes of liberalism, socialism, etc., enshrined in the public consciousness, while neglecting the deep root causes of violence in the realm of existential. Note that the question remains open: Whether violence is the ontological basis of human existence, or does it express the phenomenal configurations of the spiritual development of the individual?

Within the framework of metaphysics, which covers a wide range of philosophical currents of the XX century, including philosophical anthropology and psychoanalysis, important aspects in understanding human destructiveness are comprehended. It finds its direct expression and objectification in different manifestations of violence in public life. The classics of philosophical anthropology M. Scheler (the opposition theory of vitality and spirit in man), H. Plessner (theory of positionality), A. Gehlen (theory of biological non-specialization of man) not only gave a general description of human development, but also substantiated the specifics of human nature which is fundamentally destructive.

An analysis of the works of the German thinker M. Scheler, "Resentment in the Structure of Morals", published in 1914, as well as "The Genius of War and the German War", "War and Death", which were published a year later, allowed identifying philosophical and anthropological principles of transformation of the inner world of the individual in conditions of war, other crisis situations of "meeting" with violence. The constant struggle of hatred and love in man, the desire to destroy the world and self-destruction with the Christian worldview – is an endless process that reflects the desire and effort of man to reach his "center", according to Scheler, to know himself, his essence in its entirety.

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The founders of psychoanalysis as one of the sources of understanding destructiveness – S. Freud, C. G. Jung, W. Reich, A. Adler – and their followers, in particular E. Fromm (some of his works we used to reveal the problems of research) tried to penetrate "dark recesses" of human behavior. Psychoanalysis, on the one hand, focuses on the issues related to the existential principles of human destructiveness, which are different in nature conflicts (biological and culturological). On the other hand, it outlines both its positive and negative aspects (Freud's "struggle of life and death instincts", Reich's "characterological shell", Jung's "shadow of the person", Adler's "inferiority complex", and Horney's "basal anxiety"). Fromm attempted to combine social, biological and psychological aspects in understanding the destructive nature of man and the phenomenon of violence. In his "The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness", published in 1973, he rethinks the problem of destructiveness at the individual and social levels. His analysis of the manifestations of human destructive behavior as a result of degradation of society and violence against human nature is important for our study.

Purpose

The aim of the article is to study the phenomenon of human destructiveness in the context of metaphysical images and violence practices of late Modernism.

Statement of basic materials

To reveal the essence and specifics of the destructiveness phenomenon in the context of modern violence practices, a similar modern historical epoch was chosen. In it, violence as a sign of the times appears in the most concentrated form, and the level of social aggression shows pronounced tendencies to increase – the second half of the XIX – 20s of the XX century. It is a period of profound ontological and socio-cultural transformations associated with the destruction of the foundations of traditional society, the spread of totalitarian practices and the catastrophe of World War II.

At the same time, chronological and territorial aspect is secondary to our study; these are objective factors adding certain shades to the "portrait" of a person of this era. They do not explain the deep driving motives of his destructive behavior and the subconscious desire not only to destroy his own kind, but also to self-destruction. Thus, reference to historical events is necessary for the full disclosure of the world of feelings and experiences of man.

The perception of violence as a way of self-affirmation of a person who builds a new world, destroying the traditional way of life, in the period of late Modernism is becoming increasingly relevant. The polarization of the individual and the collective is actively taking place in society, which is reflected in the works of contemporary thinkers. In public discourse, the concepts of "natural selection" (Charles Darwin), "class struggle" (K. Marx), "will to power", "Superhuman" (F. Nietzsche). S. Freud at this time explores the phenomenon of violence in the context of instincts, complexes ("Thanatos", "Oedipus complex"). The idea of violence rootedness in human nature and its positive impact on the development of society is actualized.

The philosophical anthropology of Max Ferdinand Scheler of 1874-1928 was formed during this period, in the epoch of violent social upheavals, the First World War, and forming the pre-conditions for the Second. Scheler set himself the task of revealing the essence of man, i.e., providing an answer to the question: what is a man? "Both religions and philosophemes", he wrote, "have so far tried to study how and where man came into being, instead of determining

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what he is" (authors' transl.) (Scheler, 1994, p. 129). All the social problems faced by mankind at the crossroads of two centuries, the philosopher explained by the misunderstanding of man, who can be understood only in the context of his relentless development, constant search for himself.

Scheler acquired his "philosophical power" and authorial originality only during the First World War, the philosophical understanding of which became the most important prerequisite for the formation of his philosophical anthropology. The emergence of *Weltkriegsphilosophie* (Philosophy of World War II) was caused not only by a certain historical event, but also by the need to reflect on the spiritual crisis that split Europe not only into two warring military blocs, but also marked the crisis of the ideals of Modernism and led to a rethinking of values, underlying the European civilization (Popov, & Popova, 2018).

He understands war as a "dynamic principle" of historical development, as opposed to a "static principle" – peace. From this "point of view" war is presented as a certain function of the process of formation of nations and states, which is realized in accordance with their inherent particular historical segment of spiritual opportunities. Consequently, it is a spiritual and cosmic principle of society development. Scheler argues that war has its origins in man, the history of the development of his spiritual world, thus, refuting in advance all the biologization concepts of man that appeared later. Moreover, such an approach is a worthy response to the assertions of early Modernism thinkers about violence as an integral and completely natural, given the laws of the animal world, component of human existence.

Let us note that the conceptualization of violence in the philosophical discourse of early Modernism combines incompatible, at first glance, pragmatization and mythologizing. We can observe the design of the two-faced image of the "natural man". On the one hand, he opposes the social contract by virtue of his natural desire for freedom, and on the other, he conceives of violence as a tool for maintaining power and order. Thus, in the philosophical and political theory of T. Hobbes, man is by nature selfish, subject to passions and pursues his own interests, striving for self-preservation. The philosopher constructs a "natural" state, which presupposes a "war of all against all", and a "natural law" as a way out of the absolute state of war. Violence, therefore, does not preclude non-violence, and war and peace are the natural principles of human life in the state. Hobbesian statism affirms the need for both freedom and peace, violence and coercion in civil society. At the same time, the violence of the "Nomos" – a rationalized idea of the law that limits the arbitrariness of power, is opposed to violence in the natural state.

Like T. Hobbes, I. Kant considers violence using a category of war, but at the same time, it acquires other meanings. Thus, if for Hobbes the "war of all against all" and, consequently, the violence accompanying it, is a conceptualization of civil war, Kant builds a different concept of war, based on the realities of religious confrontation during the Reformation and the Thirty Years' War in Germany (1618-1648). However, despite the differences in socio-historical contexts, philosophers are united by a common fixation on the rationalization of sensory experience. It should be noted their inherent effort to justify morality and law in the relationship between state and law. Presented by Hobbes as "artificial" and "natural" man, they are also understood by Kant as "rational" mechanisms. Accordingly, wars between states are, first of all, human violence against another person. The state is presented as a "moral person" (i.e. a man), because it is a certain community of people. For the same reason, states are autonomous and must independently dispose of their freedom. The "morality of the state" must become the basis of its policy, which will inevitably lead to an end to wars and violence. The reason will obviously make violence unacceptable.

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Describing the transition from the "natural" state to the "legal" one, Kant appeals to the minds of people who, in order to get rid of violence, must come to terms with coercive laws. The freedom of the natural is replaced by the coercion of the law, and, hence, the violence of the law. Kant is convinced that such coercion is inevitable and necessary, including for the education of man, because it teaches him to morality. It is important that this coercive law be transformed from external to internal, which will make a person free.

According to Hegel, the unfolding of violence is connected with the circular movement of the spirit, the instrument of which is quite naturally the revolution. This is one of the forms of manifestation of the world spirit, which in its dialectical movement strives for the general, and therefore denies the singular. In revolution, force and violence are always closely intertwined and come into conflict. The power of the revolution from these positions is presented as an unrealized possibility of the spirit, absorbed by political and ideological violence.

The concept of "spirit" is key for M. Scheler. He distinguishes two components: "great cosmic forces", which determine the development of mankind and man in particular. They are "impulse" and "spirituality". Harmony as the ultimate goal of development and the realization of the desire for freedom becomes achievable when the "spirit" prevails over the "impulse". It is the "spirit" that is understood as the "center" of man, and with its help he opposes all animal and actually natural principles in himself. The philosopher emphasizes the cognitive function of the "spirit", its ability to special knowledge – religious.

In the study "Resentment in the Structure of Morals" Scheler (1999) presents a new, different from Nietzschean, vision of the concept of "resentment" as a hidden grievance, unconscious feelings of hostility, disfavor, envy. F. Nietzsche interprets the resentment from the standpoint of the cult of Christianity, which, in his opinion, is the religion of slaves, oppressed and weak individuals (differentiation of morality into "morality of slaves" and "morality of masters"). To illustrate the resentment worldview Scheler, as an example, gives a fable about a fox and sour grapes. According to him, a person who falls under the power of resentment, although internally focused on happiness, wealth, physical strength, cannot achieve this, because he rejects them as values and chooses the opposite.

Scheler comes to see resentment as a pure phenomenon and emphasizes that the entire history of mankind is accompanied by powerful outbreaks of violence. Their cause is poisoning by resentment or, according to its definition, "slow-acting poison of the soul". Accordingly, the understanding of resentment takes place in a broad sense, and it turns from a narrowly specific (Nietzschean "slave morality") to a general social phenomenon: "Resentment is the source of upheavals in the primordial order of human consciousness, one of the causes of delusion in the knowledge of this order and its implementation" (authors' transl.) (Scheler, 1999, p. 175).

The essay "The Genius of War and the German War" (Der Genius des Krieges und der Deutsche Krieg, 1915) written during the First World War became significant in Scheler's work. His key idea is to state that only in the conditions of war real "love communities" are being formed: "The most important objective goal of war is, first of all, to create and expand one or another of the many possible forms of true love communities" (authors' transl.) (Scheler, 1915, p. 10).

Since war is the most efficient means of forming the love communities, participation in it, according to Scheler, is a sacred duty of every citizen.

In the same year, 1915, another work by Scheler, "War and Death", was published in the Zeit-Echo Almanac, which did not have a significant resonance and was not properly appreciat-

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ed by researchers of the thinker's work. The Almanac was formed as a military diary, in the pages of which cultural and artistic figures freely expressed their position on the events of the war. In this work there is no reference to the legitimacy of the German war, which is discussed in "The Genius of War...". Scheler emphasizes not only its metaphysical but also its religious meaning: the death of soldiers on the battlefield is a religious sacrifice, similar to the sacrifice of Christ. In this sense, it is not vain, because the nation unites, thanks to this sacrifice, the willingness to make it. Understanding of life as a gift, understanding of the true value of which is possible only during the war dominate in the text. War appears in the form of a kind of "sacrificial altar", through which the individual can fulfill his higher purpose. We can state that the object of study for Scheler in this case is the metaphysics of death: "Life overcomes itself by sacrificing itself. Through sacrifice, life becomes something more than just life. In the case of war, sacrifice is a sacrifice for the sake of the nation-state and its culture" (authors' transl.) (Scheler, 1982, p. 41).

Such an insight into the essence of war, according to Saulius Geniusas (2019), a researcher of Scheler's work from the Chinese University of Hong Kong, naturally makes one think about the question: should Scheler's theory of suffering for a high purpose be considered phenomenological, metaphysical or religious, but, first of all, ideological? And isn't his goal to justify war? The answer to this question is found in the philosopher's reasoning about various forms of pacifism (heroic, Christian, Marxist, etc.), which makes clear Scheler's belief that humanity can achieve Eternal Peace as the highest value only through pacifism based on morality. In his work "Vom Sinn des Leidens" (1916) we can observe the liberation of the idea of sacrificial suffering from its militaristic interpretation.

In general, in Scheler's works there is a distinction in the structure of two basic components of the subject: spirit – spirituality – the subject in God and the power of the unconscious – impulse – resentment. Spirituality influences the formation of the subject more than the cultural, social, ideological factors. If impulse is dominated ("wins") in a subject, the social order, values, consciousness are formed in accordance with this priority, which becomes a favorable ground for totalitarian practices, manifestations of aggression in society. Under these conditions, the thesis of unlimited freedom is actualized, which destroys the usual norms and way of life. Such freedom "from" is chaos caused by resentment. Violence is justified precisely in relation to the "impulse" and not to the "spirit". After all, where the "spirit" prevails, freedom is understood as the released inner potential of creativity. Thus, the identity of the subject may be uncertain or distorted due to the "substitution" of the value system of the subject.

Taming the "impulse" and establishing the "spirit" – this is the most efficient formula for leveling the violence practice. At the same time, the late Modernism is characterized by sharp "pendulum oscillations" in a person's choice between "vital" and "spiritual".

One of the reasons for this division and the formation of a radically new, non-classical way of thinking was a leap in the science and technology development in the second half of the XIX century. It caused the spread among the masses a kind of euphoria from their own omnipotence and the deceptive belief that the principles of building a perfect machine can be transferred to human society. Just as in the mechanism, there is a certain number of details, each of which performs its function, putting into action the whole, so in society the infinite multiplicity of individual wills is possible and necessary to subordinate to some single plan. Such an ideologeme has become a "time bomb" for modern society. If the principles of the machine become the standard of social order, then a person eventually becomes a "cog" of this machine, becomes non-self-

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sufficient part that can be easily replaced by another. Thus, a person loses his individuality, "objectifies", becomes a soulless component of a certain universal mechanism.

Thus, at the turn of the XIX–XX centuries, a new picture of the world emerges, in which the scheme of determination radically changes: chance becomes a regularity. This new, quantum-relativistic world picture owes its appearance to A. Einstein, M. Planck, N. Bohr. A new type of non-classical rationality is being formed, which leads to a rethinking of key phenomena of human existence.

This period is characterized by strong migration processes, which resulted in the assimilation of urban and rural populations, the concentration in large industrial cities of a large number of migrants. Man, forced to explore new territories, to form a new way of life, felt as if "snatched" from the usual social center, the natural world for him (Shymko, 2018). The life of each individual undergoes significant transformations in time and space. He has to abandon the usual worldviews, the established understanding of his "home", cultural and moral values, religious principles inherited from the ancestors – all that provided a full perception of the world and his role in it.

The desire of society to form large areas of housing is explained by the internal, usually unconscious desire of man to subordinate himself and his life to a strong social order, to give up on freedom for the sake of a system that gives the illusion of strength, confidence and security. Striving to become an element of a strong structure, a person instead gets a feeling of growing loneliness. As a result, there is a contradiction between the desire to dissolve in a whole, to submit to a strong system and the desire to assert his importance as a unique individual, his right to freedom. This was the heyday of humanistic philosophical thought, which was embodied in the works of M. Berdiaiev, S. Hessen, M. Drahomanov, P. Leshaft, V. Soloviov. New ideas and concepts are spreading in the society, which are based on an active, free personality with pronounced individual characteristics.

In the search for the most optimal and at the same time "natural" model of the development of society and the individual, radical detraditionalization is absolutized, the Christian image of man is denied, and his naturalistic vision is affirmed. Such a model aimed to establish a socio-political order without the help of Christian religious principles. The union of man and nature was opposed to the idea of creation, performing an anti-Christian function. The so-called "non-pagan" modernist thought represents man in a world governed by natural laws. These laws are opened by the mind, and it obeys these laws. There is an identification of society with the social body, which functions in accordance with the established laws, and which must get rid of "unreasonable" forms of organization that appeal to the transcendent (Marchenko, 2012, p. 108).

Thus, there was a contradiction between two different types of worldview. The Christian worldview was based on the accentuation of the individual in the context of his moral assessment of the world. It postulated personality as a reflection of the Absolute Personality, and the Kingdom of God as a reality rooted in the transcendent, not the immanent. Proponents of the "natural" model of society had clear naturalistic priorities. Both positions could be reconciled only under the condition of radical changes, which became the slogan of late Modernism in its final stage, when return to natural collectivism, dissolution in faceless matter was proclaimed an ideal of human existence (Marchenko, 2012, p. 101).

The October coup of 1917 had ambiguous and contradictory consequences for all the peoples of the then Russian Empire. On the one hand, the social order hated by a large part of the population was destroyed, which gave hope for a better future in a democratic society. In the context of

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these events, the lowest strata of the population received deceptive proof of their own strength and power, which abolished the age-old social orders. On the other hand, there was a devastating blow to the life ideals and values of people who faced the need to find new spiritual landmarks (Bazaluk, Fatkhutdinov, & Svyrydenko, 2018). The events of October testified not only to the physical but also to the spiritual weakness, the helplessness of the masses before the element of revolution with its violence cult.

The problem of man's search for a defining core that would allow him to preserve his individuality in the outside world has become more acute. If the ideal of the previous era was self-improvement of the individual, his ascent to the heights of spiritual existence, including religion, the basis of the new social formation was the idea of universal happiness based on socio-economic equality, social justice.

Thus, the key contradiction of Modernism is caused by its inherent polarization in the human understanding. On the one hand, the derivation of destructiveness and "instinct of death" from human nature itself, and as a consequence, the assertion of the inevitability and regularity of violence as a manifestation of the "force" of the stronger, and, hence, the cult of the superhuman (F. Nietzsche). On the other hand – leveling of the individual, self-destruction of the "I" in favor of the collective and for the public good. Both vectors, as the history of the XX century shows, intersected in the practices of Soviet totalitarianism and German Nazism.

The invariability of the presence of violence in human existence is explained by the limitations of human destructiveness – being both "outside" and "inside". Man is always the interaction of the immanent and the transcendent, the inner and the outer. In his evolutionary development, he "falls out" of the natural order, ceases to be part of nature and opposes himself to it. Thus, he becomes autonomous and realizes itself no longer by an entity, but by a process. In "The Anatomy of Human Destructiveness", Erich Fromm (1999) reveals destruction as a process of degradation of society, which led to and, in fact, in which destructiveness took root. It is the result of violence against human nature. The destructiveness analysis involves addressing the essence of the phenomena of aggression and violence. Based on the instinctivism and behaviorism critique, Fromm substantiates the difference between benign and malignant aggression forms. By benign aggression, he means the protective reactions of the individual to the threat to his vital interests. These threats need to be eliminated to minimize benign aggression. However, this can be achieved by providing everyone with decent living conditions, which would nullify the desire for domination of some people over others. As an intermediate aggression form, Fromm (1999) identifies the so-called pseudo-aggression: "actions that may cause harm, but they were not preceded by evil intentions" (authors' transl.) (p. 232). As examples of pseudo-aggression, he cites play aggression and aggression as self-affirmation, which do not carry destruction as such. That is why benign aggression and pseudo-aggression are not destructive in nature. In contrast, malignant aggression is not generated by instincts and is unique to humans. It is the result of social dynamics and the process of socialization. This type of aggression is not related to the problems of human survival, however, feeding on human passions generated by love, hate, envy, etc., it becomes one of his ancestral characteristics: «Specifically, the human desire for absolute domination over other living beings and the desire to destroy (malignant aggression), I distinguish in a special group and call "destructiveness" or "cruelty"» (authors' transl.) (Fromm, 1999, p. 13).

Thus, destructiveness is a purely human quality that is formed as a consequence of existence in society. Man, through mind, creates safer living conditions for himself, while losing instinc-

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tive mechanisms of self-defense in the course of evolution. At the same time, it is the mind that becomes the source of the destructiveness of his nature.

To the question of who is to blame for the destruction progress, E. Fromm answers unequivocally: the man himself, because his ancestral characteristics imply a tendency to murder. Man, in the true sense of the word, is made by the ability to control himself and control the inner desire to destroy and murder his own kind. Accordingly, destructiveness as a natural predisposition to violence is a biologically abnormal and phylogenetically unprogrammed malignant aggression, which, of course, poses a threat to human survival. Moreover, given the technical progress, killing is becoming easier, and therefore, methods of deterrence must become increasingly rigid. Destructiveness has so deeply penetrated into human nature that the illusion of its innateness has arisen. In fact, as the philosopher emphasizes, destructive manifestations have a biosocial, historically determined nature, that is, society itself creates favorable conditions for its development in man.

Violence as the destruction of human nature is a vicious circle. The destruction of social relations is due to the lack of conditions for self-realization, resulting in the deformation of the inner world of man, his values (Danylova, 2016). In turn, this is an impetus for aggression against those who try to resist society and avoid destruction. This process is continuous, and gradual human construction on the new basis with comprehending and using those elements that were valuable, necessary for further formation at the highest level takes place and it is quite natural. Thus, self-transcendence is ambivalent: it represents both a negative and a positive destructiveness forms. Negative has a destructive nature, leads to disintegration and death. And the positive, through "removal", reconstruction provides preservation, development, multiplication of human.

Despite the differences in views on the root causes of destructiveness as a defining characteristic of human nature, both M. Scheler and E. Fromm agree on the need to revise the values of humanity in a dehumanizing society and increasing the threat of existential vacuum. That is why Scheler's opinion on the priorities that humanity must assign, expressed more than a century ago in the work "Resentment in the Structure of Morals" is still relevant today:

The spirit of modern civilization is not "progress" in the development of mankind, as Spencer thought, but *decline*. This spirit led to the domination of the weak over the strong, cunning over the high-minded, quantity over quality ...weakening of the core, dominant forces in man, in his struggle with the anarchy of his aspirations, i.e. neglect of goals for the development of means. (authors' transl.) (Scheler, 1999, p. 204)

Originality

For the first time the study conceptualizes the positive and negative aspects of human destructiveness in the context of late Modernism violence practices. It is proved that its ontological principles are rooted in specifically human existence and relations into which the individual en-

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ters in the process of life. Whereas anthropological principles are directly connected with the endless struggle of the "vital" with the "spirit" in man. The mechanism of realization of human destructiveness is self-transcendence, which combines "humanized" and "extrahuman" in various forms of manifestation. Self-transcendence is ambivalent: it represents both negative and positive destructiveness forms. Both ontological and anthropological principles are the basis for man to construct his existence, to form his unique and inimitable essence, to search for the meaning of his existence.

Conclusions

The appeal to the conceptual foundations of philosophical anthropology and psychoanalysis in the context of violence practices of late Modernism era allowed placing important "accents" in the understanding of human destructiveness. Violence as a result of the collision of "nature" and "culture" in man, as a destructiveness that is filtered by the socio-cultural environment, is a natural internal conflict. Its development can have both progressive and regressive vector.

At the metaphysical level, destructiveness appears as a link between the entropy of world existence and the instability of human existence itself, which is a complexly organized and open to the world system. It is rooted in instability as a constituent feature of the modern picture of the world. Accordingly, it can have both a negative color – ontological "non-guarantee" and predictability of the human, and positive – unlimited opportunities to overcome the desire for destruction and constant self-improvement. Man leaves nature, realizing his incompatibility with it, and himself – not an entity, but a process whose purpose is to search and find his "center". Taming the "impulse" and establishing the "spirit" – this is the formula for leveling the violence practice. The ability to manage one's own life is nourished by destructiveness ingrained in human nature. Self-transcendence as an anthropological precondition of human destructiveness is a kind of destruction "alloy" (going beyond the existing form with its subsequent destruction), and reconstruction (restoration, construction of the basic characteristics of the human phenomenon on a new basis).

The discovery of the meaning of a particular human life in a "then and there" situation is a manifestation of positive destructiveness based on self-transcendence. There is no other way to overcome the negative, "malignant" destructiveness, except the incessant, daily "gathering" of meanings around you. Only the ability to keep in harmony the trinity of "body-soul-spirit" will allow a person to preserve and increase his integrity in any social transformations.

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ЛЮДСЬКА ДЕСТРУКТИВНІСТЬ У БУТТЄВИХ ПРАКТИКАХ НАСИЛЛЯ ПІЗЬНОГО МОДЕРНУ: ПОЗИТИВНИЙ І НЕГАТИВНИЙ ВИМІРИ

Мета. Дослідження феномену людської деструктивності у контексті метафізичних образів і практик насилля пізнього Модерну. **Теоретичний базис.** Проблема полягає у тому, що філософська рефлексія насилля як "опредмеченої", реалізованої деструктивності людини носить, як правило, контекстний характер і перебуває на периферії осмислення її зовнішніх проявів. Відповідно "за кадром" залишається антропологічна криза, свідченням якої є девальвація гуманістичного потенціалу сучасної культури. Саме тому необхідно змістити акценти із очевидних, об'єктивно обумовлених "втілень" насилля у ХХІ столітті (збройних конфліктів, локальних воєн, терористичних актів) – на внутрішні чинники, що перебувають у царині екзистенціального. Відхід від розгляду насилля як абстрактного, безликого або ідеологічно забарвленого "зла" дозволив зосередитися на людині, її способі мислення, життєвих і суспільних орієнтирах, почуттях і внутрішніх суперечностях, що знаходять своє вираження у тій чи іншій формі деструктивності. **Наукова новизна.** На основі визначальних для філософської антропології і психоаналізу праць М. Шелера й Е. Фромма вперше здійснено концептуалізацію позитивних та негативних форм прояву людської деструктивності на тлі соціокультурних трансформацій пізнього Модерну. Доведено, що її онтологічні засади вкорінені у специфічно людському бутті й відносинах з іншими членами соціуму, тоді як антропологічні – безпосередньо пов'язані із нескінченною боротьбою в людині "життєвого", вітального із "духом". **Висновки.** Насилля є інструментом і продуктом переходу людини до більш зрілих і складних буттєвих форм. Взаємозумовленість практик насилля та ненасилля забезпечує поступальний рух людства на шляху гуманізації суспільства. Цей поступ супроводжується закономірним внутрішнім конфліктом особистості, який може мати як прогресивний, так і регресивний характер. На метафізичному рівні деструктивність постає як зв'язок між ентропією світового буття в цілому і нестабільністю власне людського буття, що являє собою складно організовану і відкриту світові систему. Самоотрансценденція як антропологічна передумова людської деструктивності має подвійний характер і поєднує у собі негативні та позитивні характеристики, зміст і значущість яких було розкрито у ході дослідження. Автори переконані: немає іншого шляху для подолання негативної, "злостійкої" деструктивності, окрім ненастанного, щоденного "збирання" навколо себе життєвих смислів та їх освоєння. Адже саме втрата таких стрижневих буттєвих структур, як смисл, ціль і цінність життя стала для сучасного світу дійсно глобальною проблемою. Акцентовано увагу на необхідності утримувати в гармонії триєдність "тіло-душа-дух", що дозволить людині за будь-яких суспільних трансформацій зберегти і примножити свою цілісність.

Ключові слова: людина; деструктивність; насилля; епоха пізнього Модерну; самоотрансценденція

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ЧЕЛОВЕЧЕСКАЯ ДЕСТРУКТИВНОСТЬ В БЫТИЙНЫХ ПРАКТИКАХ НАСИЛИЯ ПОЗДНЕГО МОДЕРНА: ПОЗИТИВНОЕ И НЕГАТИВНОЕ ИЗМЕРЕНИЯ

Цель. Исследование феномена человеческой деструктивности в контексте метафизических образов и практик насилия позднего Модерна. **Теоретический базис.** Проблема заключается в том, что философская рефлексия насилия, как "опредмеченной", реализованной в бытии человека деструктивности, носит, как правило, контекстный характер и находится на периферии осмысления его внешних проявлений. Соответственно, "за кадром" остается антропологический кризис, свидетельством которого является девальвация гуманистического потенциала современной культуры. Именно поэтому необходимо сместить акценты с очевидных, объективно обусловленных "воплощений" насилия в XXI веке (вооруженных конфликтов, локальных войн, террористических актов) – на внутренние факторы, находящиеся в области экзистенциального. Уход от рассмотрения насилия как абстрактного, безликого или идеологически окрашенного "зла" позволил сосредоточиться на человеке, его образе мышления, жизненных ориентирах, чувствах и внутренних противоречиях, которые находят свое выражение в той или иной форме деструктивности. **Научная новизна.** На основе определяющих для философской антропологии и психоанализа работ М. Шелера и Э. Фромма впервые осуществлена концептуализация положительных и отрицательных форм проявления человеческой деструктивности на фоне социокультурных трансформаций позднего Модерна. Доказано, что ее онтологические основания определяются спецификой человеческого бытия и отношениями с другими членами социума, тогда как антропологические – непосредственно связаны с нескончаемой борьбой в человеке "жизненного", витального с "духом". **Выводы.** Насилие является инструментом и продуктом перехода человека к более зрелым и сложным бытийным формам. Взаимообусловленность практик насилия и ненасилия обеспечивает поступательное движение человечества на пути гуманизации общества. Это продвижение сопровождается закономерным внутренним конфликтом личности, который может иметь как прогрессивный, так и регрессивный характер. На метафизическом уровне деструктивность выступает как связь между энтропией мирового бытия в целом и нестабильностью собственно человеческого бытия, представляющего собой сложно организованную и открытую миру систему. Самоотрансценденция, как антропологическая предпосылка человеческой деструктивности, имеет двойственный характер и сочетает в себе негативные и положительные характеристики, содержание и значимость которых были раскрыты в ходе исследования. Авторы убеждены: нет другого пути для преодоления негативной, "злокачественной" деструктивности, кроме неустанного "собираения" вокруг себя жизненных смыслов и их освоения. Ведь именно потеря таких стержневых бытийных оснований, как смысл, цель и ценность жизни стала для современного мира глобальной проблемой. Акцентируется внимание на необходимости гармонизации триединства "тело-душа-дух", что позволит человеку при любых общественных трансформациях сохранить и приумножить свою целостность.

Ключевые слова: человек; деструктивность; насилие; эпоха позднего Модерна; самоотрансценденция

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^{2*}Kharkiv National University of Internal Affairs (Kharkiv, Ukraine), e-mail shapovalw@ukr.net, ORCID 0000-0003-4826-8463**THE PROBLEM OF SEARCHING THE MEANING OF HUMAN EXISTENCE: CONTEMPORARY CONTEXT**

Purpose. The purpose of the article is the analysis of the reasons and grounds of the crisis in the sphere of meaning-making, as well as searching answers to the questions about the meaning of human life in the contemporary world, which are maximally relevant in connection with the escalation of global problems, revealing the points of convergence between various theoretical positions, evaluation of their heuristic potential. **Theoretical basis** of the research is the historical-philosophical, comparative and system approaches, as well as the analysis of philosophical insights in the field of global studies. **Originality.** Originality lies in the fact that this article is the first attempt to conduct comprehensive analysis in the problem of the sense of the Existence as it is presented in the first quarter of the 21st century and to relate it with the modern social situation that is characterized by a complex range of interconnected and interdependent anthropological problems of our time. Authors emphasize that the main reason in the crisis of meaning is that a man has lost touch with his roots, which is wildlife. He has created an artificial structure, civilization to satisfy his needs and finds no way to the transcendental, which is the true House of his being. **Conclusions.** A human must refuse from false self-conceit concerning his potential omniscience and omnipotence, cease dictating his own rules to the Existence, determine the boundaries of his freedom and try to clearly realize his place in the objective structure of being. The global situation can change for the better only if a dramatic change in the area of meaning-making happens. The decisive force, which may encourage nudging to the positive changes, can be either the free will of people who have realized the criticality of the situation or external natural and social circumstances that will make people reorganize radically. The proper prioritizing, a deep awareness of universal goals and solidarity between people could be the value basis that will become the foundation to find the meaning and create a more favorable future.

Keywords: human; reason for existence; being; cognition; global problems; transcendental

Introduction

Expanding the boundaries of the cognizable world, a man became stronger in his confidence that the world was filled with the deepest order and meaning. There is growing confidence that a part of this world has comprehended, and what it is a secret today will be revealed sooner or later. The triumph of order and meaning of the Existence seemingly is predetermined since the beginning of time. However, changes in society and the discoveries of science of the last two centuries make one doubt strongly in the faithfulness of the above maxim. The civilization created by people, on the one hand, is full of internal insoluble collisions, on the other hand, it has come into sharp conflict with nature, which threatens the very existence of the human race. Many problems have a planetary character, at the same time efforts to rectify the situation are fragmented and ineffective. The number of problems is growing rapidly, while the chances of solving them are fewer and fewer. As a result of this, the mood of a person's powerlessness in the face of out-of-control circumstances and the meaninglessness of all the efforts made by him are growing. The question arises: what are the reasons for the total sense of the meaninglessness of the Existence, where and in what a person can find support, how to be strengthened in the fact that a crisis with greater or lesser costs will be overcome and new prospects for development will open?

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As Tufan Kiyamaz (2019) correctly noted, "The problem of the meaninglessness of the Existence traces back to ancient times, and among the philosophers who proposed solutions to this problem, there was no consensus on what is actually being discussed" (p. 147). However, in Modern age, in connection with the expanding horizons of the world perceived by a man, this problem has acquired new significance.

I see the terrifying spaces of the universe that enclose me, and I find myself attached to a corner of this vast expanse, without knowing why I am more in this place than in another, nor why this little time that is given me to live is assigned me at this point more than another out of all the eternity that has preceded me and out of all that will follow me. (Paskal, 1995, p. 192)

Expanding the boundaries of the world, available to a man, originated not only delight and awe, but also caused horror, a sense of personal insignificance prior to the infinite power and incomprehensibility of nature.

Expressing a general feeling in the meaninglessness of current events and the futility of human efforts to change something for the better, the subtle psychologist and analyst of his time A. Schopenhauer wrote:

...the constant charm and disappointment, as well as the whole character of life in general, seems to be more likely targeted and intended only to awaken the beliefs in us that there is nothing in the world worthy of our aspirations, struggles and desires, all the blessings are worthless, all the world is completely bankrupt, and life is such an enterprise that does not pay back its costs... (authors' transl.) (Schopenhauer, 1992, p. 63)

He expressed a general feeling when, along with the progressive moods characteristic of his time, there was a growing sense of anxiety about where society was moving and what would happen to a person.

The tragic twentieth century marked by unprecedented human casualties and destruction in history, highlighted new angles of the problem under consideration.

"At any street corner the feeling of absurdity can strike any man in face. As it is, in its distressing nudity, in its light without effulgence, it is elusive" (Camus, 1990, p. 28).

The advent of the age of reason to which enlighteners referred, by all accounts, is postponed indefinitely.

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A paradigm change in the interpretation of meaning is also traced by B. Hubner.

Beginning from the age of Enlightenment, a man is no longer considered and determined primarily from the viewpoint of a heteronome, a powerful other – God, the state, telos, meaning, idea – that is, ideologically, but the other is more and more viewed by a man from the viewpoint of himself, the needing human I, anthropologically. (Hubner, 2006, p. 11)

The value center shifted significantly towards anthropocentrism, and this led to rather contradictory results.

The need for a new raising of the stated problem is dictated by the fact that "it does not receive due attention from the scientific community" (Kiymaz, 2019, p. 147), as well as all the authors who considered it could not take into account the new circumstances that had opened up in the modern information digital age, characterized by a growing divorcement from naturalness and an ever-greater going away into artificiality. Human civilization has fallen into such a deep crisis that it turns the present into absurdity, makes senseless the past, and induces to imagine the future rather pessimistic. Never before in human history, has the Existence seemed so meaningless as it is today. Is it possible to imagine a greater irony of history than a situation when, by the efforts of the people themselves, their existence is menacingly approaching the final ending.

The methodological base of the study was composed of works Hubner (2006); Frankl (1990); Skinner (2018); Bostrom (2016); Shmidt and Koen (2013); Danilov-Danilyan and Reyf (2016); Kurzweil (2002); and articles (Kiymaz, 2019; Phillips, 2019), which represent the most relevant ways to solve the problems under consideration.

Purpose

The purpose of the article is to analyze the causes and foundations of the crisis in the sphere of meaning-making, as well as searching answers for questions about the meaning of human life in the contemporary unpredictable world, which are actualized maximally at present, revealing the points of convergence between various theoretical positions, evaluation of their heuristic potential.

Statement of basic materials

Since a man has become sentient and realized the whole depth of this finding, he cannot tolerate the meaninglessness of the world around him, as well as with the internal meaninglessness, disorientation and incoordination of his own consciousness. Regardless of whether this seems pointless or real, a person is trying by all forces to overcome such a state. For this, to a large extent numerous spiritual practices are devoted – mythology, magic, religion, philosophy, art, science – they have been created over millennia in the history of human culture.

In a first approximation, the boundaries of being coincide with the boundaries of human self-knowledge. These boundaries are constantly expanding, they reached impressive dimensions to date. There is no doubt that this process will continue, opening new horizons both within the mega world, the Big Universe, and in the micro world, promising new discoveries.

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Cognition is determined by horizons of values and senses within which any human activity takes place. In the cognitive process, people are driven by what they believe in, what they consider to be true, meaningful, or meaningless. If, for example, you consider the world or some part of it to be totally meaningless, this will identify a specific strategy for behavior in this world. If we assume that everything that is going on is filled with a deep, incomprehensible meaning, then another strategy follows. The boundaries of being in this way are determined by the boundaries of meaning. To a large extent, by whether we judge the world from the standpoint of eternity and infinity, or we believe that all things in the world and the Existence as such are limited in space and time. Where do the boundaries of meaning go, what is their meaningful part – these questions that worried philosophers of the past continue to remain relevant today.

A person, in reality, cognizes himself, limits of his physical and intellectual capabilities while cognizing being, expanding its boundaries. Without knowing these boundaries, he cannot fully realize what his purpose in this world is, why nature has rewarded him with such a perfect tool of knowledge, like reason. Perhaps those who claimed that a person with his mind is an instrument of Nature (Substance, Absolute Spirit) through which Nature (Absolute Spirit) perceives itself, becomes transparent to it (Hegel), is not so wrong. To gain insight oneself as such would be an extremely tempting goal.

According to its potential capabilities, a person with his intellect could perform as the "king of nature", stand at the top of the life hierarchy. However, a negligible minority of people engaged in truly creative activities corresponds to this ideal. The behavior of most of our contemporaries is absolutely not in line with this mission. Their actions are aimed at solving momentary, mundane tasks that are far from the goals of self-knowledge of the Absolute Spirit.

Previous visions concerning the meaning and meaninglessness of the Existence, prior to the scope of changes occurring today, are completely leveled out. The question about the direction of transformations in the sphere of meaning acquires epoch-making significance. It is not enough for a thinking person to simply survive and give health progeny. The meaning of the Existence is not so banal. The details are still not completely clear, but one thing is not in doubt: no matter what happens in society, it should be sought deeper than it seems to the ordinary consciousness.

The crisis of the value sphere occurs against the background of the accelerating movement of the Earth's civilization, the direction of which seems rather uncertain. We live in conditions of the fourth industrial revolution. As Skinner (2018) correctly asserts, "The colossal effect of the digital revolution, which begins the fourth age in human history, is that for the first time we all got in touch with each other" (p. 25). The major role is played by communications provided by information and computer technologies. The machine is becoming more and more decisive in the foreground, and it is radically different from those that were created at the dawn of the industrial revolution. Contemporary smart machines are capable of carrying out operations commensurate with the intellectual activity of men. Currently, computer thinking looks simpler and more primitive, in comparison with the wealth of a person's mental life. However, the edge between natural and artificial intelligence is gradually blurring and this process is gaining momentum.

One can completely agree with N. Bostrom, who pointed out that:

Pioneers in the field of artificial intelligence, despite all the belief in the

inevitable appearance of artificial intelligence that is equal to human one,

for the most part, denied the appearance of a supersanity that surpasses

the human mind. It seems that their imagination ... has just run dry, and they easily passed the inevitable conclusion: the next step will be the birth of superintelligent machines. (Bostrom, 2016, p. 15)

Indeed, science and technology are frequently found with completely unusual processes. Already at the molecular level, the differences between organic and inorganic are not so obvious. At the level of atoms and elementary particles, talking about the living and the rational does not make sense. Meanwhile, the nervous processes morphologically are precisely the flow of electrical signals and biochemical reactions that occur in the structures of the central nervous system, including the brain. In other words, what we call the movement of thought is largely accomplished at the level of atoms and elementary particles.

Something similar happens in modern computers, although they are created on a different material basis. The operations performing in them are identical in many respects to what is happening in the human brain. Kurzweil emphasized:

After the brain is connected to non-biological structures, they will begin to develop and strengthen biological structures. And with each new generation of technologies, our intelligence will grow and the volume of machine intelligence will also grow. Which, ultimately, will lead to the fact that the non-biological part of us will prevail over the biological ...

About this is a singularity. (Kurzweil, 2002, p. 10)

A natural conclusion suggests itself: if progress in this area continues so rapidly, it is possible that robots, created on the basis of artificial neural networks and ultrafast quantum computers, will surpass humans both in terms of their structure and in the part of their intellectual functions.

It is regrettable, but hopes of numerous philosophers and religious thinkers from Socrates and Plato to T. de Chardin and J. Maritain to see that biological evolution will be replaced by spiritual evolution and it will have no limits, are not justified. We are not going in the direction of ever-greater spirituality, but increasingly technological. Instead of the noosphere, we got the Internet: it is a pulsating and changing mental picture of the planetary human consciousness with all its reasonable and unreasonable sides. Having left aside the issue of the Global Network content, which deserves a separate discussion, we note that the speed of all processes in the new information environment is rapidly increasing. The man as a biological being is not created for such speeds; he is not able to instantly process terabytes of information. However, technical devices with elements of artificial intelligence do an excellent job of these tasks. Prerequisites are created so that in the distant (or not-too-distant) future, robots perform their tasks without any human intervention (Skinner, 2018, p. 94). A situation may arise that a person, as the weakest link in a new super-technological civilization, will

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become completely redundant. This will be the end of human biological evolution and a transition to a new quality that one can only speculate about (Joe, 2019, p. 5). This circumstance not at all adds optimism regarding the meaning of human existence. It is unlikely that anyone will agree that the meaning of human history is to create an artificial superintelligence and to disappear from the planet themselves.

The crisis of the sphere of meaning-making is not least connected with the ecological situation that has developed at the present time. Subjecting a comprehensive analysis of this situation, V. I. Danilov-Danilyan, and I. E. Reif justifiably conclude:

For many centuries, the biosphere has unsuccessfully resisted this destructive human activity. But, starting from the first decade of the 20th century, the man and nature interaction transformed, seeming to, into a new quality: unidirectional changes that had never been observed before occurred in all environments, and their speed continues to grow steadily. And this means that the biosphere's own compensatory capabilities are no longer able to withstand the influence of civilization, which, on the scale achieved, become destructive. And this unprecedented environmental crisis developed in full view of only one or two generations. (Danilov-Danilyan, & Reif, 2016, p. 30)

Moving towards the scientific-technical progress and expanding the boundaries of the being comprehended by them, people have evolved into the leading force on our planet, they subjugated all other living beings and forced them to serve them. However, their activities gave rise to such serious problems that they threaten to bury humanity under their own weight. Some of them are being resolved, others are just about to start, and some of them look so complex that there are no technological or financial opportunities to resolve them. The saddest thing is that there is no common will aimed at finding a way out of a difficult situation. Instead of concentrating the declining resources and directing them on the right track, people senselessly waste them in order to establish their momentary mercantile goals. The value system is substantially deformed, instead of activities "from the viewpoint of eternity", on the expectation of a long-term perspective, most people and leaders of nations live by the principle of "here and now" (Shapoval, 2019, p. 45).

The boundaries of meaning are not just blurred, sometimes it seems that the meaning is completely lost. Metanarratives are excluded from public and individual consciousness, concern for things that are extremely simple and primitive comes to the fore. Meanwhile, an increasingly complex society requires ever more complex people who can solve non-trivial problems and take responsibility. Fundamental, life-meaning issues one cannot be avoided, moreo-

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ver, without their solution it is impossible to resolve the contradictions of the modern stage of civilization development and further advance.

The more a person learns the world, the more often he comes to the idea of the total meaninglessness of all things, both socially and naturally (Frankl, 1990). Not only human society, but everything in this world seems marcescible, moving towards decay and death. As it turned out, the Universe as a whole had its beginning and will have an end. Once again, the ground is falling away underneath, a person feels lonely and lost in a world alien to him. The world existed billions of years before man, and it will exist after him. Not with us, everything began and not with us will end. It becomes more and more obvious that people are not the pinnacle of being, but only the next link in a long chain, in which even the next links are shrouded in mystery, not to mention what is beyond the horizon. Understanding this, it is necessary every time to search for new foundations of your activity, to create new meanings so as not to become a slave to the forces natural or generated by people themselves, or even completely dissolve in being. According to Anthony Phillips (2019), "On second thought, a person, to a large extent, has nothing to rely on except for his value and axiological foundations, the belief that being is full of higher meaning" (p. 463). Only we have yet to solve it.

Originality

The attempt is made to carry out a comprehensive analysis in the problem of the meaning of the Existence, as it is presented in the first quarter of the 21st century and to relate it with the modern social situation that is characterized by a complex range of interconnected and interdependent anthropological problems of our time. The authors emphasize that the main reason in the crisis of meaning is that a man has lost touch with his roots, which is wildlife and having created an artificial structure to satisfy his needs – civilization – he finds no way to the transcendental, which is the true House of his being. The loss of meaning is the loss of connection with the integrity of being. A new gaining of meaning is possible through the restoring of the said connection.

Conclusions

The results analysis in this article allows us to draw the following conclusions. The major causes of the crisis in the sphere of meaning-making are that a person was captured by false self-conceit about his potential omniscience and omnipotence, on which he continues to insist, despite the fact that being convinces of the opposite. It is necessary to cease dictating his own rules to the Existence, to realize the limits of his freedom, and try to clearly define his place in the objective structure of being. Only if radical changes in the sphere of values and senses occur, the global situation can change for the better. The decisive force that will lead to these changes can be either the mind or free will of a person who has realized the criticality of the situation, or external natural and social circumstances that will make him relate to the being in a very serious manner. The proper prioritizing, a deep awareness of universal goals and values, solidarity between people can become the foundation for finding new facets in the meaning of human existence.

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ПРОБЛЕМА ПОШУКІВ СЕНСУ ЛЮДСЬКОГО ІСНУВАННЯ: СУЧАСНИЙ КОНТЕКСТ

Метою статті є аналіз причин і підстав кризи сфери смислопородження, а також пошуки відповідей на питання про сенс людського життя в сучасному світі, що актуалізувались у зв'язку із загостренням глобальних проблем, виявлення точок дотику різних теоретичних позицій, оцінка їх евристичного потенціалу. **Теоретичний базис** дослідження склали історико-філософський, компаративістський та системний підходи, а також аналіз філософських напрацювань в області глобалістики. **Наукова новизна** полягає у тому, що в статті вперше зроблена спроба провести комплексний аналіз проблеми сенсу сущого, якою вона вбачається у першій чверті ХХІ століття, пов'язавши її з сучасною соціальною ситуацією, яка характеризується складним комплексом взаємопов'язаних і взаємозалежних антропологічних проблем сучасності. Акцентується, що основна причина кризи сенсу полягає у тому, що людина відірвалася від свого коріння, яким є жива природа, і створивши для задоволення своїх потреб штучну структуру – цивілізацію, – не знаходить шляхів до трансцендентного, що є істинним Домом її буття. **Висновки.** Людина повинна відмовитися від помилкової зарозумілості про своє потенційне всезнання й всемогутність, перестати диктувати сущому свої правила, визначити межі своєї свободи і спробувати ясно усвідомити своє місце в об'єктивній структурі буття. Тільки в тому випадку, якщо відбудуться кардинальні зміни у сфері смислопородження, глобальна ситуація може змінитися на краще. Вирішальною силою, здатною підштовхнути до позитивних змін, може стати або вільна воля людей, які зрозуміють всю критичність ситуації, або зовнішні природні та соціальні обставини, які змусять людей кардинально перебудуватись. Правильна розстановка пріоритетів, глибоке усвідомлення загальнолюдських цілей і солідарність між людьми могли б стати тією ціннісною основою, яка буде підставою набуття сенсу і створення більш сприятливого майбутнього.

Ключові слова: людина; сенс існування; буття; пізнання; глобальні проблеми; трансцендентне

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ПРОБЛЕМА ПОИСКОВ СМЫСЛА ЧЕЛОВЕЧЕСКОГО СУЩЕСТВОВАНИЯ: СОВРЕМЕННЫЙ КОНТЕКСТ

Целью статьи является анализ причин и оснований кризиса сферы смыслополагания, а также поиски ответов на вопросы о смысле человеческой жизни в современном мире, которые предельно актуализированы в связи с обострением глобальных проблем, выявление точек соприкосновения различных теоретических позиций, оценка их эвристического потенциала. **Теоретический базис** исследования составили историко-философский, компаративистский и системный подходы, а также анализ философских наработок в области глобалистики. **Научная новизна** заключается в том, что в статье впервые сделана попытка провести комплексный анализ проблемы смысла сущего, как она представляется в первой четверти ХХІ века, увязав ее с современной социальной ситуацией, характеризующейся сложным комплексом взаимосвязанных и взаимозависимых антропологических проблем современности. Акцентируется, что основная причина кризиса смысла состоит в том, что человек, оторвавшись от своих корней, которыми является живая природа, и создав для удовлетворения своих потребностей искусственную структуру – цивилизацию, – не находит путей к трансцендентному, являющемуся истинным Домом его бытия. **Выводы.** Человек должен отказаться от ложного самомнения о своем потенциальном всезнании и всемогуществе, перестать диктовать сущему свои правила, определить границы своей свободы и попытаться ясно понять свое место в объективной структуре бытия. Только в том случае, если произойдут кардинальные изменения в сфере смыслополагания, глобальная ситуация может измениться к лучшему. Решающей силой, способной подтолкнуть к положительным изменениям, может стать либо свободная воля людей, осознавших всю критичность ситуации, либо внешние природные и социальные обстоятельства, которые заставят людей

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кардинально перестроиться. Правильная расстановка приоритетов, глубокое осознание общечеловеческих целей и солидарность между людьми могли бы стать той ценностной основой, которая будет основанием обретения смысла и созидания более благоприятного будущего.

Ключевые слова: человек; смысл существования; бытие; познание; глобальные проблемы; трансцендентное

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UDC 17.035.1:171N. A. MRINSKAYA^{1*}^{1*}National Pedagogical Dragomanov University (Kyiv, Ukraine), e-mail natamrinska@gmail.com, ORCID 0000-0001-7958-9118**EGOISM AS A WAY OUT OF EXISTENTIAL CRISIS FOR A PERSON IN DISABILITY SITUATION**

Purpose of the article is to establish the role of egoism in the life of a person faced with a disability situation, as a moment of self-determination in an existential crisis. I set the task to evaluate the influence of egoism and find out its significance in the prospect of the person's further existence in the conditions of disability using the philosophical anthropology based on the meta-anthropology principle. **Theoretical basis.** Based on the fact that the role of egoism is perceived by public opinion as a vice and entails the absorption by a person of the benefits intended for others, I find them inappropriate for a person in a situation of disability. Taking into account the concepts of ego and altruism and altruistic egoism, which partially justify the positive influence of egoism, are only a product of the symbiotic interaction of altruism and egoism. The combination of egoism with altruism cannot reveal the essence of the crisis for a person in a disability situation. In a situation of disability, a person cannot synthesize altruism, as part of the egoism symbiosis. Methodological system in the study of the positive role of egoism, the modern theory of meta-anthropology by Nazip Khamitov is used. The theory that divides the being of a person into various types (ordinary, ultimate, and being beyond the bounds) is able to most fully structure the concept of egoism in the being of a person who has disability. **Originality.** I made an attempt to prove the positive role of egoism in a situation related to the body transformation into new conditions. The analysis of evidence of the need for the egoism development, as a function capable of actualizing a person in the formed crisis circumstances is carried out. A theory about the need for egoism to get a person out of the existential crisis situation (ultimate being) in which he stays due to a disability situation was proposed. **Conclusions.** I show that taking care of oneself (egoism) is a balancing factor for a person, as opposing a fatally unfair situation in which a person has received disability. Rational egoism is able to bring a person out of ultimate being and allow him to transform into a new, changed reality.

Keywords: egoism; egoaltruism; ordinary being; ultimate being; being beyond the bounds; person; disability

Introduction

I consider disability as an injury that significantly changed the physical characteristics of the body. Such a person cannot live a former life. The new being of disability entails a crisis state of mind, leading a person to an existential rethinking of his role in life and the search for new goals.

First, a person in a disability situation loses the integrity of his inner egoism. If we consider disability as a tragedy, and a person with disability as a tragic personality, can egoism exist without an external social assessment and influence?

New factors affecting a person create an existential shock. They lead to the need to transform his own fear for life into the egoism. The only sense is life and the variant of its saving – egoism.

Purpose

Based on the foregoing, the aim of the article is to identify the positive meaning of "rational egoism" with respect to philosophical meta-anthropology and to identify a way out of the crisis of ultimate being.

Analysis of recent research and publications

I analyzed the latest publications on egoism, concluded that this topic has not been studied enough, especially in situations of disability. But I was interested in several publications of recent years. I would like to note an article on the topic of socio-psychological adaptation in individuals with a predominance of egoistic qualities in the study of the social, psychological and philosophical aspects of egoism (Gayvoronskaya, 2012). Avdeeva (2013) conducted research on the issues of "rational self-love" and a positive attitude towards egoism, as an ethics supporting solidarity. She outlined a number of factors characterizing the egoist as a person prone to domination. A. V. Filatov conducted a study in ethical standards of egoistic thinking and matters of morality. His work on the history of philosophy is based on a study of the works of Lev Shestov and provides an opportunity to look at egoism as a state of deep personal tragedy (Filatov, 2011). Lisa Downing (2019) conducted gender morality issues including egoistic manifestations according to the feminist theory. She first divided egoism into female and male. I also highlighted a chapter on egoism and ego-centrism in the concept of virtue from Philip J. Ivanhoe (2018).

Several articles on medical psychology, which are indirectly related to the topic of my work, open up the medical and psychological criteria of self-care as a mechanism for overcoming the disease (Antonova, & Kuznetsova, 2017). Objective understanding of personality reflection in the moments of self-organization (Sizikova, 2019). Objective information on the fundamental principles of the egoism mechanism in the concept of "particularly-universal" (Koromyslov, 2019). A systematic analysis based on the cultural-historical method, which makes it possible to understand "emotional egoism" as a contradiction between the moral value of a person and the social significance of an individual (Kuznetsov, 2017). Analysis of egoism and altruism in the representation of biological sciences using the role of philosophical metaphysics within the framework of the project "Categorical opposition "altruism-egoism" in the moral and ethical discourse of our time" (transl. by N. M.) (Maksimenko, Zenets, & Varova, 2018). But all these works do not fully reflect set task and are far from philosophical anthropology, so I had to turn to earlier works in the field of egoism, altruism and the spheres influencing these internal qualities of a person.

Trying to consider egoism in a disability situation, calling it "limited rational egoism", I found confirmations of my thoughts from the philosophers Arthur Schopenhauer, Friedrich Nietzsche, Nikolai Chernyshevsky, Rudolf Steiner, Paul Tillich, and Michel Foucault. In this context, let me quote Arthur Schopenhauer's (2014) statement which I completely agree with: "I and egoism are one: if the latter disappears, then, in fact, there is no longer the former" (transl. by N. M.) (p. 120). Chernyshevsky takes the constant of "rational egoism" as a basis and relies on the French materialists, emphasizing the importance of egoism in social significance as the pursuit of the common good. For me, in this study, his quote, which explains the position of the last century and remains relevant to this day, becomes important. He writes: "a person does what is more pleasant for him to do; he is guided by a calculation that tells him to give up less profit or less pleasure for more profit, more pleasure" (transl. by N. M.) (Chernyshevsky, 1974, p. 116).

Nikolai Chernyshevsky goes deeper into the social perspective and formulates the position of personal good relating it. The disclosure of such a view makes all people a priori egoists, but at the same time, one does not deepen into the egoism essence and the person himself, as it is less significant in comparison with the field of society. In modern studies, egoism is rather related to the field of psychology, to social philosophy or ethics, or is rethought in the works of anthropologists of the past.

Statement of basic materials

Rudolf Steiner (2007) believes that man is egoism in its purest form with all its power and strength directed towards himself (p. 173). What I cannot disagree with. In other words, a person is full of his personal egoism, he knows himself how and what he needs, morality and dogma only tie him. Therefore, I support Steiner's position in the dispute with Chernyshevsky, when he speaks of internal egoism as the core of human being, believing that the destruction of the self can come only from an external factor, which destroys the concept of the egoist and, accordingly, stops him.

Friedrich Nietzsche, who back in the 19th century connected egoism and ego, in my opinion, he thereby indicated that egoism is an integral part of any thinking being. He wrote: "There can be nothing else but egoism, that for people whose ego becomes weak and fluid, the power of great love is weakened, that the most loving are primarily due to the power of their ego ..." (transl. by N. M.) (Nietzsche, 2005, p. 213). It should be borne in mind that in Nietzsche, the egoism disclosure is accepted as a blessing, but is fully attainable only if the person is growing up as a person, which I also agree with. However, in the topic under study, the fact of renewal, i.e. change habitual lifestyle, habitual body integrity can be considered as a person's growing up.

The topic of egoism, considered by many authors, loses prime cause of "self-care" and is turned into a unity of altruism and egoism. A similar search for symbiosis is described by Hans Selye (1979), who introduces the phrase "altruistic egoism", thereby indicating the impossibility of the existence of egoism in its pure form (p. 21). Or the same concept is hidden by another definition of "egoaltruism" in the work of Yuriy Ryurikov (1990, p. 57). But in this case, I understand the thoughts of the authors as the fact that they perceive egoism as a benefit to the person. Moreover, the benefit from egoism is impossible without sympathy or an external factor of influence. The concepts introduced by Hans Selye and Y. Ryurikov, in my opinion, should be interpreted as the opportunity for the manifestation of altruism to maintain alternative egoism in another. Thus, these concepts refer to social relations. They are positive in every sense, but these are not manifestations of internal egoism in its pure form, which the author of the article is trying to consider.

Egoism, blocked by the criteria of social morality, eventually either becomes a miserable model of itself, or develops into a synthesis form in the examples of "altruistic egoism or egoaltruism". As writes about the egoism globalization, with whom I would like to disagree: "the difference in the action levels of solidarity and egoism was probably one of the reasons that provided the possibility of a long and relatively peaceful coexistence for two mutually exclusive concepts" (transl. by N. M.) (Avdeeva, 2013, p. 130). In this case, egoism and selfishness, which are completely different in structure and manifestations, should be divided within the framework of social influence. Reflections of Philip J. Ivanhoe (2018), which say that the model of moral motivation is much stronger than the model of self-sacrifice, support my position on egoism and selfishness. Egoism, in the social model of values, is turned into altruism with some benefit for the individual and loses the essence of its highest purpose as "self-care", leaving for this only the consequences of the altruism projected into the outside.

We can make intermediate conclusions that altruism is "rational egoism", and we cannot reveal egoism in its pure form in socially dependent individuals. So does it exist outside of society, are there any examples of its manifestation without additional leverages? Yes, such egoism is egoism of overcoming oneself or "limited rational egoism", that is, egoism without egoistic manifestations, limited by one person, without violating the boundaries of others.

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Egoism with disabilities – in my understanding, this is egoism that does not go beyond the possible harm to others for their own good. Such egoism cannot exist due to the infringement of the "rational egoism" of the other. Thus, I separate egoism and selfishness in different categories. From a logical point of view, egoism as a medium for the development of one's "ego" in the concept of one's own attitude towards oneself must not violate the objectivity of the internal essence of the personality itself.

Rational egoism goes beyond the boundaries of natural egoism and is based on reason, as a censor of an act, not relying on its impulsiveness. Thus, the status of "limited rational egoism" is a symbiosis of the moral and egoistic qualities of the individual himself, regardless of morality, and it is directed inward, not outward. "Limited egoism" is "existential egoism". As an example, we can cite the following thesis: "I will do what I want to increase my own self-esteem and for my own good without the help of other people" (Bazaluk, & Blazhevych, 2015). In simple words, I will choose the best, until I am limited by internal morality and guided by internal self-respect within the framework of my needs.

Such an example is very visible in a metropolis, as a choice. A selfish model of behavior comes down to the principle: "I will take a very convenient parking spot, which is beneficial to me regardless of the convenience of those around me". And egoism in its pure form, but without selfish manifestation, looks like this: "I will take a very convenient parking spot, leaving the opportunity for the convenience of others". Seemingly, the difference itself is not great, but if one thinks about it, it is huge. Both one act and the second is a manifestation of egoism, but in the second act, a person is more affected not by external factors of morality, but by the internal limitations of his selfishness.

Therefore, I talk about "rational limited egoism" using the word "limited", which in Ukrainian and Russian corresponds to the well-known definition of a person with disabilities, where he is characterized as a physically limited person. This concept perfectly describes the problem under consideration and gives an understanding that egoism is limited to one person outside of society, and at the same time does not produce altruism and cannot be supported by "egoaltruism" or "altruistic egoism". Egoism is limited both by definition and by the essence of its magnitude. It should also be called "limited" because it is possible in this form only within the framework of ultimate being, during periods of crisis and existential experience, choice, assessment or reassessment of one's essence – in other layers of being, it does not have such limitations.

At present, egoism is characterized by behavioral principles. An individual outside of society will not suspect that he is egoist. The transformation of egoism into the basic values of the individual himself during crisis changes becomes a necessary instrument for self-awareness. This is evidenced by the theory called by Michel Foucault (1998) as "self-care", and the state of disability is a vivid example of this type of egoism, as the only straw using which you can get out of a tragic state without losing your inner core.

First, let me make it clear that I consider the situation of a tragic state, disability, which, in my opinion, has basic indicators in the meta-anthropological vector of perception, as "being on the edge". In the theory of meta-anthropology, N. V. Khamitov identifies three main dimensions of human being: ordinary being, ultimate being and being beyond the bounds. He emphasizes that ultimate being, "being-on-the-edge is a rebellion against the social assignment of human life, a breakthrough to freedom" and clarifies that ultimate being is possible only in an existential crisis. "Existence", the author writes, "means the tragic discord of the I and the world around us, the growing contradiction between them" (transl. by N. M.) (Khamitov, 2017, p. 111).

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Considering the situation with acquired disability as a fate, one should determine the place and position of the individual in the context of the meta-anthropological paradigm.

In the study, disability is a tragic accident that has led to the loss of bodily harmony, the full realization of the possibility of death and the subsequent search for a new meaning in life. Fatal accident becomes determining factor of being for several years, and possibly for life. This definition puts the disabled person in the framework of ultimate being or the tragic boundary into which a person plunges instantly. It is not thoughts, not anxieties, not external alienation that immerse him in an existential state, but fate, which creates a precedent for deepening into existence. The horror and despair that befell a disabled person disorient him in the field of everyday (ordinary) life, creating voids: the loss of life meaning on a personal plane, the absence of a role in the society structure.

All this moves him from ordinary to ultimate being. Such tragic changes for a disabled person bordering on non-existence, "void and loss of meaning are the essence of the expression of non-existence, threatening the spiritual life of a person. Human finiteness implies such a threat, and alienation is its actualization" (transl. by N. M.) (Tillich, 1995, p. 38). This is how Paul Tillich describes and explains this, which I completely agree with, but I emphasize that non-existence leaves him in the framework of ultimate being with a gaping void of despair. Keeping to the traditions of atomism, we can accept that "non-existence" is a void. Then there can be no sense in void and the possibility of resolving the situation reaches an impasse.

Thus, in my opinion, and the personal experience of a person with a disability, a disabled person experiencing the tragedy of what is happening, depreciates himself. Using the metaphor of Paul Wayne, which Foucault successfully noticed, a person is in a state of aquarium. His own internal and external problems are completely separated from the outside world, and he looks at it like a fish in aquarium that he recalls (Bernini, 2015, p. 45).

Being in this state and rethinking not only the meaning of the new existence, but himself as a new person, he reacquaints with himself and learns to live in a new body. At that moment, "limited rational egoism" becomes an assistant and the only mentor in defining oneself as a significant element of the universe. Creates, builds himself new, his essence, culture, values, which coincides with the conclusions of M. Foucault: "(a situation) in which internal relations with oneself were strengthened and revalued and the importance of attitude to oneself was increased" (transl. by N. M.). Thus, the principle of "care of the self" by M. Foucault (1998) most fully reveals the existence of a person's need for himself and is interpreted, in my opinion, very clearly defining such a need as "the art of existence (techne tou biou) in its various forms ..." (transl. by N. M.) (p. 51).

Creating the concept of meta-anthropology, N. V. Khamitov (2017) suggested that a person cannot be constantly on the same level of being, and his life is divided into certain segments. Each person, being in one of the types of being, periodically goes beyond its limits under the influence of the circumstances of the outside world. The state of existential crisis can keep an ordinary person in ultimate being for the period of transformation, to rethink the tragic contradictions. A disabled person, with the receipt of a new body can be in the ultimate state most of his life. Moving into the ordinary or beyond the bound being may not be attainable for him.

In such immersions in a tragic reality or a state of existential crisis, a person stays for a long time. The formation of a new reality for him is possible through the acceptance of himself and through love for himself, for a new body, for new circumstances of life and for new ways of realizing his egoism. We find a similar personality description of Lev Shestov in the discussion of

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F. M. Dostoevskiy's underground man, when he characterizes a person in a crisis, who already through his denials gives rise to the tragedy of rejection. Lev Shestov's (2016) quote, in my opinion, emphasizes the tragedy of disability and its impact on humans: "no social reorganization will drive out tragedies from life and, apparently, the time has come not to deny suffering as some kind of fictitious reality one can get rid of using the magic word "it should not be", but accept them, acknowledge and, perhaps, finally understand" (transl. by N. M.) (p. 60).

Life has created such contradictions, raising them to a paradox. In this paradox, egoism exists as the salvation of one's inner world in the awareness of the injustice of being. A person realizes that it is completely impossible to live in the old way, he needs to create not only the concept of personal egoism, but also his own egoistic being in the framework of real life. The deepest prerequisite to provoke egoism is, first of all, the materiality of existence itself, which in the new body has to be rethought and form being for one's own needs. As correctly indicated, "the key 'category' in the construction of egoism is denial, expressed in the alienation of a person, his self-absorption and focus on his own interests, beyond understanding their dialectical connection with the interests of society as a whole" (transl. by N. M.) (Koromyslov, 2019, p. 52). This confirms the inevitability of being of a person with disability outside the objectivity of the world around him.

As V. L. Lekhcier (2007) notes: "The meaning of pain and illness is 'compulsion to interrogation' not as another form of speech, but as a hopeless ontological state associated with personality traits ... this state and experience is accompanied by a radical interrogation regarding one's own existence and being in general" (transl. by N. M.) (p. 48). And I will add that it is the relationship with pain that creates the space of ultimate being. The goal in this case, for a person with disabilities, is to preserve his essence as a person and redefine his life goals. Physical pain that fills the space does not allow you to love your body. The body, which has changed its form, hurts the mind, and the mind refuses to accept reality as the source of being. A person is immersed in a state of apathy and dislike for himself, the way out of this state is egoism, as a manifestation of an internal essence. A person becomes a little child who does not understand the environment; only two things are important to him: who he is and why he is here. And all this lies in the realm of anxiety.

Paul Tillich considers three types of anxieties and divides them into classes – anxiety of non-existence, anxiety of lack of meaning and anxiety of guilt. He says that not all kinds of anxieties (although they may be present in a person) will be expressed simultaneously (Tillich, 1995, p. 46). In a situation of disability, a person is faced with all three types of anxieties, moreover, in hypertrophied form. The only way out of this situation is egoism, as an incentive for existence, considering it a stage of overcoming the disease, and I agree with these reasonings: "it is the rethinking of one's life and values that can motivate a person to fight and defeat a disease that is even considered to be fatal" (transl. by N. M.) (Antonova, & Kuznetsova, 2017, p. 466).

Thus, "limited rational egoism" acts as a step for overcoming the tragic crisis of a person in a situation of disability. But how long can a person remain in "existential egoism?" In answer to this question, it can be assumed that in such a pure form egoism cannot exist forever, it will also leave the framework of ultimate being and will be transformed into other types of egoistic awareness. In the concept of tragic accident, egoism becomes necessary for the simple survival of a person. Later, when it is transferred to the being beyond the bounds, egoism can be transformed into altruism, and in everyday life, into consumer egoism. Let us consider these transitions.

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Sooner or later, a person will need social communication and integration. In my opinion, "rational egoism" has its transformations in the field of ordinary being. If we take as the basis that ordinary being is a routine space of daily life, then existential egoism becomes the egoism of consumerism and acquires bright features of selfishness. Acceptance of benefits from others to the detriment of the needs of others and neglecting their desires. In this case, a person becomes a kind of vampire who takes away the goods necessary for him to the detriment of society and the environment. The sociocultural system is not able to create a rebuff because the principles of humanism and tolerance are proclaimed in society. Moreover, a person with a disability having already left the framework of ultimate being continues to enjoy the benefits of the transformation that has happened to him. We often encounter squalid personalities with minimal physicality changes, e.g. lack of arm or leg, begging, or using their position to gain profit.

The second negative factor in ordinary being may be the manifestation of resentment, thereby egoistic manifestations become detrimental not only to the environment, but also to the person himself in his limited abilities. As described V. V. Kuznetsov (2017), with whom I cannot disagree: "resentment manifests itself as a complex of envy, hatred, umbrage and revengefulness towards other individuals who are more successful in implementing the law of existential egoism" (transl. by N. M.) (p. 95). In the same way, ordinary being creates dangerous prerequisites for a person to stop being in the existential state of "limited egoism" and to enter a state of negation. A person walks out of anxieties through physical or spiritual doping, turning to religious movements or alcohol abuse. All this creates the illusion of the world's acceptance of man in his new state. The return into ordinary being without proper internal transformation brings problems both for the person himself and for the surrounding people, relatives and the society as a whole. Only a sufficient immersion in one's inner world with a new transformation of the body and rethinking one's anxieties and fears, as well as accepting oneself as a new person, is able to carry out painless integration into ordinary being. As trite as this sounds, but love yourself new. Based on the statistical facts of the WHO, almost 30 million people are addicted to drugs, and suicide is the second leading cause of death among young people (Lozovoy, & Ponedilok, 2018, p. 34). The author of the article sees the reason for this as a lowering the value of their life with increasing self-absorption. The solution to the problem cannot lie in the usual fields of knowledge and should consist in the development of a philosophical and anthropological system in the construction of new values for a person faced with a crisis. Only a concept of rethinking and new paradigms at the level of social and spiritual education and self-development can lead a person out of a crisis.

To rise one notch, to the being beyond the bounds, as to the creative space of awareness from ultimate being, is possible only if one immerses one's egoism in interconnection with the laws of the environment. Human behavior should be more flexible and requiring integration of a person into processes. I should note and agree with Lisa Downing (2019) that a woman is more adaptive and able to experience more gently the conditions of a personal crisis, which the author calls "self-sufficient egoism" (p. 20). But this topic requires a deeper immersion in gender differences.

A vivid example of life in a disability situation for me is Stephen Hawking. Despite the progressive disease that befell him, all his life he was a man living a decent life and having achieved great success in his field. It is an example of this person that creates understanding of how one can be completely dependent on others and be beneficial for everyone at the same time. "Limited egoism" makes it possible to transform into altruism.

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Answering the question posed at the beginning of the work can there be egoism in its purest form, without the influence of society and what forms it has, I conclude: such egoism exist, it is a way of survival within the framework of ultimate being as "limited rational egoism" of a person. And it is egoism that allows a person to grow in its manifestations in the fight against various types of anxieties and overcome the consequences of disability.

Originality

For the first time, meta-anthropology is used as an anthropological analysis tool for a person in a disability situation. I attempted to prove the need for egoism in a situation related to the transformation of the body into new conditions. The need to develop egoism as a function capable of actualizing a person in the circumstances of being disabled. The necessity of egoism to overcome the situation of existential crisis (ultimate being), in which a person is due to a disability situation, is also proved.

Conclusions

In social culture, egoism does not have unambiguous structure and tends to transform into various synthetic forms: "egoaltruism" or "altruistic egoism". As a positive quality, egoism in the pure form is possible only in the structure of ultimate being.

For a disability situation, egoism becomes an incentive in the struggle for the formation of a new I and is positive:

1. Egoism of an individual in a disability situation is always expressed in the formula of "self-care".
2. Egoism is the only way out of the existence of anxiety, and in this case, it should be designated as "limited rational egoism".

In the future, it is planned to consider in detail and stage by stage the manifestations of egoism at all meta-anthropological levels, connecting the classification by personality type and gender characteristics.

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ЕГОЇЗМ ЯК СПОСІБ ВИХОДУ З ЕКЗИСТЕНЦІЙНОЇ КРИЗИ ДЛЯ ЛЮДИНИ В СИТУАЦІЇ ІНВАЛІДНОСТІ

Мета статті – встановити роль егоїзму в житті людини, що зіткнулася з ситуацією інвалідності, як моментом самовизначення в екзистенційній кризі. Я ставлю завдання – з допомогою філософської антропології за принципом метаантропології оцінити вплив егоїзму і з'ясувати його значимість в перспективі подальшого буття особистості в умовах інвалідності. **Теоретичний базис.** Ґрунтуючись на тому, що роль егоїзму сприймається громадською думкою, як порок, і тягне за собою поглинання особистістю благ, призначених для інших, я знаходжу їх невідповідними стосовно людини в ситуації інвалідності. Я беру до уваги концепції "еґоальтруїзму" та "альтруїстичного еґоїзму", що лише частково обґрунтовують позитивний вплив еґоїзму і є продуктом симбіотичного впливу альтруїзму й еґоїзму. Поєднання еґоїзму з альтруїзмом не можуть розкрити суть кризи для людини, що потрапила в ситуацію інвалідності. У ситуації інвалідності людина не може синтезувати альтруїзм, як частину симбіозу еґоїзму. Методологічною системою в дослідженні позитивної ролі еґоїзму використовується сучасна теорія метаантропології Назіпа Хамітова. Теорія, що розділяє буття людини на різні типи (буденне, граничне і позамежне), здатна найбільш повно структурувати поняття еґоїзму в бутті людини, що зазнала інвалідності. **Наукова новизна.** Мною зроблено спробу довести позитивну роль еґоїзму в ситуації, що пов'язана з трансформацією тіла в нові умови. Проведено аналіз доказів необхідності розвитку еґоїзму як функції, що здатна актуалізувати людину в сформованих обставинах кризи. Також висунута теорія про необхідність еґоїзму для виходу із ситуації екзистенційної кризи (граничного буття), в якому людина перебуває через ситуацію інвалідності. **Висновки.** Я показую, що турбота про себе (еґоїзм) є врівноважуючим фактором для людини, як протиставлення фатально-несправедливій ситуації, в якій людина отримала інвалідність. Розумний еґоїзм здатний вивести людину із граничного буття й дозволити трансформуватися в новій, зміненій реальності.

Ключові слова: еґоїзм; еґоальтруїзм; буденне буття; граничне буття; метакритичне буття; людина; інвалідність

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ЭГОИЗМ КАК СПОСОБ ВЫХОДА ИЗ ЭКЗИСТЕНЦИАЛЬНОГО КРИЗИСА ДЛЯ ЧЕЛОВЕКА В СИТУАЦИИ ИНВАЛИДНОСТИ

Цель статьи – установить роль эгоизма в жизни человека, столкнувшегося с ситуацией инвалидности, как момента самоопределения в экзистенциальном кризисе. Я ставлю задачу – с помощью философской антропологии по принципу метаантропологии оценить влияние эгоизма и выяснить его значимость в перспективе дальнейшего бытия личности в условиях инвалидности. **Теоретический базис.** Основываясь на том, что роль эгоизма воспринимается общественным мнением, как порок, и влечет за собой поглощение личностью благ, предназначенных для других, я нахожу их несоответствующими применительно к человеку в ситуации инвалидности. Я принимаю во внимание концепции "эгоальтруизма" и "альтруистического эгоизма", которые лишь частично обосновывают положительное влияние эгоизма и являются продуктом симбиотического взаимодействия альтруизма и эгоизма. Соединение эгоизма с альтруизмом не могут раскрыть суть кризиса для человека, попавшего в ситуацию инвалидности. В ситуации инвалидности человек не может синтезировать альтруизм, как часть симбиоза эгоизма. Методологической системой в исследовании положительной роли эгоизма используется современная теория метаантропологии Назипа Хамитова. Теория, разделяющая бытие человека на различные типы (обыденное, предельное и запредельное), способна наиболее полно структурировать понятие эгоизма в бытие человека, получившего инвалидность. **Научная новизна.** Мною предпринята попытка доказать положительную роль эгоизма в ситуации, связанной с трансформацией тела в новые условия. Проведен анализ доказательства необходимости развития эгоизма как функции, способной актуализировать человека в сформированных обстоятельствах кризиса. Также выдвинута теория о необходимости эгоизма для выхода из ситуации экзистенциального кризиса (предельного бытия), в котором человек пребывает из-за ситуации инвалидности. **Выводы.** Я показываю, что забота о себе (эгоизм) есть уравнивающий фактор для человека, как противопоставление фатально-несправедливой ситуации, в которой человек получил инвалидность. Разумный эгоизм способен вывести человека из предельного бытия и позволить трансформироваться в новой, измененной реальности.

Ключевые слова: эгоизм; эгоальтруизм; обыденное бытие; предельное бытие; запредельное бытие; человек; инвалидность

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TO THE BASICS OF MODERN POLITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY: FREEDOM AND JUSTICE IN THE SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY OF T. HOBBS

Purpose. The purpose of the study lies in critical reconstruction of Thomas Hobbes's social contract theory as an important principle not only of modern political anthropology, but also of modern and postmodern social projects. As well as, in the unfolding of the fundamentally important both for the newest social-philosophical and philosophical-anthropological discourses of the thesis that each individual is the origin of both personal and institutional freedom and justice, making the contract first of all with himself, with his desires and sorrows and then with other people and the state. **Theoretical basis.** The principle of social contract offered by Hobbes became a new social, methodologically significant and relevant principle of regulation of activity, which indicates essential for the modern political philosophy and the philosophy of law transition from teleological (ancient and medieval) to legal (modern) ideas of justice. For an in-depth study of the philosophical and anthropological aspects of Hobbes's contractualism, we used the historical-comparative and contextualization method, as well as the works of leading native and foreign researchers of Hobbes, who uphold the provisions on the organic affiliation of fundamental socio-philosophical and philosophical-anthropological questions about the nature of man, the relation of coercion, freedom and justice with the discourse of social contract. **Originality.** On the basis of a consistent analysis of the anthropological component of Hobbes's theory of social contract, an in-depth understanding of modern contractualism and contemporary discussions in the field of its existential and anthropological component is offered, as well as the thesis that political anthropology is the core of the philosophical anthropology because it makes possible the methodologically important understanding of the basic problems of human existence – the interaction of justice and freedom, self-interest and public good, as well as it quite clearly outlines the ways to overcome the dilemmas of liberalism and communitarianism, individualism and holism. **Conclusions.** Political anthropology of T. Hobbes constructed in the context of a modern social project, justified the issue of interaction between freedom and justice, which is fundamentally important to nowadays, through the search for such a way of social relations, in which an individual, being in the realm of social existence, would seek to limit his own selfishness and freedom for the sake of the common will of the majority. Thanks to Hobbes, the idea of external humility in disobedience to the inner, of freedom of conscience as a "human and citizen", of an understanding of individual independence, which is not just a permissible but accepted by state power, has been acquired with exceptional theoretical and practical meaning. Thanks to Hobbes's works, the essence (and the falsity of simplified interpretations of the latter's heritage) was revealed by the relationship between the cooperative and the conflicted vision of man.

Keywords: social contract; man; justice; freedom; power; state

Introduction

Such well-known philosophers as D. Gauthier, O. Höffe, W. Kersting, A. Leist, H. Maier, K. Hubner, C. Taylor, C. Schmitt, M. Weber critically realized and referred to the classical theory of social contract of Thomas Hobbes. The significance of the idea of a social contract for the

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constitution of a just state of law is noted by Ukrainian researchers as R. Dymerecs, O. Khoma, V. Shamray, A. Yermolenko. In philosophical circles, the interest to Hobbes's understanding of a man, his freedom, power and justice is only increasing, as evidenced, for example, by an international conference at the Department of Political Philosophy at the University of Tübingen, dedicated to the realising of the famous work of Hobbes "De Cive" in March last year.

Purpose

The purpose of the study lies in critical reconstruction of Thomas Hobbes' social contract theory as an important principle not only of modern political anthropology, but also of modern and postmodern social projects. As well as, in the unfolding of the fundamentally important both for the newest social-philosophical and philosophical-anthropological discourses thesis that each individual is the origin of both personal and institutional freedom and justice, making the contract first of all with himself, with his desires and sorrows and then with other people and the state.

Statement of basic materials

This is primarily about the methodological significance and urgency for modern philosophy and our inner space of the principle of social contract developed by Hobbes as a new social principle of regulation of human existence, which became the embodiment of the essential for modern political philosophy and the philosophy of the right of transition from the teleological to the legal images of a man, his freedom and justice. It is precisely because of the profound methodological shifts in the understanding of a human nature, as well as its freedom and justice, and almost all known in the sphere of European political philosophy authors' appeal to the Hobbes' way of thinking. They emphasize the fact that the break with the natural state means a new social principle of activity's regulation – when the place of instincts and traditions can be replaced by justice. And the individual, with all his natural rights, agrees with the community only in condition of the presence of such rules that express a general interest. The interpretation of the mentality by T. Hobbes only as a mentality predominantly instrumental, only as rational, substitutes a reasonable compromise of rational individuals within the limits of a particular agreement. This new-day idea of a social contract, embodied primarily in the political philosophy of Rousseau, is concentrated, and was later embodied in the thesis of I. Kant that in the practical questions concerning the justification of norms and actions, the place of profound principles such as nature or God is replaced by a formal principle of mentality.

The investigated by Lou Marinoff influence of T. Hobbes' ideas on such classics of contractualism as J.-J. Rousseau, J. Locke, and I. Kant, not only made it possible to extrapolate by the author of the article of the Hobbes' negative interpretation of human nature (humans are selfish predators with instinct wishes) on Freud ideas of overcoming the fear of death and the unknown, but also actualized Hobbes' political and philosophical anthropology which we are studying. If L. Marinoff (2019) calls modern people as "unlimited maximizers" who strive to get a quick and maximum benefit of every situation whether it is social, economic or political at minimal personal cost, then it is quite logical to supplement T. Hobbes's "strict portrait of human nature" by reconstructing of his thoughts about freedom and justice.

Before formulating the main "critical" points of Hobbes's political philosophy, we emphasize that it was the social contract, became for him synonymous to the agreement of individuals about a stable state order that was able to save people from the horrors of the "natural state"

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with its "a war as is of every man against every man". The tragic picture of the lonely, poor and short human life, inherent in the individual in its "primitive state", a sense of fear and mutual danger, generates, according to Hobbes, the possibility of the agreement of individuals to end the "a war as is of every man against every man" and the achievement of civil peace. As W. Kersting (1996) points out: "absolute domination is not only a sufficient condition, but also a necessary condition for ending the state of war and establishing a peaceful order of coexistence" (p. 100).

The necessity for an overall understanding of the social and political life of a person is also stipulated by the search for ways of mediating the main measurements of regulating the individual's behaviour in civil society; personal opportunity to agree on a rejection of aggressive behaviour. Mutual interest also gives the possibility of continuation the action, initially, only of a simple peace agreement within the state, where a person is compelled to sacrifice the right and part of freedom, relying on the ability to distinguish between good and evil. However, here appears the problem of the combination of freedom and justice, of personal and general interest, which is an additional argument in favour of a consistent and critical reconstruction of Hobbes's answer to the question. In other words, how important and fundamental for him and for the further development of modern political philosophy was the negative-conflict interpretation of human nature, their freedom and justice? This is primarily about the work of the famous German philosopher Otfried Höffe. It is worthwhile to highlight Hobbes (Höffe, 2010) as his most significant work, which describes not only the way of life and the main ideas of T. Hobbes's "encyclopaedic works", but also contemporary discussions on the political philosophy of the latter, and also explores the basic concepts and principles of Hobbes's political anthropology: from his image of man to the philosophy of power, who needs further research and development precisely in the stream of his political philosophy. This is especially true of Hobbes' Leviathan and his work "De Cive" reflections on power, justice and freedom, as the cornerstone of his political philosophy. In addition, the understanding of the essence of political anthropology, outlined in the work of O. Höffe (1987) "Political justice" and developed in the collection of articles under his editorship "Man – a political animal? Essay on Political Anthropology" (Höffe, 1992) also points to the fruitful understanding of the philosophical work of Thomas Hobbes precisely in line with political anthropology.

As O. Höffe rightly believes, one should speak about a significant component of modern political philosophy and its fundamental problem – the problem of justice. In this context, it was Hobbes who initiated the search for the answer to the question: "Are there really such natural interests (and, consequently, the interests of mankind), which would prove to be useful, or vice versa – against, social, more precisely, political, that is, form-forming in relation to the state and rights, powers of coercion?" (Höffe, 1987, p. 139).

Therefore, political philosophy is the core of philosophical anthropology, because it enables an understanding of the fundamental issues of human existence – justice and freedom. Thanks to the works of Hobbes, the essence (and the falsity of simplified interpretations of the heritage of the latter) of the relationship of the cooperative and conflict man's vision was revealed.

The problems of modern political anthropology are formulated in the form of finding answers to questions about the main ways, ways of justification (by definition) of the natural state and the basic human fears and aspirations of the basic principles of social existence. As we have already noted, in the very idea of a social contract, which underlies all social agreements and acts as a fundamental legitimation, the basic problems of modern political philosophy and anthropology

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are rooted. The essence of these problems can be formulated not only as a dilemma of cooperation or conflict, or happiness or freedom. Thanks to Hobbes, we not only can, but we must constantly assert that no one, even under the fear of death, can think otherwise than convinces his own mind. And from this he follows his idea of external humility in internal disobedience, which should lead the philosopher and subsequently leads to the idea of freedom of conscience as "human rights and citizen", to the understanding of individual independence, which is not only permissible, but must be recognized as state power.

The most famous work of Hobbes begins with a section about man, his passions and virtues, which has a significant not only methodological but also socio-practical content. The man in his "Leviathan" and other works is both strong and weak at the same time, and his image and life appear to be organically interconnected. Fortunately, the fruitful grains of his reflections have not been destroyed along with his age, but have quite successfully survived to this day: an evil, aggressive person needs a strong state, as soon as it directs for the better, it becomes able to manifest its spiritual, divine origin, and then the state becomes less cruel. Thus, the core of the Hobbes understanding of man is the idea that a person, having received a state, may and must (already in a social state) strive to become "like God":

Sometimes a man desires to know the event of an action; and then he thinketh of some like action past, and the events thereof one after another, supposing like events will follow like actions. As he that foresees what will become of a criminal recons what he has seen follow on the like crime before, having this order of thoughts; the crime, the officer, the prison, the judge, and the gallows. Which kind of thoughts is called foresight, and prudence, or providence, and sometimes wisdom. (Hobbes, 2005, p. 16)

Good and evil are also interconnected, do not derive from the nature of the objects themselves, but depend on the person "that is it which he for his part calleth good; and the object of his hate and aversion, evil; and of his contempt, vile and inconsiderable" (Hobbes, 2005, p. 39).

These thesis Hobbes (2005) not only supplement the definition of the three types of good and evil, but also notes that "all appetite, desire, and love is accompanied with some delight more or less; and all hatred and aversion with more or less displeasure and offence" (p. 41).

It can also be argued that Hobbes's negative human qualities, which are especially noticeable at the time of shameless accumulation of initial capital, are fundamentally relevant to the present. It is about covetousness, which always has a shade of shame, and ambition, as a desire for a position and an award. However, when defining vanity, Hobbes does not forget about fame as awareness of his own strength and abilities and the strength on them. When self-confidence "grounded on the flattery of others, or only supposed by himself, for delight in the consequences of it, is called vainglory" (Hobbes, 2005, p. 44).

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In the transitional era, important are the lack of sympathy and solidarity, virtues which are the consequence and the basis of justice: contempt for other people can be regarded as cruelty derived from self-confidence, and the combination of man's upset by the wealth and honour of other people with an endeavour Destroy the rival or become an obstacle – that's what envy is.

Before defining happiness as essential (together with freedom) as a constituent of the fundamental questions of political anthropology, Hobbes stops on such virtues as honesty and dignity, and then outlines the primitive and constitutive meaning of eternal and unceasing desire by a man of ever greater power. Therefore dignity of a person "is a thing different from the worth or value of a man, and also from his merit or desert, and consisteth in a particular power or ability for that whereof he is said to be worthy" (Hobbes, 2005, p. 83).

In defining happiness as a constant movement from one object to another, Hobbes emphasizes that this often refers to the superiority of such a general human inclination as "a perpetual and restless desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death" (Hobbes, 2005, p. 85).

And most importantly, what is the main reason for such an inclination? That is, according to Hobbes, not so much about the desire for ever greater pleasure that accompanies the authorities, so much so that greater and greater power ensures the proper level of already existing power and prosperity. And the people who are powerless to obey the authorities are prompted by the desire for peace and security. Moreover, "fear of oppression disposeth a man to anticipate or to seek aid by society: for there is no other way by which a man can secure his life and liberty" (Hobbes, 2005, p. 87).

Already here, Hobbes outlines the switchover from the anthropological component to the theory of the transaction, which is why his interpretation of power must be especially served. Note that Hobbes's interpretation of power is not as unambiguous as some of his critics say: it is not just about the unlimited desire of material goods, the latter become subject to the phenomenon of power when the distribution begins among many friends and servants:

Nature hath made men so equal in the faculties of body and mind as that,
though there be found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body or
of quicker mind than another, yet when all is reckoned together the difference between man and man is not so considerable as that one man can thereupon claim to himself any benefit to which another may not pretend as well as he. (Hobbes, 2005, p. 107)

And the weakest can kill the strongest, united with other people. Continuing his reflections, Hobbes (2005) emphasizes that equality is the basis of distrust, and the latter motivates the desire of the authorities: "And from this diffidence of one another, there is no way for any man to secure himself so reasonable as anticipation; that is, by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can so long till he sees no other power great enough to endanger him" (p. 108).

The same people feel great bitterness in staying in a society without power, and in the very nature of man we find, according to Hobbes (2005), rivalry, uncertainty and aspiration for glory: "Hereby it is manifest that during the time men live without a common power to keep them all in

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awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a war as is of every man against every man" (p. 109), which is not inherent only stagnation in all spheres of social life, and above all, constant fear and danger of violent death, which transforms human life into a lonely, poor and short one. However, the marked constant fear and danger of violent death and the desire for a peaceful life make people not only prone to peace, but outline the foundations of a peace agreement. To understand these principles, Hobbes again refers to the definition of freedom as the absence of obstacles to the free and prudent use of power.

It is from this awareness of power that there is an opportunity to overcome the state of war, the ability and necessity for a person to: "lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men as he would allow other men against himself. For as long as every man holdeth this right, of doing anything he liketh; so long are all men in the condition of war" (Hobbes, 2005, p. 114).

Thus, describing the natural state through the statement of the desire (equal to the violent death) of people to self-preservation, happiness and power, Hobbes emphasizes – the word is too weak an irritant of human passions and cannot be compared to the fear of a strong, authorized compelled authority. Because of this weakness of only one word to force people to execute their agreements, there is human existence, Hobbes (2005) points out, only two ways to strengthen them: "And those are either a fear of the consequence of breaking their word, or a glory or pride in appearing not to need to break it" (p. 123).

Only in the context of an agreement you can talk about justice and injustice. The actual notions of not only concluding and observing agreements, but also the way out of the natural state and establishment of the state, are actualized:

Therefore before the names of just and unjust can have place, there must be some coercive power to compel men equally to the performance of their covenants, by the terror of some punishment greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their covenant, and to make good that propriety which by mutual contract men acquire in recompense of the universal right they abandon: and such power there is none before the erection of a Commonwealth. (Hobbes, 2005, p. 125)

The State becomes essentially fundamental to property and justice: "So that the nature of justice consisteth in keeping of valid covenants, but the validity of covenants begins not but with the constitution of a civil power sufficient to compel men to keep them: and then it is also that propriety begins" (Hobbes, 2005, p. 126).

Hobbes also argues that the basic principles of a social contract and the human desire to act fairly and impartially do not come from the unconditionally universal structures of the mind, but from the conditional, categorical, conventionally agreed refusal, the prohibition to participate in a disastrous general social conflict. Moreover, the principle of justice based on such an agreement is not actually a metaphysical, universalizing justice, but only a temporary principle,

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which needs (for its own compliance) further state-political legitimization. The same thanks to T. Hobbes has articulated the importance of realizing the justice of the modern world – the mutual rejection of freedom must occur in certain, generally recognized limits. How does Hobbes answer the question of what it means to be a free person:

And according to this proper and generally received meaning of the word, a freeman is he that, in those things which by his strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindered to do what he has a will to. But when the words free and liberty are applied to anything but bodies, they are abused; for that which is not subject to motion is not to subject to impediment: and therefore, when it is said, for example, the way is free, no liberty of the way is signified, but of those that walk in it without stop.

(Hobbes, 2005, p. 40)

In other words, Hobbes continues, human freedom is that it performs as its will and desire point to it. Moreover, in his opinion, fear and freedom are also compatible, and human actions for fear of laws are also voluntary, because he can hold out from them.

True, D. Hume, beginning with a critical understanding of modern contractualism, considered somewhat naive thinking about the fact that power structures are established only by agreement. In his opinion, the binding nature of social orders may have initially contractual nature, but subsequently gradually loses it, obtaining an independent, independent of the arrangements of the force. Hume warns against the danger of imposing the unlimited power of the ruler and insists – only the principles of general and binding for all laws can protect the life and property of each person. It is this (polemically directed against Hobbes) the idea of the rule of law over the legitimate will of the ruler consistently advocated J.-J. Rousseau. When Hobbes tends to the advantages of the political system and the "kingdom of the earth", Hume gravitates to an internal moral law that updates his reflections in the context of the newest critical discourses of the social contract (E. Tugendhat, A. MacIntyre, and others) and the conventional interpretation of nature and the essence of morality.

Thus, Hobbes desired to realize comprehensively the rooted, in his opinion, depending on the security of freedom from the security of the relationship between the state and the citizen, the sovereign and the subject, transforming (but in due course, through the work of Locke and Rousseau) the landscapes distorted by the selfish interest of political existence into an intimate just political space. The latter tends to the internal moral law and prefers the interpretation of the state system as a free, and not alienated subordination of individuals to a certain supreme moral law, which receives the title of general will: I adhere to such an agreement, individuals take responsibility to be guided in their actions only by reason. It should also be emphasized that the morality of a person and his good attitude to other people are due to the relations of equality and solidarity, and vice versa, in the unequal conditions of social existence, people turn into atomic selfishness.

Originality

Yet in the theory of social contract of T. Hobbes, who "defeated the traditional priority of a man over the individual and the responsibility over the right" (Maier, 2002, p. 221), it is said that each "small" person is a leak, both personal and institutional freedom and justice, concluding, first of all, an agreement with themselves, with their ambitions and consciences, and then with other people and the state. Everything mentioned above to a certain extent, as Laurens van Apeldoorn (2019) points out in the contextual special for the Ukrainian social space article "On the Person and the Office of the Sovereign in Hobbes's Leviathan" refers to the sovereign, his actions as an "ordinary person" and actions of a sovereign as a politician as an artificial person who embodies the state in the head office. Proposed by the author interpretation of Hobbes' "Leviathan" became the development of the idea of the possibility of a constitutional restriction of the actions of the sovereign (state authority), the continuation of the discussion about the relations of the sovereign of a person and the civil society.

And, secondly, the deep transformations and crisis phenomena of modern society actualize over and over again the comprehension of the place and role of social contract in modern society. The particular relevance, it is the newest, often critical, aimed at understanding the heuristic meaning and the limits of modern contractualism, acquired for post-Soviet countries, which seek to build their states as legal and democratic. After all, democracy, at least in its most significant definition, is nothing but power, based on a social contract. In addition, the desire to combine the empirical and normative dimensions of contemporary social and political philosophy, to overcome the deep gap between philosophical discourses and real being, and to find the answer to the question of real and worthy ways out of the already described T. Hobbes's state of "a war as is of every man against every man" and devaluations based on freedom and courage, moral virtues, social justice in general.

Of course, such a desirable and hard-to-reach presence of common interest and consent based on mutual trust will help people (better than any contract) to act in a coordinated manner to achieve a common goal. And in order to remain in the area of justice and morals, it is necessary not only to get rid of formal agreements and to replace them with real deals, but to adhere to these agreements, without changing them to the advantage of ruling elites or clans. Thirdly, it is thanks to Hobbes that the significance of understanding the role of a social contract is not only for the constitution of the state, but also for its further functioning as a community of citizens who have the opportunity to live freely and discuss the actual social problems.

Consequently, the principle of a social contract rooted in the philosophy of man, actualizes not only the problem of justice, but also the problem of freedom and the rule of law as an essential moral and legal way of existence of modern society. A well-formulated idea is that the discourse of the social contract contains fundamental philosophical questions about the nature of man and the source of socialism, the nature of the interaction of people in society and the ways of its regulation, the nature of morality and law, the relation of coercion and freedom in society requires further research and development.

Thus, it is worth noting that the arguments of Communitarists against liberalism can already be overcome within the framework of a liberal paradigm, since individual rights and freedoms are carried out only in a certain social context. O. Höffe begins with the fact that historically, liberalism and individualism grew together. However, this is different doctrines. Liberalism is a doctrine of political morality that focuses on the issue of personal freedom. Individualism is a moral doctrine. It is related to liberalism in the same way that liberalism is related to democracy,

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which is interpreted as the theory of political institutions. Liberalism can reign as a basis for democracy, although it can be achieved for democratic purposes and on other grounds, each of which presupposes a democratic theory in a slightly different way (Höffe, 1996). It is also advisable to speak of communitarianism as an addition to liberalism, and the limitation of the application of the theory of social contract to the basic structure of a particular society was theoretically weak and rather fragile, since the public agreement should primarily concern the principles of "external" (global) justice. The latter should be interpreted in the search for algorithms to overcome global economic inequality and a new understanding of the subject of justice.

Conclusions

T. Hobbes has already emphasized that the reasons for violations of the social contract and hostility between people are rooted in the very nature of man and can be distinguished for the following three reasons: competition, distrust and vanity. It is the lack of trust that leads to violence and unfair claims of life and property of other people. This is also accompanied by desire, also in any way, more respect and recognition. Due to the absence of trust people appear to each other not as citizens, equal members of the public agreement, but as distressed competitors. Of particular relevance to the further study of T. Hobbes's philosophy is its profound, intellectual courage, reflection on man and his social being: "And be there never so great a multitude; yet if their actions be directed according to their particular judgements, and particular appetites, they can expect thereby no defence, nor protection, neither against a common enemy, nor against the injuries of one another" (Hobbes, 2005, p. 3).

Already from the time of Hobbes, thanks to Hobbes, the significance of the trust of the participants in the social contract has become clear, which, in contrast to suspicion and distrust, transforms atomic, selfish individuals into real citizens.

Constructed in the context of a modern social project, political anthropology of T. Hobbes justified the issue of interaction between freedom and justice, which is fundamentally important to nowadays, through the search for such a way of social relations, in which an individual, being in the realm of social existence, would seek to limit his own selfishness and freedom for the sake of the common will of the majority. Thanks to Hobbes, the idea of external humility in disobedience to the inner, of freedom of conscience as a "human and citizen", of an understanding of individual independence, which is not just a permissible but accepted by state power, has been acquired with exceptional theoretical and practical meaning. Thanks to Hobbes's works, the essence (and the falsity of simplified interpretations of the latter's heritage) was revealed by the relationship between the cooperative and the conflicted vision of man.

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ДО ЗАСАД МОДЕРНОЇ ПОЛІТИЧНОЇ АНТРОПОЛОГІЇ: СВОБОДА ТА СПРАВЕДЛИВІСТЬ У ТЕОРІЇ СУСПІЛЬНОЇ УГОДИ Т. ГОББСА

Мета. Мета дослідження полягає у критичній реконструкції теорії суспільної угоди Томаса Гоббса як важливої засади не лише модерної політичної антропології, а і модерного та постмодерного соціальних проєктів. А також – у розгортанні принципово важливої і для новітніх соціально-філософських та філософсько-антропологічних дискурсів тези про те, що кожна окрема людина є витоком, як персональної так і інституційної свободи та справедливості, укладаючи передусім угоду з собою, зі своїми прагненнями та сумлінням, а вже потім з іншими людьми та державою. **Теоретичний базис.** Принципово важливим, методологічно-значущим та актуальним для сучасної політичної антропології став запроваджений Гоббсом принцип суспільної угоди як новий суспільний принцип регуляції діяльності, що засвідчує про істотний для сучасної політичної філософії та філософії права перехід від телеологічних (античних та середньовічних) до правових (сучасних) уявлень про справедливість. Для поглибленого дослідження філософсько-антропологічних аспектів контрактуалізму Гоббса в якості необхідного постало використання історико-порівняльного методу та методу контекстуалізації, а також праць провідних вітчизняних та зарубіжних гоббсознавців, які обстоюють положення про органічну приналежність фундаментальних соціально-філософських та філософсько-антропологічних питань про природу людини, співвідношення примусу, свободи і справедливості до дискурсу суспільної угоди. **Наукова новизна.** На підставі послідовного аналізу антропологічної складової Гоббсової теорії суспільної угоди запропоновано поглиблене розуміння модерного контрактуалізму та сучасних дискусій в царині його екзистенційно-антропологічної складової, а також доведено тезу про те, що саме політична антропологія є осердям антропології філософської, бо уможливорює методологічно-значуще розуміння засадничих для людського буття проблем – взаємодії справедливості та свободи, власного інтересу та суспільного блага, а також

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досить чітко окреслює шляхи подолання дилеми лібералізму і комунітаризму, індивідуалізму і голізму. **Висновки.** Розбудована в контексті модерного соціального проєкту політична антропологія Т. Гоббса обґрунтувала принципово важливе й до сьогодні уявлення про взаємодію свободи і справедливості через пошук такого способу соціальних взаємин, за яких окрема людина, перебуваючи в царині соціального буття прагнула б обмеження власного егоїзму та свободи заради колективної волі більшості. Завдяки Гоббсу набули непересічного теоретичного та практичного сенсу ідеї про зовнішню покору при непокорі внутрішній, про свободу совісті як "права людини і громадянина", про розуміння індивідуальної незалежності, яка є не просто дозволеною, а визнаною державною владою. Завдяки творам Гоббса виявилась сутність (та хибність спрощених тлумачень спадщини останнього) взаємозв'язку кооперативного та конфліктного образу людини.

Ключові слова: суспільна угода; людина; справедливість; свобода; влада; держава

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К ОСНОВАМ СОВРЕМЕННОЙ ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ АНТРОПОЛОГИИ: СВОБОДА И СПРАВЕДЛИВОСТЬ В ТЕОРИИ ОБЩЕСТВЕННОГО ДОГОВОРА Т. ГОББСА

Цель. Цель исследования заключается в критической реконструкции теории общественного договора Томаса Гоббса как важной основы не только современной политической антропологии, но и современного и постмодернистского социальных проектов. А также – в развертывании принципиально важного и для новейших социально-философских и философско-антропологических дискурсов тезиса о том, что каждый отдельный человек является источником, как персональной, так и институциональной свободы и справедливости, заключая, прежде всего, договор с собой, со своими стремлениями и совестью, а уже потом с другими людьми и государством. **Теоретический базис.** Принципиально важным, методологически значимым и актуальным для современной политической антропологии стал разработанный Гоббсом принцип общественного договора в качестве нового общественного принципа регуляции деятельности, который засвидетельствовал значимый для современной политической философии и философии права переход от телеологических (античных и средневековых) к правовым (современным) представлениям о справедливости. Для углубленного исследования философско-антропологических аспектов контрактualизма Гоббса использованы историко-сравнительный метод и метод контекстуализации, а также работы ведущих отечественных и зарубежных исследователей Гоббса, которые разрабатывают идеи об органической принадлежности фундаментальных социально-философских и философско-антропологических вопросов о природе человека, соотношения принуждения, свободы и справедливости к дискурсу общественного договора. **Научная новизна.** На основе последовательного анализа антропологической составляющей теории общественного договора Гоббса предложено углубленное понимание современного контрактualизма и современных дискуссий в области его экзистенциально-антропологической составляющей, а также обоснован тезис о том, что именно политическая антропология является сердцевинной антропологии философской, так как делает возможным методологически значимое понимание основных для человеческого бытия проблем – взаимодействия справедливости и свободы, собственного интереса и общественного блага, а также достаточно четко определяет пути преодоления дилеммы либерализма и коммунитаризма, индивидуализма и холизма. **Выводы.** Разработанная в контексте современного социального проекта политическая антропология Т. Гоббса обосновала принципиально важное и сегодня представление о взаимодействии свободы и справедливости через поиск такого способа социальных отношений, при которых отдельный человек, находясь в области социального бытия, стремился бы к ограничению собственного эгоизма и свободы ради коллективной воли большинства. Благодаря Гоббсу приобрели непреходящий теоретический и практический смысл идеи о внешнем подчинении при неповиновении внутреннем, о свободе совести как "права человека и гражданина", о понимании индивидуальной независимости, которая

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выступает не просто разрешенной, а признанной государственной властью. Благодаря произведениям Гоббса выявлена сущность (и ошибочность упрощенных толкований наследия последнего) взаимосвязи кооперативного и конфликтного образа человека.

Ключевые слова: общественный договор; человек; справедливость; свобода; власть; государство

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PERCEIVING THE SACRED FEMININE: SOME THOUGHTS ON THE CYCLADIC FIGURINES AND JUNGIAN ARCHETYPES

Purpose. Without claiming to explain the meaning and purpose of the Cycladic figurines of the canonical type (FAF) in the context of the culture that created them, the author attempts to investigate the phenomenon of these ancient images and their impact on contemporary humans through the lens of Carl Gustav Jung's theory of the collective unconscious and the archetypes. **Theoretical basis.** The primary meanings and purposes of the Cycladic figurines are ambiguous and incomprehensible to us. We cannot understand them in the context of their original culture. But we are able to create our own meanings: unfinished images generate an opportunity to bypass our conscious mind and to contact the unconscious. The Cycladic figurines may resonate with female archetypes in the male and female psyche, as well as symbolize the ontological primacy of creative unity of opposites, the integrity of consciousness and the unconscious. **Originality.** The author outlined the possible unconscious meanings generated by the Cycladic figurines for human psyche. The Cycladic figurines actualize the archetypes of the collective unconscious, such as the Great Mother, the Anima, and the Self. These ancient images can be used for introspection, art therapy, active imagination, meditation, mindfulness. **Conclusions.** The results show that the Cycladic figurines have had a huge impact on the artists of the 20th century and continue to influence our contemporaries due to the emotional response they evoke in the unconscious, which conceals the primordial features of the ancient mind. Laconic ancient images provide a vast space of options for human imagination. In an attempt to interpret them, we are suddenly seized and carried away into unknown depths. Archetypal images are manifested in any form – from sublime and beautiful to terrible, but they create a single space full of numinous awe and beauty. Engaging with the archetypes and revealing their hidden messages, we establish a connection between consciousness and the unconscious, between the personal and collective unconscious to achieve a deep self-awareness and inner growth.

Keywords: Cycladic figurines; C. G. Jung; collective unconscious; archetypes; Great Mother; Anima; Self

Introduction

There are so-called eternal, or universal, themes that art has always addressed and reinvented, and the theme of a woman is among them. Each epoch has its own ideal of a woman. The whole history of humankind is reflected in the women's images and narratives about them. Women have always attracted the special attention of the artists. Created in the visual arts, images of women represent a poetic ideal in its harmonic unity of body, mind, and soul. Perhaps, there is nothing more admirable than a stunning beauty of a woman – a Muse whom songs, poems, paintings, movies are dedicated to. For eons, men have performed many great exploits for beautiful women. Not surprisingly, even the ancient creators of the wall paintings tried to perpetuate the eternal idea of beauty.

Nowadays, despite the fact that beauty is turned into a feminist issue (Khmil, 2019; Khmil, & Korkh, 2014; Storozhuk, & Hoyan, 2017) and many representatives of the feminist movement struggle against the oppressive beauty standards, "beauty is still here. Fashion – political and otherwise – changes, but certain universal ideals seem to have remained fairly intact throughout human history" (Lehrman, 1999). Thus, beauty appears to be more than just a social construct. Even if the idea of beauty can be challenged, the experience of beauty cannot be denied, and artists since the beginning of the world till now have been trying to reveal the true beauty of humans – first and foremost women.

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One of the amazing creations of the human genius are the Cycladic figure sculptures (Cycladic idols) – monochrome and laconic, yet sophisticated and elegant marble images, mostly female, which became the hallmark of the Cycladic culture. The Cycladic culture refers to the culture of the Cyclades of the southern Aegean Sea. It dates back to the Neolithic (5200 – 3200 BCE) and the Early Bronze Age (3200 – 2100 BCE). Lacking any written sources or oral narratives, the researchers know very little about the daily life, religion, beliefs, values, customs, and traditions of the Cycladic culture. Therefore, the purpose and the meaning of the marble figurines gave rise to the different interpretations. They are interpreted as the funerary objects, ritual images, votive objects, even toys and educational aids, or the personification of the Great Mother-Goddess (Goodison, 1989; Renfrew, 2010; Renfrew, Philaniotou, Brodie, Gavalas, & Boyd, 2018). Based on the findings of C. Stephanos and M. Marthari (Marthari, Renfrew, & Boyd, 2017) on the island of Syros, E. Gonzales (2018) argues that the mysterious figurines should be demystified and studied within the archaeological context. She claims that the Cycladic figurines are likely to have many features depending on their context and "these objects were instrumental in illuminating women's roles in ritual and the construction of an elite Cycladic identity" (Gonzales, 2018, p. 13).

The extreme laconism of the Cycladic figurines, their purity and a certain "detachment" from the earthly life resonate with the contemporary ideas of beauty and give us a possibility of universal interpretations and different meanings. In the 20th century the Cycladic idols fascinated and inspired such well-known artists as A. Modigliani, G. Moore, C. Brancusi, A. Giacometti, P. Picasso, G. de Chirico, H. Arp, B. Hepworth who breathed new life into these ancient forms. What attracts modern people to these ancient masterpieces?

The interpretation of beauty differs in temporal and spatial aspects, but the very concept of beauty is firmly embedded in the human psyche. It is not a complete image per se, but a certain dynamic or motivational trend that contributes to the synthesis of a personal factor, which largely depends on the spatial-temporal continuum, and the impersonal motives. Beauty goes beyond the purely aesthetic characteristics of the world and, as N. Berdyaev (1993) emphasized, becomes a "characteristic of the highest state of being, the highest achievement of existence" (p. 327). How does the synthesis of personal and impersonal, profane and numinous occur in our perception of beauty? How is this encounter of two worlds encoded in the human psyche?

Purpose

Without claiming to explain the meaning and purpose of the Cycladic figurines of the canonical type (FAF) in the context of the culture that created them, the author attempts to investigate the phenomenon of these ancient images and their impact on contemporary humans through the lens of Carl Gustav Jung's theory of the collective unconscious and the archetypes. The author used an interpretive research paradigm, integrative anthropological approach, and multidisciplinary analysis.

Statement of basic materials

Returned from oblivion, the Cycladic figurines at first provoked a negative aesthetic reaction among European art connoisseurs: «the Karlsruhe catalogue is introduced with early opinions such as "small monsters made of bits of marble", "ugly", and "barbarian"» (Gill, & Chippindale, 1993, p. 605). Indeed, the marble images that were named "primitive idols" defied the established canons of beauty and were far from both the ideal of beauty of the 19th century and the

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aesthetic ideal of classical Greece. The most common group of the Cycladic idols, the so-called FAF (Folded Arm Figurines), shares certain characteristics:

The head is tilted upward and backward on a short neck, with only the nose indicated among the facial features. Ears and eyes are not normally shown. The figurines are generally female, always naked. The arms are folded at the waist, nearly always right below left. Above them the two breasts are lightly indicated. There is sometimes a horizontal line at the waist, and the pubic triangle is often indicated by incision. The legs, always held together, are often slightly bent at the knees, and the feet... are inclined so that the figure, if it was indeed imagined as upright, was standing on tiptoe. There is a marked lack of detail: often only fingers and toes are indicated by incision, and details such as ankles, kneecaps, navel, ribs or hair are not shown. The back is extremely simple, with only an incised line for the backbone, and sometimes incisions behind the arms. All the figurines, including the several pregnant ones, are notably slim. In general the figurines are very graceful. (Renfrew, 1969, p. 9)

To the museum visitors, the Cycladic idols with their simple shapes and minimal details most likely personified the primitive world, the world of the "Other", which was perceived as hostile Chaos in the refined world of Cosmos and familiar beauty. But eventually they turned into a source of inspiration for the 20th century artists – "primitive idols" were transformed into the new aesthetic archetypes. Evading conscious awareness, a forgotten language directly appealed to the heart of a modern human: "it was a symbolic language – the primordial language of the unconscious and humanity" (Neumann, 2015, p. 16). Although the original images were once generously painted (Birtacha, 2018; Hendrix, 2003) and their creators most likely saw the marble statuettes as a blank canvas for the further development of the desired images, white marble of the figurines, which lost the original image of the Cycladic culture, has become the inspiration for our contemporaries: "unfinished Cycladic figures resemble finished 20th century sculptures" (Gill, & Chippindale, 1993, p. 656).

The white marble bodies, the lack of specific details, clean geometric lines made the figurines ideal source of our own beauty ideas. This allows us to go beyond our own emic reality, the structure of metaphors and to encounter a phenomenon that is beyond any culture and deeply

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rooted in the unconscious. The meanings encoded in the images exist in our unconscious in a latent state. The Cycladic idols trigger the archetypal ideas. Their primary meanings and purposes are ambiguous and incomprehensible to us. We cannot understand these figurines in the context of their original culture. But we are able to create our own meanings: unfinished images generate an opportunity to bypass our conscious mind and to contact the unconscious. Human fantasy acquires a "field of activity", in which eternal archetypes can be "translated" into acceptable cultural forms.

The figurines themselves have become symbols that contain much more than the things they reflect (Losev, 2012). A symbol implicitly contains all possible manifestations of a thing, gives it a deep meaning and forms its internal regularity. Symbols cannot be interpreted within the frame of formal logic: they appeal not only and not that much to reason, but to instincts, affects, and emotions. They provide an opportunity to comprehend life, because life itself generates emotions and symbolic ideas.

Perceiving the Cycladic figurines as a certain symbol, the mind inevitably reaches the ideas, which lie beyond logic, and goes into the sphere of representations that are collective by their nature, those "archaic remnants", which C. G. Jung called "archetypes" or "primordial images". Consciousness perceives archetypes at the level of symbols. The prominent psychologist warned against misunderstanding of the archetypes as the certain mythological images or motives. C. G. Jung (1964) defined the archetype as "a tendency to form such representations of a motif – representations that can vary a great deal in detail without losing their basic pattern... They are, indeed, an instinctive trend, as marked as the impulse of birds to build nests, or ants to form organized colonies" (p. 67). Being manifested in a symbolic form, instincts are transformed into the archetypes. And the very "archetypal image symbol corresponds, then, in its impressiveness, significance, energetic charge, and numinosity, to the original importance of instinct for man's existence" (Neumann, 2015, p. 5).

The energy of the archetypes can be felt due to the special charm that accompanies their appearance. They evoke enchanted awe. So it was with the Cycladic images: "today, four and a half thousand years later, they enchant us again with the purity of their forms, their freshness, and their perfection" (Thimme, 1977, p. 282). The subconscious of the modern humans intuitively captured the spirit of the figurines and transformed them through the prism of the archetypes. Filled with specific energy, archetypal thinking in its symbolic form interpreted the meaning of the figurines as Divine Feminine. Divine Feminine has an infinite number of faces that represent the Great Goddess of the past, present, and future. She is a blooming maiden, a mother – life giver, and a crone who knows the secrets of life and death. This Goddess with many faces belongs to all epochs and all cultures (Bazaluk, 2019).

Since ancient times, people were aware of the impact of nature's cycles on their being, and in particular the moon cycles. Representations of the Great Goddess correlate with moon phases – Goddess-Maiden is the new waxing moon, Goddess-Mother is the full moon, and Goddess-Crone is the waning moon (Graves, 2013). Embodied in the Triple Goddess, three-in-one changing faces of the moon became one of the most famous symbols of Neopaganism, Wicca in particular.

The Great Mother is one of the main archetypes of the collective unconscious. Behind the image of the most significant for each person real maternal figure, there is always an archetypal image of the Great Mother – Mother-Goddess, Mother-Nature. The image of the Great Mother emerged from the primordial archetype. It is represented in three forms: the good, the horrible,

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and the good-bad mother. This archetype has a great variety of manifestations – from Virgin Mary and Sophia to Lilith and Kali. According to C. G. Jung,

The qualities associated with it are maternal solicitude and sympathy; the magic authority of the female; the wisdom and spiritual exaltation that transcend reason; any helpful instinct or impulse; all that is benign, all that cherishes and sustains, that fosters growth and fertility. The place of magic transformation and rebirth, together with the underworld and its inhabitants, are presided over by the mother. On the negative side the mother archetype may connote anything secret, hidden, dark; the abyss, the world of the dead, anything that devours, seduces, and poisons, that is terrifying and inescapable like fate. (Jung, 1969, p. 158)

An archetypal image of both a merciful and hostile Goddess, a loving and terrible Mother who gives and sustains life and pulls into the abyss is the embodiment of perfect bio-survival security and the threats, destruction, and death. This dialectic of the image generates its authority and numinosity.

Another female archetype – the Anima – is directly related to the Great Mother. It personifies feminine psychological patterns within a man: the ability to love, feeling for nature, vague moods, prophetic insights, susceptibility to the irrational, contact with the unconscious mind (Franz, 1964). This is an unconscious female component of the male psyche, which "represents a supreme feminine (i.e. anima) figure such as Kwan-Yin in Chinese Buddhism, Sophia in the Christian-Gnostic doctrine, or the ancient Greek goddess of wisdom Pallas Athena" (Henderson, 1964, p. 152).

Like the image of the Great Mother, the image of the Anima has both positive and negative aspects: from the instinctive stage of witch creatures – mermaids, lamias, sirens, fairies, which lead to confusion, depression, destructive affects, and personality disorders, to a wise mediator and guide to personal empowerment and the inner world of the True Self.

While for men the Cycladic figurines may resonate with the archetypal image of the Anima, in the realm of the female psyche they may actualize the deepest core of the psyche – the Self, which is embodied in female images (Franz, 1964). Like the previous archetypal images, the Self has positive and negative expressions. In the archetypes themselves binary oppositions exist in the undivided form.

Facing the archetypes of the collective unconscious and integrating them, we make contact with the primordial layers of our psychic energy. These deep encounters with the archetypes bring us back to the initial experience: we take the Cycladic figurines "from their makers in pre-history and bring them into the values and psychologies of our own worldviews" (Gill, & Chipindale, 1993, p. 657).

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The Cycladic idols' body images attract special attention – the canonical Cycladic figurines are androgynous despite the schematically marked female biological features. Broad shoulders, narrow enough hips, lack of facial features can be attributed to both women and men. Many of the features that researchers regard as female can be seen in the figurines interpreted as male (Phillips, 2019). The androgyny of the canonical Cycladic figurines resonates with C. G. Jung's idea of the androgyny of the Anima: "The androgyny of the anima may appear in the anima herself at a certain stage, but it derives at a higher level from unity of the self" (Jung, 2015, p. 509).

Such images may embody the lost primordial unity and a figurine itself may symbolize the ontological primacy of creative unity of opposites, the integrity of consciousness and the unconscious, and the lost harmony (Danylova, 2015). Entering modern life in the form of symbols, prehistoric sculpture masterpieces may fill it with fullness, purpose and wide horizons and give rise to a deep sense of being.

Originality

The author investigated the Cycladic figurines of the canonical type (FAF) through the lens of Jung's theory of the collective unconscious and the archetypes and outlined the possible unconscious meanings generated by these images for human psyche. Transcending the chthonic and the uranic elements of the Cosmos, uniting the Void and all Forms, the Cycladic figurines actualize the archetypes of the collective unconscious, such as the Great Mother, the Anima, and the Self. These ancient images can be used for introspection, art therapy, active imagination, meditation, mindfulness. Engaging with the archetypes and revealing their hidden messages, we establish a connection between consciousness and the unconscious, between the personal and collective unconscious to achieve a deep self-awareness and inner growth.

Conclusions

The results show that the Cycladic figurines have had a huge impact on the artists of the 20th century and continue to influence our contemporaries due to the emotional response they evoke in our unconscious, which conceals the primordial features of the ancient mind. Human beings as an independent form of existence manifest themselves at the intersection of the worlds of nature and culture being deeply rooted in each of them (Danylova, & Salata, 2018). Human instincts are decisive in the world of nature (Lorenz, 2017, 2019), while the world of culture is ruled by symbols (Cassirer, 2020; Kolesnykova, & Matveyeva, 2019). Symbols are the mediators between humans and the world, and this symbolic universe defines humans as much as they are aware of themselves in it.

Laconic ancient images provide a vast space of options for human imagination. In an attempt to interpret them, we are suddenly seized and carried away into unknown depths. Archetypal images are manifested in any form – from sublime and beautiful to terrible, but they create a single space full of numinous awe and beauty. Deprived of details, Cycladic figurines without faces or with a thousand faces don't say anything directly. They merely hint as a great work of art, which as C. G. Jung (1979) put it is similar to a dream "that never has an unambiguous interpretation. None of dreams says: "You are obliged" or "This is the truth"; it reveals the image like the nature grows the plant, and we are given the opportunity to draw our own conclusions from this image" (p. 196). The Cycladic figurines convey their universal beauty through their silent universal language and call us into the lost world of harmony.

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ОСЯГАЮЧИ СВЯЩЕННУ ЖІНОЧНІСТЬ: ДЕЯКІ ДУМКИ ПРО КІКЛАДСЬКІ СТАТУЕТКИ ТА АРХЕТИПИ ЮНГА

Мета. Не претендуючи на вирішення питання про сенс і призначення кікладських статуеток канонічного типу (FAF) у контексті культури, що створила їх, автор робить спробу осмислити феномен цих древніх зображень та їхній вплив на сучасну людину з позиції теорії колективного несвідомого та архетипів Карла Густава Юнга. **Теоретичний базис.** Первинне призначення та сенс кікладських статуеток є неоднозначними і незбагненими. Ми не можемо зрозуміти ці фігурки в контексті їхньої оригінальної культури. Але ми здатні відтворити власні смисли: "незавершені" зображення генерують можливість обминати раціональні бар'єри нашої свідомості та звернутися безпосередньо до несвідомого. Кікладські статуетки можуть резонувати з жіночими архетипами в чоловічій і жіночій психіці, а також символізувати онтологічну первинність творчого єднання протилежностей, цілісність свідомості та несвідомого. **Наукова новизна.** Автор окреслив можливі несвідомі змісти і значення, породжені кікладськими статуетками, для сучасної людини. Кікладські фігурки актуалізують архетипи колективного несвідомого, такі як Велика Матір, Аніма, Самість. Ці давні зображення можна використовувати в самоаналізі, арт-терапії, активній уяві, медитації, майндфулнес. **Висновки.** Результати дослідження демонструють, що кікладські статуетки справили надзвичайний вплив на творчість митців ХХ століття й продовжують справляти його на наших сучасників завдяки тому емоційному відгуку, який вони викликають у нашому несвідомому, що приховує у собі первісні риси, характерні для древнього розуму. Лаконічні стародавні зображення надають неосяжного простору людській фантазії. Архетипні образи можуть проявлятися в будь-якому вигляді – від піднесеного і прекрасного до жалючого, але вони створюють єдиний простір, сповнений тремтіння й священної краси. Взаємодіючи з архетипами і розкриваючи їхні приховані послання, ми встановлюємо зв'язок між свідомістю і несвідомим, між індивідуальним і колективним несвідомим для глибокого самопізнання та внутрішнього зростання.

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Ключові слова: кикладські статуетки; К. Г. Юнг; колективне несвідоме; архетипи; Велика Матір; Аніма; Самість

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ПОСТИГАЯ СВЯЩЕННУЮ ЖЕНСТВЕННОСТЬ: НЕКОТОРЫЕ МЫСЛИ О КИКЛАДСКИХ СТАТУЭТКАХ И АРХЕТИПАХ ЮНГА

Цель. Не претендуя на разрешение вопроса о смысле и предназначении кикладских статуэток канонического типа (FAF) в контексте культуры, создавшей их, автор делает попытку осмыслить феномен этих древних изображений и их влияние на современного человека с позиции теории коллективного бессознательного и архетипов Карла Густава Юнга. **Теоретический базис.** Первоначальное предназначение и смысл кикладских статуэток является неоднозначным и непостижимым. Мы не можем интерпретировать эти фигурки в контексте их оригинальной культуры. Но мы способны создать собственные смыслы: "незавершенные" изображения генерируют возможность обойти рациональные барьеры нашего сознания и обратиться непосредственно к бессознательному. Кикладские статуэтки могут резонировать с женскими архетипами в мужской и женской психике, а также символизировать онтологическую первичность творческого единения противоположностей, целостность сознания и бессознательного. **Научная новизна.** Автор обозначил возможные бессознательные содержания и значения, инициированные кикладскими статуэтками, для современного человека. Кикладские фигурки актуализируют архетипы коллективного бессознательного, такие как Великая Мать, Анима, Самость. Эти древние изображения можно использовать в самоанализе, арт-терапии, активном воображении, медитации, майндфулнес. **Выводы.** Результаты исследования демонстрируют, что кикладские статуэтки оказали огромное влияние на искусство XX века и продолжают оказывать его на наших современников благодаря тому эмоциональному отклику, который они вызывают в нашем бессознательном, таящем в себе первобытные черты, характерные для древнего разума. Лаконичные древние изображения предоставляют огромное пространство для человеческой фантазии. Архетипические образы могут проявляться в любом виде – от возвышенного и прекрасного до ужасного, но они создают единое пространство, полное трепета и священной красоты. Взаимодействуя с архетипами и раскрывая их скрытые послания, мы устанавливаем связь между сознанием и бессознательным, между индивидуальным и коллективным бессознательным для самопознания и внутреннего роста.

Ключевые слова: кикладские статуэтки; К. Г. Юнг; коллективное бессознательное; архетипы; Великая Мать; Анима; Самость

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UDC 141.319.8:1(430)(470+571)(091)V. S. VOZNYAK^{1*}, N. V. LIPIN^{2*}^{1*}Drohobych Ivan Franko State Pedagogical University (Drohobych, Ukraine), e-mail volodimir.voznyak@gmail.com, ORCID 0000-0002-6877-3785^{2*}Kyiv National University of Trade and Economics (Kyiv, Ukraine), e-mail pinli@ukr.net, ORCID 0000-0003-0940-088X**EDUCATION LIKE BREACH BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE**

Purpose. The article aimed at comprehending the phenomenon of education in its anthropological content, by comparing two versions for the analytics of the crisis state in education, given by Hannah Arendt and Evald Ilyenkov. **Theoretical basis.** For implementing this task, the method of in-depth reflexive reading of texts is used, when traditional academic concepts are considered in a new context determined by the analytics of real social problems. In this case, we are talking about the development of thinking not only as a cognitive ability but as an ethical and ontological feature of a human being. In that event, thinking arises through its invisible belonging of one person to many others that both Arendt and Ilyenkov ascertain. **Originality.** Originality of the article is to identify the anthropological dimension of education and to establish the negative influence of such ways in organizing the educational process while it is under the dictation of current circumstances. The justification for this thesis is presented by identifying the consonance of the educational concepts from Hannah Arendt and Evald Ilyenkov. **Conclusions.** The opposition between action and thinking, revealed by Hannah Arendt, cannot be understood as a divorcement of thinking from reality, since another man appears to be the original reality for a person, namely, in thinking a person enters the space of a meeting with another man, put himself into another person's mind and with this firstly attains his place in the world, becoming himself, acquiring the image of a man. So perceived education does not become manipulative training, but it is a real birth of a subject as creating himself. Undermining of the authority in the modern world is accompanied by the searching new forms in structuring the common space of human endeavor, which is possible when the educational status is determined by its attitude to the world rather than by the social environment. The authority of a teacher is effective when he relies on his responsibility for the world into which he introduces the child and which opens to him. Responsibility for peace and the resulting authority is associated with love for the world. Only with sufficient love for the world, a person is capable of taking responsibility for it.

Keywords: man; education; thinking; society; authority; responsibility for the world

Introduction

The creativity of Hannah Arendt is most often associated with the problems of evil and violence and the analytics of the totalitarianism phenomenon. However, it is increasingly noticed that deepening of this issue deduces her thought to the problems of thinking: just recall her thesis, which sounds like some conclusion: Eichmann's inability to think (Arendt, 2008, p. 81), a report on the banality of evil (Arendt, 2008, p. 376) is headlined. Therefore, although she positions herself as a political thinker, one appeals to her heritage at the beginning of the 21st century in connection with the comprehension of the crisis in education. Moreover, this is a worldwide trend (Hodgson, Vlieghe, & Zamojski, 2018; Korsgaard, & Aldinger, 2018; Shchytsova, 2019; Vlieghe, & Zamojski, 2019). The situation of a person in the modern world is directly related to the understanding of thinking (Mamardashvili, 1992, p. 119), which draws special attention to the field of education. After all, exactly in the space of education such a universal human ability as thinking should purposefully develop, this is ascertained by such thinkers as Friedrich Nietzsche (1996, p. 381) and Evald Ilyenkov (2002). To some extent, they represent two poles of the human situation: the dominant of life and the dominant of thought. Comprehension of this confrontation is seen as productive for understanding the crisis of education in its anthropological dimension when not only professional skills but the human image itself is in the spotlight.

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From our point of view, a person enters the human world through the development of thinking. The child begins to think from an early age, coming together with adults into the world of human culture. Life, especially school life, does not oppose to thinking. Rather, on the contrary, thinking should be immanent to the life of education. Then education ceases to be a preparation for adulthood and becomes a common (students and teacher) cause of thinking. The gap between thinking and activity, the invisible world and the phenomenal world, public and private space, on which Arendt focuses her attention, translates into an understanding of education as preparation for life (Biesta, 2010), as a result, there is a danger of authoritarian manipulation. When comparing the statement of the Arendt's education problems and the position of the educator described by Kierkegaard (Korsgaard, & Aldinger, 2018), the question arises: how can we educate our children to become independent and critical beings, at the same time hoping that they will become so critical to have nothing common with us. At the same time, it is worth noting the trap into which the older generation falls, expecting the execution of their attitudes and thereby turning the educational process into a manipulation (Freire, 2017).

As we see it, the formulation of this problem is related to the contradiction recorded by Arendt: a person lives among people and the sphere of publicity is important for him, but distortion into the sphere of publicity is the reason for an escape from subjectivity. As a result, active life and leveling of the contemplative life begin to dominate, with which Arendt (1989) associates thinking (p. 23). She associates the evil of totalitarianism with a lack of thinking. Moreover, it is interpreted not in a cognitive sense, but as the ability to see the world through the eyes of another person. E. Minnich (2016) continues to develop this direction. She enhances Arendt's approach to thinking asserting the "evil of banality": in a situation of the thoughtlessness of everyday life, a type of evil ("extensive evils") develops, which is very difficult to resist due to its anonymity and mass character.

Shchytsova (2019) expressed the broad context of problematics, on the base of H. Arendt's texts she highlights the relationship between education and political life in modern societies and notes the antidemocratic, elitist aspect in her interpretation of natality: "the education based on the so-interpreted principle of natality cannot contribute the formation of a democratic community, an ethos of democratic solidarity" (p. 17). She notes the critical re-reading of Arendt's works, which began in the second half in the 80s of the 20th century in European space and speaks about the ambivalence of conclusions, wondering how to read Arendt today. How to read Arendt's texts with students are issues of particular relevance: if we assume that we want to be equally anti-authoritarian as Arendt was anti-totalitarian author, and we want to be equally anti-neoliberal as Arendt was humanistic (Shchytsova, 2019, p. 18).

One of the opportunities for such a reading was developed by Hodgson, Vlieghe, and Zamojski (Hodgson, Vlieghe, & Zamojski, 2018; Vlieghe, & Zamojski, 2019). These authors assert that one of the important points in the comprehension of education by Hannah Arendt is the actualization of "love for the world" as non-indifference and interested attitude: "Education is an interaction between the generations which is first and foremost concerned with disclosing the world (rather than with learning)" (Vlieghe, & Zamojski, 2019, p. 522). In other words, the dominant of freedom in education is connected with an interest to the world that is worth the effort to study with the new generation. Then learning is a constant attempt to make "educational love" the guiding principle of student-teacher relations, not only they possess subjectivity (autonomous freedom), but a "third actor" appears (Voznyak, 2014): the very heart of the matter becomes leading. The dominant of the core subject (a developing part of

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the world) presupposes the continued authority emanating from a lovingly cultivated world rather than the power of a human-teacher.

Purpose

The article offers the opportunity to read Hannah Arendt's ideas in the optics of an active approach to the problem of thinking. Prospectivity of this philosophical direction is presented in the actualization of the ideas by Evald Ilyenkov in the European intellectual space, which was started in the 90s of the 20th century by David Bakhurst (1991), later by Vesa Oittinen (2014) and is being actively continued today (Lotz, 2019; Vivaldi, 2017).

Evald Vasilievich Ilyenkov (1924-1979) is the outstanding Soviet philosopher of the twentieth century. He was a contemporary of H. Arendt and interpreted the problems of education, thinking and human development in a man from a different perspective and in line with another philosophical tradition. If Arendt's philosophizing can be characterized as continuations of the Kantian tradition, then Ilyenkov was a Marxist, but, let's say so, in the Hegelian sense. In other words, he was a conscious and deep dialectician. Belonging to this direction of philosophical thought was expressed in his works, which are devoted to various aspects of the aesthetic nature of fantasy, the theory of the ideal development of a creative personality and the problems of pedagogy.

The Ilyenkov's concept of thinking moves in line with the classical philosophical tradition, which was substantively disclosed by Gennadiy Lobastov (2012) and Sergey Mareev (2015), this is its dignity and advantage compared to new-fangled conversations about thinking and its nature. Bakhurst (1991, p. 174, 186), and Levant (2012), and Vivaldi (2017, p. 186) stand Ilyenkov's philosophy in connection with the history of Western philosophy, noting the importance of his approach to the problem of ideal.

Statement of basic materials

From the viewpoint of Arendt (1961), "essence of education is natality, the fact that human beings are *born* into the world" (p. 174). Appeal to the phenomenon of birth (natality) in the context of education and upbringing allows us to consider them as preparation for creating a new one. The child, the younger generation is perceived by H. Arendt (1998) as a chance to renew, implement a new initiative in the old world. "The new beginning inherent in birth can make itself felt in the world only because the newcomer possesses the capacity of beginning something anew, that is, of acting" (Arendt, 1961, p. 9). And although a person is conditioned by the world of things created by him, natality as a fundamental premise for human existence is most closely bonded not with labor and creation, but with a deed. A characteristic feature of such an action as the deed is that it "goes on directly between men without the intermediary of things or matter" (Arendt, 1961, p. 7). Since politics is a way of human existence among other people, "since the action is the political activity par excellence" (Arendt, 1961, p. 9), and natality is a central category of political life.

The problem is that, in H. Arendt's (1961) opinion, upbringing should not play any role in politics, because in the political sphere we are dealing with equals, i.e. with those that have already been brought up (p. 177). In the field of education, in Arendt's opinion, it is out of the question the equality between a child and an adult. The relationship between a teacher and a student should be determined by the authority.

In that moment in Arendt's discussion of education, there is a temptation to interpret relations between participants in the educational process as authoritarian ones. It should be noted that

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Arendt herself provides some reason for such an interpretation of authority-based relations. So, for example, in her work "What is authority?", she writes: "authority is whatever makes people obey" (Arendt, 1961, p. 92). And although authority means "such obedience in which people retain their freedom" (Arendt, 1961, p. 93), authoritarian relations, as H. Arendt (1961) asserts, unfold in the absence of a "common intelligence" (p. 93).

Authority is incompatible with persuasion, which presupposes equality and works through a process of argumentation. Where arguments are used, authority is left in abeyance. Against the egalitarian order of persuasion stands the authoritarian order, which is always hierarchical. If authority is to be defined at all, it must be in contradistinction to both coercion by force and persuasion through arguments. (Arendt, 1961, p. 93)

Comprehending the foundations of the crisis in American education in the 1950s, H. Arendt considered the loss of a teacher's *authority* the most significant among them. Such a loss happened by two reasons: firstly, because the teacher turned into a skilled worker who simply informs the student about his subject, but does not take responsibility for the world (Arendt, 1961, p. 189). Secondly, the deeper cause in the collapse of authority was the preceding crisis of tradition and religion. In the old days, authority was built on the basis of tradition. In the 50-60s of the last century, the bridge between the past and the future, which was a tradition, broke down. Following it, the authority resting on the automatism of prejudices, also collapsed.

In the contemporary world, which is not structured by authority and is not supported by tradition, education cannot completely abandon them. However, it would be a mistake to understand the need for educational authority as a call for authoritarian relations. From our viewpoint, such relationships are an obstacle to developing thinking. Authoritarian relations enshrine a certain place for a person in hierarchical relations. But, as it will be shown later, thinking is just a way to overcome the limitations of any socially fixed place. And thanks to such ability as imagination, a person could be in the place of any other person, look at the world through his/her eyes. Moreover, for the development of thinking, imagination, as the ability to look at the world through other eyes, is constitutive one. It is also significant for the revival of tradition, as the ability to look at the world through the eyes of people of other eras and cultures.

In this regard, it is necessary to understand that restoring the authority and the appropriate attitude toward the past requires dividing the education from the rest of the spheres in the world. This is necessary "in order to apply to it alone a concept of authority and an attitude toward the past which are appropriate to it but have no general validity and must not claim a general validity in the world of grown-ups" (Arendt, 1961, p. 195). In fact, we are talking about freeing the activity of education and upbringing from the influence of society and politics, going beyond the prevailing principles and norms in them.

So, education must not be completely defined by that place which it, as a social institution, occupies in the society. In this angle, it does not have a place, it is a question about education as the "island of utopia". That is to say, the place of education is defined not by the social environ-

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ment, but by its attitude to the world. The authority of the teacher is inseparable from his responsibility for the world, into which he introduces a child and shows it to him. The teacher should not limit by the learning of "art of living", because "the function of the school is to teach children what the world is like and not to instruct them in the art of living" (Arendt, 1961, p. 195). Responsibility for peace and the resulting authority is associated with love for the world. Only with sufficient love for the world, a man is responsible for it.

Thus, in education, authority can only be personal and conditioned by responsibility for the world, the ability to demonstrate it to children. The significance of personal authority in education lies in the fact that it allows you to live without violence, power, and strength. Where "force is used, authority itself has failed" (Arendt, 1961, p. 93). And although "authority is whatever makes people obey" (Arendt, 1961, p. 103), it presupposes "an obedience in which people retain their freedom" (Arendt, 1961, p. 106). We believe that the authority of a teacher can be defined as "enforcement" to freedom which is possible through the discovery of the world. In this case, the freer the subjects of the pedagogical process become, the lesser role the authority plays in the field of education. Despite the fact that, according to Arendt, upbringing does not imply the possibility of equality, exactly it should be the goal that determines the student and teacher relationship. We can agree with the J. Rancière's (1991) opinion that equality in the ability to think is at the same time essential for the possibility of education as liberation: "We know that it is this that defines the stultifying vision of the world: to believe in the reality of inequality, to imagine that the superiors in society are truly superior..." (p. 108).

The world opens to a man not in loneliness, but in life together with other people. "Inner freedom" results as a consequence of the obtained world's freedom experience. As H. Arendt (1961) wrote, for the first time we feel freedom and its opposite "in our intercourse with others, not in the intercourse with ourselves" (p. 148). In addition to this, we get and the experience of our own "I" through the experience about another person. The relation to oneself, in which a person's knowledge of inner freedom is possible, is mediated by the relation to another. So, freedom is not individual in its inherent, but a social one. Firstly, we perceive freedom not despite, but because of existence among people. And if freedom is the freedom to act, then education is such pre-political "the scene for action and speech" (Arendt, 1961, p. 148), where the younger generation learns the reality of freedom.

Obviously, freedom is associated with the superfluity of human existence. It is not dependent on external or internal violence. Entrance into the world, which occurs in education, is liberation from the dictate of the empirical environment, transcending from here (space) and now (time) to the sphere where all temporal and spatial distances are destroyed, into the breach between the past and the future, i.e. into thinking. According to H. Arendt, thinking has no place, it is everywhere, and therefore nowhere. It always "falls out of any kind" and interrupts the automatism of daily living. Thinking carries a man to "into some never-never land, the land of invisibles" (Arendt, 1981, p. 85). In thinking, it is possible to restore the connection between the past and the future, to revive the tradition. It unfolds in a situation of lack of tradition and authority, outside of any hierarchies and predetermined outcome. "Each new generation, every new human being, as he becomes conscious of being inserted between an infinite past and an infinite future, must discover and ploddingly pave anew the path of thought" (Arendt, 1981, p. 210). Thus, birth and the freedom associated with it for own realization should "pave" the path of thought.

Education introduces the child into the world, revealing the breach between the past and the future. Thinking originates in this breach, in breaking the ordinary course of life. This breach is a

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"small non-time-space" (Arendt, 1961, p. 13) compels a person to transcend his own finitude and thereby constitute the sphere of the spirit, trample down space through the activity of thinking "the trains of thought, of remembrance and anticipation, save whatever they touch from the ruin of historical and biographical time" (Arendt, 1961, p. 13). So, thinking unfolds in a situation of disruption, interruption of the ordinary course of life. In a situation of lack of thinking, continuity between generations and the preservation of what is generated by human activity becomes impossible, and it is destroyed by it.

What H. Arendt calls "the invisible world of thinking", "non-time-space", E. Ilyenkov describes it as an ideal form that does not exist as a finished result.

It is that which is not, together with that which is, that which does not exist in the form of an external, sensuously perceived thing but at the same time does exist *as an active faculty of man*. It is being, which is, however, not-being, or the effective being of the external thing in the phase of its becoming in the activity of the subject, in the form of its inner image, need, urge, and aim. (Ilyenkov, 2008, p. 264)

The ideal thinking exists as a certain bodiless form, as the omnipotent soul of things which remains itself in various bodily incarnations. But simultaneously it does not coincide with any of them. "A form of which it cannot be said where exactly it 'exists'. Everywhere and nowhere in particular" (Ilyenkov, 2012, p. 180). The ideal one is the "taken off form", the form of a thing outside of the thing itself, namely, in the form of human activity. "In itself, the ideal is the socially determined form of man's life activity corresponding to the form of its object and product" (Ilyenkov, 2008, p. 261). However, the ideal in itself moves further: "the ideal is only there where the form itself of the activity corresponding to the form of the external object is transformed for man into a special object with which he can operate specially without touching and without changing the real object up to a certain point" (Ilyenkov, 2008, p. 278).

Then a person does the activity in an ideal plan and with an ideal plan. Actually, this is how thinking works: with an ideal plan, transforming the form.

As G. Lobastov (2012) notes a pure form of activity opposing any form of objective reality is, according to Ilyenkov, thinking. In his schemes, categories any and each thing is represented and seen. Thinking is "an ideal reproduction of reality in its own universal forms, and this universal form is a form of one's own activity" (Lobastov, 2012, p. 384). The universal ideal forms of man's activity learned from the history of human existence are essential for the formation of individual abilities, including thinking.

E. Ilyenkov did not bypass the problems of the formation of thinking in ontogenesis, actively participating in the famous Zagorsk experiment on the training and education of blind-deafmute children. Thinking (as well as other abilities) germinates and grows in a child in the process of his inclusion in a jointly divided activity with adults, and then with peers. In the process of such activities, the child learns to master the ideal form, objectified in things, and had been created by man and for man. Within this activity, the child immediately focuses his perception on the mean-

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ing of the objects included in it. These are both household goods and toys. Acquiring a language, the child can already "work" with the ideal form per se, "inside him", using logical categories that are embedded in the structure of the language (speech). G. Lobastov (2012) notes that in the substantively-transformative activity "*a person's ability is formed to reproduce the scheme of his activity* with things beyond these things themselves, but in some other material" (p. 19). Thinking as such finds itself only in acts of an objective shift "in human work methods, therefore, in acts of shift, changes in the form of the thing itself, in the disclosure in its composition of new, hitherto unknown parameters and characteristics" (Lobastov, 2012, p. 38).

In a perfect form, the social nature of a person is represented, or, by H. Arendt's words, the fact that a person exists among other people. Therefore, thinking and activity open the world rather than just the environment of existence, because they allow you to look around with the eyes of other people, to be in their place. Learning to think, educating the mind, in this case, is the development of the ability to look at things from the standpoint of the human race.

Consciousness only arises where the individual is compelled to look at himself as if from the side, as if with the eyes of another person, the eyes of all other people – only where he is compelled to correlate his individual actions with the actions of another person, that is to say, only within the framework of collectively performed life-activity. (Ilyenkov, 2012, p. 187)

In this context, it is understandable that thinking is not just, what Arendt believes, should be returned to the world through judgment.

If thinking, the two-in-one of the soundless dialogue, actualizes the difference within our identity as given in consciousness and thereby results in conscience as its byproduct, then judging, the by-product of the liberating effect of thinking, realizes thinking, makes it manifest in the world of appearances, where I am never alone and always much too busy to be able to think. (Arendt, 1968, p. 189)

According to Arendt, politics is the primary area in the return of thinking to the world. It is within it a deed is possible. In accordance with the dividing the social and political spheres of human existence, the first appears to be deprived of the liberating force of thinking. But the problem in the return of thinking to the world is seen in a slightly different way if we assume that

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thinking for the first time only arises in the world. From this perspective, following G. Hegel, E. Ilyenkov solved this problem.

From the E. Ilyenkov's (2006) viewpoint, the development of the personality himself is nothing more than the development of the ability to look at the world through the eyes of the human race. In E. Ilyenkov's opinion, the emphasized ability is directly related to the work of the mind and imagination. He defined them as the ability to see things through the eyes of another person, through the eyes of all other people, through the eyes of mankind (Ilyenkov, 2006, p. 215). Inability to put oneself in the place of another person, i.e. lack of imagination is the cause of the destruction of the world as space "between people" (Arendt, 1968, p. 4). The lack of imagination distorts the world that the younger generation is encountering. This happens because, firstly, "broad-mindedness" and its universality are directly related to the ability to take the place of another person, to accept his point of view and his judgment (Arendt, 1989, p. 43; Ilyenkov, 2006, p. 215).

Secondly, the undeveloped ability of imagination is often expressed in the inability to see reality and compensated by unbridled fantasies. For education and upbringing, the lack of imagination leads to the fact that thinking is replaced by a collection of finished knowledge. "A person deprived of imagination, or rather with an undeveloped imagination, sees only what he already knows in advance in the world around him, what is verbally recorded in his mind, in his psyche" (Ilyenkov, 2006, p. 225). Without the ability of imagination, a person is only able to recreate swotted information and act in strict accordance with it.

With the help of imagination, thinking leaves its isolation from other people, correlates itself with their standpoints. And although, as H. Arendt (1989) insists, thinking takes place in isolation, "it still goes on in isolation, but by the force of imagination, it makes the others present and thus moves in a space that is potentially public, open to all sides" (p. 43).

Originality

Originality of the article is in comprehending the anthropological dimension of education when it reveals not only a professional orientation, but it is seen as a strategy for constituting a person, developing his image. This semantic aspect is present in the German word *Bildung* and neglect of this component is detrimental to the education system, which is explicated through a comparison of the concepts in the education of Hannah Arendt and Evald Ilyenkov.

Conclusions

Thus, in thinking endowed with the ability of imagination, public space and essential openness, the nature of a man, unfolds. Thinking is isolated on the individual's side, but it is a social ability. For good reason, at least two people are required to dialogize among themselves in order to realize it. The value of thinking in education is defined by its invisible belonging of one person to many others. Therefore, the task of education is insight into the world to new generations, the world that is not directly given to the sensory organs, which is invisible, but it holds everything visible. It is exactly the space between people in which a man is truly born as a man, i.e. begins to see the world through the eyes of all other people. In this sense, education is enlightenment, gaining the ability to see and act.

In thinking, a person, remaining himself, enters the space of multiplicity. He puts himself into the place of another person and with this firstly finds his place in the world. Such thinking is both critical and caring (ethical). In it, using the creative ability of imagination, a person not only thinks together with others, but also feels together (sympathizes) with others.

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Education can teach to think if it appears as such a common cause in which all actors of the pedagogical process are involved. The teacher is the guide of the child to the world. But you can only show the world to someone who can and wants to see it. In order for education to be a common cause, all its participants must strive to achieve equality. After all, public space makes sense as a space of concern for a common interest, as a space of liberation from the tendency to impose their interest on others and the world as a universal one. In thinking, which does not have a visible result, in fact, there is one very important result – this is the subjectivity, humanity of those who think. One can think only being a "citizen of the world", a representative of the human race. Realizing his common cause in accordance with its essence, an individual (a child and an adult) introduces himself into the appropriate image and likeness of a person.

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ОСВІТА ЯК ПРОЛОМ МІЖ МИНУЛИМ І МАЙБУТНІМ

Мета. У статті ставиться завдання осмислити феномен освіти в її антропологічному змісті, зіставляючи два варіанти аналітики кризового стану освіти, дані Ганною Арендт і Евальдом Ільєнковим. **Теоретичний базис.** Для реалізації цього завдання застосований метод поглибленого рефлексивного прочитання текстів, коли звичні академічні поняття розглядаються у новому контексті, визначеному аналітикою реальних суспільних проблем – в даному випадку мова йде про розвиток мислення не стільки як когнітивної здатності, скільки етико-онтологічної особливості людського буття. В такому випадку мислення виникає через його невидиму причетність однієї людини іншим, що констатує і Арендт, і Ільєнков. **Наукова новизна.** Новизна статті полягає у виявленні антропологічного виміру освіти і фіксації негативного впливу таких способів організації освітнього процесу, коли він підпорядкований диктату обставин, що склалися на даний момент, – обґрунтування цієї тези дане через виявлення співзвучності концепцій освіти Ганни Арендт і Евальда Ільєнкова. **Висновки.** Виявлене Ганною Арендт протистояння дії і мислення не можна розуміти як відрив мислення від дійсності, оскільки початковою реальністю для людини постає інша людина, а саме в мисленні людина входить в простір зустрічі з іншою людиною, стає на місце іншої людини і цим вперше знаходить своє місце в світі і стає сама собою, знаходячи образ людини. Так зрозуміла освіта не стає маніпулятивним дресуванням, але є дійсним народженням суб'єкта, який творить самого себе. Руйнування авторитету в сучасному світі супроводжується пошуками нових форм структурування загального простору діяльності людства, що можливо тоді, коли місце освіти визначається не соціальним середовищем, а її відношенням до світу. Авторитет учителя дієвий, коли він спирається на відповідальність за світ, в який учитель вводить дитину та який відкриває їй. Відповідальність за світ й обумовлений нею авторитет пов'язані з любов'ю до світу. Тільки при наявності достатньої любові до світу людина здатна відповідати за нього.

Ключові слова: людина; освіта; мислення; суспільство; авторитет; відповідальність за світ

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ОБРАЗОВАНИЕ КАК БРЕШЬ МЕЖДУ ПРОШЛЫМ И БУДУЩИМ

Цель. В статье ставится задание осмыслить феномен образования в его антропологическом содержании, сопоставляя два варианта аналитики кризисного состояния образования, данные Ханной Арендт и Эвальдом Ильенковым. **Теоретический базис.** Для реализации данного задания применен метод углубленного рефлексивного прочтения текстов, когда привычные академические понятия рассматриваются в новом контексте, определяемом аналитикой реальных общественных проблем – в данном случае речь идет о развитии мышления не столько как когнитивной способности, сколько этико-онтологической особенности человеческого бытия. В таком случае мышление возникает через его невидимую сопричастность одного человека многим, что констатируется и Арендт, и Ильенковым. **Научная новизна.** Новизна статьи заключается в выявлении антропологического измерения образования и установлении негативного влияния таких способов организации образовательного процесса, когда он подчинен диктату обстоятельств, сложившихся на данный момент, – обоснование этого тезиса дано через выявление созвучности концепций образования Ханны Арендт и Эвальда Ильенкова. **Выводы.** Выявленное Ханной Арендт противостояние действия и мышления нельзя понимать как отрыв мышления от действительности, поскольку изначальной реальностью для человека предстает другой человек, а именно в мышлении человек входит в пространство встречи с другим человеком, становится на место другого человека и этим впервые обретает свое место в мире, становясь самим собой, обретая образ человека. Так понимаемое образование не становится манипулятивной дрессировкой, но есть действительным рождением субъекта как творящего самого себя. Разрушение авторитета в современном мире сопровождается поисками новых форм структурирования общего пространства деятельности человечества, что возможно тогда, когда место образования определяется не социальной средой, а его отношением к миру. Авторитет учителя действен, когда он опирается на его ответственность за мир, в который он вводит ребенка и который открывает ему. Ответственность за мир и обусловленный ею авторитет связаны с любовью к миру. Только при наличии достаточной любви к миру человек способен брать ответственность за него.

Ключевые слова: человек; образование; мышление; общество, авторитет; ответственность за мир

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HUMAN CONDITION IN A GLOBALIZED SOCIETY OF RISKS AS A SOCIAL AND ETHICAL PROBLEM

Purpose. The study aims at thematizing social and ethical problems related to the changes of the human condition in the contemporary globalized society of risks. These risks include threats of not only physical destruction of human race, but also transformation of the natural constitution of the human being. The task of achieving this objective also includes comparative analysis of this problem in the classical and contemporary philosophical anthropology. **Theoretical basis.** Works of the representatives of the contemporary philosophical anthropology, including the methodology of the transcendental anthropology as discursive ethics. **Originality.** Contrary to the classical philosophical anthropology, which was based on the concept of the human being as "unfinished project of nature", the author suggests a concept of human being as "unfinishable project of history" which poses new requirements to the ethics both on the level of its fundamentals, and on the level of its application. **Conclusions.** The complex globalized world needs axiological and normative re-orientation of the society based upon universalist macroethics of discourse. This macroethics should aim at *Letztbegründung* of the moral and ethical imperatives for the future development of society, changes of humanity and its natural constitution.

Keywords: Anthropocene; discourse; global ethos; human condition; universalist macroethics; humans as an unfinishable project of history

Introduction

The title and content of this article have three components: the first is the "human position" as a key concept of classical philosophical anthropology – let us recall the works of H. Plessner, M. Scheler, A. Gehlen, where the "human position" is in the very titles of their works. The specific "human position" became a paradigm through which not only the human but also the extra-human world was explained. "Human position" or "human condition" is also an important marker of today's philosophical anthropology, as evidenced in particular by the works of "Human Condition" by H. Arendt (1999), "Human Situation as a Challenge to Ethics" by K.-O. Apel (1999a) and others.

In this connection it is necessary to find out the specifics of the present human situation. And this is the second component of this article. The specifics are, first of all, that today, as never before, the "human condition" is changing so rapidly that it requires new approaches to philosophical anthropology, to social theory, and to ethics. Secondly, the very existence of man in the world, of humanity as such, is at stake. Not only is the danger of the physical destruction of humanity on a global scale as a result of nuclear, environmental, pandemic disasters, but also the destruction of man as such. This situation is linked to a "global risk society", as Ulrich Beck (2008) called it.

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In turn, these risks are caused, as Niklas Luhmann showed, by the immense complexity of modern society as a system-complex, contingent formation. This complexity is a consequence of the systematic differentiation of society when each social system emerges as a self-referential social system focusing on its own system binary codes. Such complexity contains the contingencies with unforeseen consequences. Thus, today's society is a globally complex, contingent society, with risks and threats. This diagnosis is generalized by the assertion of a new age in the history of mankind, the age of the *Anthropocene*, which has replaced the age of *homo sapiens sapiens* of the last three hundred years (Ott, 2018, p. 234).

Finally, the third component concerns ethics as a social system that needs the corresponding paradigmatic changes. Since modern society is an open system, it is too difficult to predict the ways in which it will develop compared to closed societies. This means that humanity can survive by turning first to moral values as a deterrent to the expansion of the subsystem of purposeful rational action and the milestones of its further development. "The ultimately unleashed Prometheus to whom science is giving hitherto unknown strengths and economics' unrelenting drive calls for ethics" – thus begins the book "The Imperative of Responsibility" by Hans Jonas (2001, p. 7) – the protagonist of ethics for modern technological civilization. Thus, the threatening situation calls for new approaches to ethics, which are denoted by concepts such as "global ethos" (Küng, 1997), universalistic planetary macroethics of discourse (K.-O. Apel, 1999b, 2017), "ethics of global responsibility for the future" (Böhler, 2014). This situation places new demands not only for justification of ethics but also for its application.

Purpose

The study aims at thematizing social and ethical problems related to the changes of the human condition in the contemporary globalized society of risks. These risks include threats of not only physical destruction of human race, but also transformation of its natural constitution. The task of achieving this objective also includes comparative analysis of this problem in the classical and contemporary philosophical anthropology, the application of moral imperatives in applied ethics.

Statement of basic materials

Exploring the issues of "human condition" or "human situation", the question arises about the specificity of the human situation today? A preliminary answer to this question can be found in Gunther Anders' (1956, p. 239) book, *Antiquity of Man*. Antiquity is that the biological constitution of man is out-dated. The person is not able to respond to changes that are happening in the modern world. Let us recall that one of the foundations of classical philosophical anthropology was the assertion of the biological constitution of man as an unfinished project of nature. This determines his specificity and unique position in the world. This approach becomes a paradigm in the interpretation and social world of man.

In his turn, ethologist Jakob von Uexküll introduced many concepts that were later borrowed by representatives of philosophical anthropology. Through the mentioned book by Anders, they got into philosophy and social theory. And thanks to Apel's (1999a) work, "Human Situation as a Challenge to Ethics", they reached ethics as well. First of all, I refer to concepts such as "world of perception" (Merkwelt) and "world of action" (Wirkwelt). Meanwhile, in animal world, the "world of action" coincides with their "world of perception", the "world of action" of people goes beyond their "world of perception". The total expansion of a person is accompanied by the

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increased contingency of the social world and the decreased possibility of its control. The overwhelming volume of everything created by man transforms the world into a complex and contingent one that is not perceived (not "noticed") by human feelings, as it is not already grasped by our mind. G. Anders (1956) diagnosed this situation as a "Prometheus Controversy" between *homo faber* and *homo sapiens* (p. 239).

This situation, therefore, is related to the complexity of the created social world in all its spheres – economics, science, technology and more. This means that these spheres go beyond human lifeworld. The radius of human action is both spatially and temporally incommensurable with his lifeworld. In particular, the sphere of economy in the process of globalization is losing its home (*oikos*), and speculative capital is expanding its destructive potential. In particular, this made itself felt in the 2008 global financial crisis, from which humanity has not recovered yet. Such a "roulette game" or "casino-capitalism" by the title of the book of Western researchers "The end of casino-capitalism?" (*Das Ende des Kasino-Kapitalismus? Globalisierung und Krise*, 2009). I should note: the question mark here is rhetorical. In addition, the crisis of such a capitalist casino poses the dangers of ideological regression, in particular to the communist worldview. For example, the famous postmodern philosopher Gianni Vattimo (2009), in the article "Post-modern Communism" in this volume, writes: "it is absolutely true: as a philosopher of "weak thought" and as a Christian, I had to become a communist again" (transl. by A. Y.) (p. 239).

The concepts of science are becoming more abstract, they are no longer related to the imagery and sensuality of the human lifeworld. They are increasingly rationalized, quantified and formalized, reflecting abstract laws of nature. Understanding this world requires abstract concepts, formalized definitions, and quantitative relationships. The technique has long lost its correlation with the human hand, which had already been fixed by A. Gehlen. This is especially true for nanotechnologies that are no longer tied to the human biological constitution. The latter even interferes with their functioning. These technologies also need ethics, so nanoethics is emerging (Schummer, 2009).

One of the paradigmatic themes in philosophical anthropology, as noted, is the theme of human natural constitution. Classical philosophical anthropology was grounded in the idea of the ontological invariability of human nature. This idea defined the ideological and methodological functions of philosophical anthropology in the social sciences and applied anthropological research. An example of classical philosophical anthropology is Arnold Gehlen's conception of the ontologically given natural constitution of man as an insufficient being. Accordingly, Gehlen created the theory of social institutions that perform the function of "unloading" (*Entlastung*).

However, since the second half of the twentieth century, this concept has been called into question. In particular, Jürgen Habermas (1973) refutes the proposition of the invariable human nature, proposing the historicity of human nature: "Humans live and act only in specific lifeworlds, in their society, not "in" the world as such" (transl. by A. Y.) (p. 107). Moreover, in Habermas's (1973) view, "the "ontological" content of traditional anthropology also has political implications, even more dangerous in combination with "value-neutral" science" (p. 108). Since then, it is no longer about the invariable natural constitution of man as an "insufficient being" and "unfinished project of nature", but about the human nature as an open project of history. In pursuit of Habermas, I propose the idea of "*man as an unfinishable project of history*", using the term "unfinishable" in the wake of Richard Münch. Note that, in contrast to the Habermas concept of "modernity as an unfinished project" (*unvollendetes Projekt*), Münch (1995) applies the

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concept of "modernity as an *unfinishable* project" (unvollendbares Projekt) (p. 151). Changing the suffix means that this project cannot be completed in principle. However, such incompleteness of human development requires new approaches to determine the milestones of such development. Let us return to A. Gehlen to determine how such milestones should be formed.

Although Gehlen considered work and language as the factors of human genesis, his anthropology lacked the idea of the meta-institution of discourse. Discourse is not one of the possible institutions, it is a meta-institution to which all other institutions must submit.

Gehlen de-transcends the 'transcendental', lowering it from the 'sky' of the spirit to the 'ground' of social institutions. This is another trend of modern philosophy, to which functional-system theory, transcendental pragmatics and other directions belong. However, Gehlen lacks the idea of a self-reflective institution, an idea that, at least in modern society, is a secular form of institution legitimation, reaching a radical manifestation of the idea of discourse developed by different schools of philosophy, including transcendental pragmatics. Transcendental pragmatics, in contrast to the Gehlen's anthropology, 're-transcends the transcendental', re-turning it to the 'virtual sky' of the meta-institution of discourse. It is in this direction that the transcendental anthropology of discourse develops.

(transl. by A. Y.) (Yermolenko, 2013, p. 16)

Thus, the current trend is the tendency to move from classical anthropology to anthropology of discourse, which is at the same time a transcendental anthropology. This is where I use Marcel Niquet's (2002) work "Human Identities. From Classical Philosophical Anthropology to Discourse Anthropology". Discourse anthropology is the anthropology of intersubjectivity, according to which a person is inherently a discursive being, *homo discursivus*.

In the end, this fact also influences the traditional lines of philosophy. For example, the existentialist problem is shifting towards intersubjectivity, particularly in the *inter-existential* concept of Thomas Rentsch (1990). Such a turn occurs in economic theory, in particular in the series of editions of the Ethics and Economics Dialogue by Berlin's transcendental pragmatics (D. Böhler, G. Gronke, etc.). Communicative pedagogy paves the way, particularly in the project "Ethics and Pedagogy Dialogue" of the same Berlin school (Böhler-Auras, 2000). In the environmental sciences, it is the transition from the concept of "environment" to the concept of "the world as a community" (Meyer-Abich, 2004). In the social sciences, this tendency is manifested in the search for ways of discourse-ethical justification of social theory (K.-O. Apel, 1998, p. 395).

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These trends are also evident in applied anthropological disciplines, in particular, in solving problems of gene technologies, cloning, preimplantation genetic diagnostics, etc. To what extent can man take his own natural evolution under his own control and control it? And will this not put an end to the existence of human natural constitution, and therefore to the existence of man himself? These issues are not only of moral and ethical importance, but also of legal and socio-political significance. The main thing is: how much can artificially created people be human? It is also a question of the relationship between "natural" and "artificial" people, the symmetry of their rights. Since the violation of this symmetry calls into question the institutions of Western democracy, which are based on the principle of natural rights.

In addition, the improvement of "human nature" upbears one of the most fundamental pillars of ethics, namely, the principle of freedom. As the position by which a person can be constructed purposefully casts doubt on a person's conviction and responsibility. Let us suppose that a person's genetic code is a "book" in which all his or her qualities are "written". If this book is "rewritten", then it seems that all, including social, human qualities can be formed. However, such "editing" would allow the realization of new utopias of social construction of man ("superhuman") with the corresponding qualities, properties and abilities. H. Jonas opposes this, putting forward the ethics of "principle of responsibility" in opposition to the utopia of E. Bloch's "principle of hope". Jonas insists on the inadmissibility of genetic-technological interference with human nature, since our natural constitution is an ontological heritage we have inherited from entire previous evolution.

Another way of arguing against genetic interference with human nature is suggested by J. Habermas (1998) on the pages of one of the essays in the Postnational Constellation: "I believe", says Habermas, "that universalist principles of egalitarian law imply only such decisions (Entscheidungskompetenzen) that comply with mutual respect for the equal autonomy of every citizen" (transl. by A. Y.) (p. 249). In my opinion, the *principle of universalisation*, which was *reconstructed* on the basis of the communicative paradigm, is the only able to guide the way in solving this problem. The principle of universalization is the basis for the principle of discourse through which the norms and practices of human activity are legitimized. Appropriate assessment also applies to preimplantation genetic diagnosis, which, according to Habermas, will lead to the fact that gene programming will violate the foundations of a democratic society based on equal rights by nature.

However, such a position of Habermas does not conform to his original principle of "decide by yourself" without using ontological, naturalistic and religious grounds.

The fact is that 'natural birth' only in appearance forms the basis for symmetry. In fact, people are born *unequal* by nature, and such inequality forms the basis for the asymmetry of interpersonal relationships and social relations. The concept of 'equality by nature' emerges as a manifestation only when there is involved the concept of equality as a regulatory idea counterfactual with respect to 'inequality by nature'. Therefore, symmetry is a regulatory idea that causes a society to move to a state in

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which it becomes possible, never totally fulfilling in empirical society.

Therefore, an appeal to a 'birth in an unnatural way' can hardly be grounds for denying eugenics or cloning; moreover, it will be contrary to the requirement to "decide by yourself". (transl. by A. Y.) (Yermolenko, 2013, p. 24)

Moreover, the processes of development of science and technology can hardly be stopped.

Then the more important issue is not about permitting or banning such technologies, but about coexistence with 'new people' and the possibility of reaching an understanding with them. This, in turn, means that we, as humans, have to defend our own dignity and our own rights, including the right to our own bodily identity. So we will also have to negotiate with the creatures if they are smart. Thus, the concept of 'birth in an unnatural way' is unlikely to threaten the institutions of a democratic society. (Yermolenko, 2013, p. 25)

Therefore, it is not nature that must decide, neither tradition nor God. We alone are responsible for these decisions. After all, this extraordinary burden of responsibility is hard to sustain for a single person. This burden can only be borne together with other people as a shared discursive responsibility. Such joint responsibility does not contradict the individual one, it complements, "removes" it. After all, responsibility to oneself is the basis for shared responsibility, and shared responsibility is already contained in responsibility to oneself (D. Apel, 2019, p. 7). This is an identified responsibility, where everyone, along with others, is responsible for certain actions, both for his or her actions and for the community as a whole. Such responsibility is not limited to the ethics of institutions, as by A. Gehlen. Institutions themselves must be legitimized by a higher authority, which is the meta-institution of discourse. This requirement also applies to the discourse-ethical legitimation of social institutions at the global level ("second-order globalization") (K.-O. Apel, 2017, p. 66). The pandemic situation testifies to the unity of the world, which requires the coordinated action of global institutions. Global institutions, legitimized by universalistic ethics of discourse, are an important factor in addressing global problems, particularly in the situation of a pandemic.

Thus, modern philosophical anthropology must take into account the factors associated with the new "human condition" in the globalized world, defined by the concept of "man as an unfinished project of history", when man takes control of the further evolution of sapient life on the

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Earth. However, in what way this process will take place, we will have to decide by ourselves through argumentative discourse based on the regulatory principle of transcendental communication. It is a way of rational ultimate justification (Letztbegründung) of the value orientations and moral norms, as well as the legitimation of global institutions for the modern high-tech civilization.

Originality

Contrary to the classical philosophical anthropology, which was based on the concept of the human being as "unfinished project of nature", the author suggests a concept of human being as "unfinishable project of history" which poses new requirements to the ethics both on the level of its fundamentals, and on the level of its application.

Conclusions

The complex globalized world needs axiological and normative re-orientation of the society based upon universalist macroethics of discourse. This macroethics should aim at Letztbegründung of the moral and ethical imperatives for the future development of society, changes of humanity and its natural constitution.

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СИТУАЦІЯ ЛЮДИНИ В ГЛОБАЛІЗОВАНОМУ СУСПІЛЬСТВІ РИЗИКІВ ЯК СОЦІАЛЬНО-ЕТИЧНА ПРОБЛЕМА

Мета. Дослідження спрямовано на тематизацію соціально-етичних проблем, пов'язаних зі змінами ситуації людини в сучасному глобалізованому суспільстві ризиків, що містить у собі загрози не тільки фізичного знищення людства, а й трансформації природної конституції людини як такої. Досягнення мети передбачає також порівняльний аналіз цієї проблематики в класичній та сучасній філософській антропології. **Теоретичний базис** складають праці представників сучасної філософської антропології, зокрема методологія трансцендентальної антропології як дискурсивної етики. **Наукова новизна.** На противагу класичній філософській антропології, яка спиралась на концепт "людини як незавершеного проекту природи", автором запропоновано концепт "людини як незавершеного проекту історії", що висуває нові вимоги до етики як у площині обґрунтування, так і в площині застосування. **Висновки.** Складний глобалізований світ потребує ціннісно-нормативної переорієнтації суспільства на засадах універсалістської макроетики дискурсу, спрямованої на граничне обґрунтування морально-етичних імперативів для подальшого розвитку суспільства, змін людини та її природної конституції.

Ключові слова: антропоцен; дискурс; глобальний етос; "ситуація людини"; універсалістська макроетика; людина як незавершуваний проект історії

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СИТУАЦИЯ ЧЕЛОВЕКА В ГЛОБАЛИЗИРОВАННОМ ОБЩЕСТВЕ РИСКОВ КАК СОЦИАЛЬНО-ЭТИЧЕСКАЯ ПРОБЛЕМА

Цель. Исследование направлено на тематизацию социально-этических проблем, связанных с изменением ситуации человека в современном глобализованном обществе рисков, чреватых угрозами не только физического уничтожения человечества, но и трансформации конституции человека как такового. Достижение цели предполагает сравнительный анализ этой проблематики в классической и современной философской антропологии. **Теоретический базис** составляют работы представителей современной философской антропологии, в частности методология трансцендентальной антропологии как дискурсивной этики. **Научная новизна.** В противовес классической философской антропологии, которая опиралась на концепт "человека как незавершенного проекта природы", автором предложено концепт "человека как незавершающегося проекта истории", что выдвигает новые требования к этике и в плоскости обоснования, и в плоскости применения. **Выводы.** Сложный глобализованный мир требует ценностно-нормативной переориентации общества на основе универсалистской макроетики дискурса, направленной на предельное обоснование морально-этических императивов для дальнейшего развития общества, изменений человека и его природной конституции.

Ключевые слова: антропоцен; дискурс; глобализованное общество; глобальный этос; "ситуация человека"; универсалистская макроетика; человек как незавершающийся проект истории

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MAN AND LOGOS: HERACLITUS' SECRET

Purpose. The author believes that the main topic of philosophical studies of Heraclitus was not nature, not dialectics, and not political philosophy; he was engaged in the development of *philosophical anthropology*, and all other questions raised by him were subordinated to it to one degree or another. It is anthropology that is the most "dark" part of the teachings of this philosopher, therefore the purpose of this article is to identify the hidden anthropological message of Heraclitus. In case of success, it will become clear what made him "darken". **Theoretical basis.** The methodological basis of the article is the anthropological understanding of fragments of Heraclitus' texts presented in a historical and philosophical context. **Originality.** The philosophical concept of Heraclitus is still a mystery for researchers of his work. The author of the article proposed such a variant of interpretation, within the framework of which different elements of this concept fit into a consistent model. **Conclusions.** The article proves that although the anthropological turn in philosophy is traditionally associated with the activities of the sophists and Socrates, the previous philosophical thought was also not devoid of anthropological ideas. Moreover, pre-Socratic philosophers posed problems, the interpretation of which brought the doctrine of man to the level of high-order abstractions, while surprisingly preserving the concreteness of the life-meaning questions that confront him. And one of the brightest representatives of pre-Socratic anthropology was Heraclitus of Ephesus. Religion was the motivator that made him study the world, man, and society. The doctrine of the Logos developed by Heraclitus had a tremendous impact on Plato and Philo of Alexandria, and through them on the author of the Fourth Gospel, who begins his story with a "Greek" rethinking of the mystery of the Incarnation. If Heraclitus claimed that a person carries a particle of the Logos, then John (or the one who wrote on his behalf) proclaimed that the Logos itself incorporated a particle of man. Despite all the differences between these approaches, each of them postulated the cosmic (divine) significance of human existence, which means that it brought anthropology to the ontological level.

Keywords: Heraclitus; Logos; immortality; soul; self-knowledge; divinity; anthropology; meaning of life; memory

Introduction

Most people think philosophy is obscure, and I will not argue that there is no reason for such an opinion. However, there was only one philosopher, for who had earned the nickname "Dark", and this was Heraclitus of Ephesus.

Not only ignoramuses, but also people of an extraordinary mind (for example, Socrates) considered the philosophy of Heraclitus very difficult to understand, although today any student after a brief acquaintance with the textbook will easily retell the main ideas of this thinker. The fact that the ancient Greeks did not have at hand our textbooks on the history of philosophy partially excuses their "lack of understanding", but still does not completely clear the suspicion that we missed something important in the teachings of this philosopher.

People write vaguely for various reasons. Sometimes a writer conceals the absence of original idea using difficult phrases and constructions. Obviously, this is not about Heraclitus, because

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his originality is undeniable. Sometimes the complexity of presentation is justified by the complexity of topic, and the author simply does not see the opportunity to explain his idea more simply. This is also not about Heraclitus, because he did not abuse, and even because this Greek despised the readers so much that he deliberately made his idea as less clear as possible. Cicero (1967) reproached him with the latter (p. 73, p. 319), and Diogenes Laertius (1925) explained that "he deliberately made it the more obscure in order that none but adepts should approach it, and lest familiarity should breed contempt" (p. 413).

It is natural to expect purported mystery from a priest, prophet, or founder of a secret society; Pythagoras secrecy is somewhat annoying, but at least it was justified by his strategy. As for Heraclitus, he did not create a sect, so he did not need to promise his supporters access to exclusive knowledge. If this is not just ambitions and arrogance, then there must be reasons for such a strategy. However, they cannot be extracted from what popular reconstructions of the Heraclitus' teachings provide. He appears as a person thinking outside the box, the author of witty aphorisms, misanthrope and an enemy of open society. For the former, ancient philosophers highly valued him and pay tribute to this day, aphorisms have become the property of the general public, and his arrogance and political views evoked both admiration and condemnation. Original, eccentric and gloomy hermit, a "typical" genius, whose greatest insights were combined with a nasty character and narcissism.

Heraclitus' philosophy was revolutionary for its time, but what could be *secret* in it? He was not the first to talk about *arhe*, about space, etc. Other Ionian philosophers were ready to share their knowledge with everyone, and Heraclitus for some reason did not want his knowledge to fall into unworthy hands. What did the philosopher of Ephesus try to hide from the ignorant, and what thought did he want to share with those who knew, what secret did this Greek hide from the uninitiated?

For two and a half millennia, many comments have been written on the teachings of Heraclitus of Ephesus and many reconstructions have been created, in the light of which all the shadows, it would seem, should have long receded. In addition to the traditional for the history of philosophy themes, oppositions of Heraclitian becoming and Parmenides being (Christidis, 2012), the image of the river as a symbol of variability (Narecki, 2012), the concept of Logos (Brann, 2011; Johnstone, 2014), Heraclitus attitude to religion (Adomenas, 1999), a reconstruction of his philosophy of nature (Habash, 2019; Neels, 2018) and political philosophy (Popper, 1945; Robitzsch, 2018), more specific questions are raised. For example, the problems of oblivion in the philosophy of Heraclitus are considered by David Michael Schur (1994) in a thesis, which was defended at Harvard University. The specific style of Heraclitus discusses Celso Vieira (2013), and Robin Reames (2013) discusses the influence of Heraclitus on the formation of rhetoric. But something prevents from depriving him of the nickname he got from his compatriots.

Purpose

My hypothesis is the assumption that the main theme of Heraclitus' philosophical studies was not nature, not dialectics, and not political philosophy; he was engaged in the development of *philosophical anthropology*, and all other questions raised by him were subordinated to it to one degree or another. It is anthropology that is the most "dark" part of the teachings of this philosopher, therefore the purpose of this article is to identify the hidden anthropological message of Heraclitus. In case of success, it will become clear what made him "darken".

Statement of basic materials

Many theologians and even spiritual writers turned to Heraclitus, and sometimes in cases that are completely unobvious, where we find ourselves at a loss: what does Heraclitus have to do with it? It would seem that in many places quotes of "more religious" authors would be more appropriate. For example, in the Gospel the quotes of the abstract-philosophical concept of the Logos or in a Treatise on Afterlife – of the sun movement. It seems that if someone to mention among the Greek philosophers in such cases, it is rather Pythagoras, Plato or Anaxagoras. Heraclitus encrypted his religious insights, as Diogenes Laertius mentioned. In later times, one thought that his characterization concerned only his presentation style – somewhat unusual, but not so complicated – wondering in secret how can he be such a misanthrope in order to present quite simple, and sometimes banal thoughts in such a confused language. However, the subject of philosophical reflection of Heraclitus was not a secret for the ancient Greeks. Maybe they did not really understand their meaning, but the range of interests was understandable, although not to everyone.

Every religion has its own mythological component – a certain narrative about the acts and adventures of the celestials – however, the degree of development of the mythological component varies greatly. The more developed the narrative, the greater the chance for the gods to continue their "posthumous" existence in folklore. Zeus and Athena, Poseidon and Aphrodite, Apollo and Artemis are much more alive than many of their colleagues from other countries due to the fact that *many stories* have been preserved about them.

But it is the narrative that most annoys those who prefer philosophical meditations to entertaining. Among the latter was Heraclitus, whose attacks on both traditional and non-traditional religiosity of his time gave rise to suspect him of materialism and even atheism. Nevertheless, the Ephesian thinker did not intend to debunk religion as such, but merely expressed neglect of the religiosity forms that the crowd was satisfied with. As Mantas Adomenas (1999) notes, the goal of Heraclitus' criticisms is not the religious practices themselves, but their popular interpretation. Bloody sacrifices, phallic processions and false sacrings, he perceived as a mockery of the sacred, wickedness and insult to the gods.

In turn, Heraclitus attracted religious authors (including the authors of the Derveni Papyrus and the Fourth Gospel) not as a materialist or, even more so, not as an atheist, but as a deep religious thinker who, ridiculing superstition, opened the way to a true understanding of the Divine. He did not try to create an order or a sect, did not engage in religious propaganda, and did not call himself a missionary of other worlds, a god or someone like that. Heraclitus was deeply religious, but almost not devout, being aimed not so much at the gods, but at *divinity*.

For a Christian, "divinity" comes from God, for a polytheist, "divinity" is what the gods themselves are *involved in*. Since even the mention of the gods was inevitably associated with the deeds that the poets attributed to them, it was not easy to extract from the stories about the gods the divinity to which philosophical minds were inclined. Therefore, Heraclitus had a low opinion of the national religion of his compatriots; in fairness, it must be said that he was not alone in the desire to whip Hesiod.

Divinity may be regarded as a kind of ideal, but at the same time, the gods who are worshiped and in honor of whom holidays, processions, sports, etc. are organized, can be very far from this ideal (Bazaluk, 2019). The contradiction between the ideal of divinity and its carriers ("Homeric gods") was too obvious, so when the Greek philosophers talked about god, they were talking either about abstract divinity, or (if god had the name) about some cosmic principle.

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But the religious views of the Greeks were not limited to the traditional Olympic religion, there were also the mystical cults, the most widespread of which was associated with the name of Orpheus. Plutarch and Clement of Alexandria believed that Heraclitus borrowed many of his ideas from the Orphics, and some modern authors consider this an exaggeration (Sider, 1997, p. 148). Heraclitus was not Orphic, considering the mysteries of this sect to be profanation (as the Pythagorean sect was also a profanation for him), but he, despite his nasty temper, never reproached Orpheus. Moreover, he gave Orpheus' teaching an unprecedented depth.

It is Heraclitus, not Pythagoras – whose teachings were not of Greek origin at all – could be considered a reformer of Orphism, except for one circumstance. The teaching of Heraclitus in its nature is such that it could not be the subject of religious propaganda, and therefore these two lines have diverged so much that now their relationship is almost imperceptible to us. Nevertheless, it was, and it was not at all accidental that the author of the Derveni Papyrus (the intellectual Orphic, well acquainted not only with mythology and cosmology, but also with philosophy) in his commentary on Orpheus quotes Heraclitus, not Homer or Hesiod, not Pythagoras or anyone from the Pythagoreans (Betegh, 2006, p. 11; Kouremenos, Parássoglou, & Tsantsanoglou, 2006, p. 129; Laks, & Most, 1997, p. 11). But what was "Orphic" in Heraclitus and why did he arouse such interest among purely religious authors?

The fact that you cannot step twice into the same river is known even to people who are very far from philosophy, and many of them have no idea about the author of the aphorism. The latter is witty, but nothing more; Heraclitus was hardly the first to pay attention to the variability of the world. There is probably no person who at least sometimes is not regret the impossibility of returning to the past in order to change something, or even just ... return. Yesterday said goodbye to us forever; tomorrow will be different in any case, unless, of course, the same thing happened to you as to the main character of the Groundhog Day. Plato (1997) noted that almost all sages, beginning with Homer, taught about the variability of the world, and only Parmenides was an exception (p. 169). It is the teaching of the Eleatics, which clearly came into conflict with both the sense organs and life experience that should have seemed absolutely fantastic, however, it is Heraclitus who was called "Dark", not Parmenides. Apparently, we do not even understand what the ancient Greeks did not understand at Heraclitus.

What river was Heraclitus talking about? This question seems to be meaningless. His words can be applied to *any* river; moreover, here the river is just a symbol. These things are obvious enough even to the ignorant. However, Heraclitus was reputed to be a man who deeply hid his thought. Therefore, we can assume the existence of several semantic levels. The waters change in all rivers, but there are rivers, the entry into which is by no means connected with swimming.

However, before approaching the water, let us sit on the bank and think about the bad temper of Heraclitus. His dislike for fellow citizens is well known, as is his hostility to most predecessors. But among the latter he especially singled out Pythagoras, whom the Dark Philosopher mentions several times and always in a sharply negative context. What is the reason for such dislike for the thinker from Samos?

I will not consider the version of rivalry and envy, for to suspect Heraclitus in this would be the downright indecency. Perhaps the Ephesian philosopher was irritated by combining the search for truth with ridiculous requirements (for example, with a prohibition on eating beans), just as he was ironic about Hesiod's division of happy and unhappy days. However, the matter, it seems to me, is not limited to the rejection of the marketing strategy of Pythagoras. There is something else.

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Here we come to the essence of the anthropological project of Heraclitus. The main theme of his search lies in the plane of human destination. His contempt for the majority of fellow citizens does not come down to aristocratic snobbery. Being in a crowd is bad, not only because the values of the crowd turn a person away from the search for truth, but also because this search itself, in principle, cannot become mainstream. There is no single path, single method, single model of knowledge, and for Heraclitus this is a fundamental point. Pythagoras, who created the order (sect) was to be perceived by the Ephesian thinker not just as a fraudster. And the accusation of plagiarism is also not without reason.

Pythagoras' guilt is not in neglecting the requirements of scientific ethics, and not in violation of copyright to intellectual property (they did not exist as social values), but in the initially incorrect approach to the search for truth. Pythagoras gathered other people's knowledge, passed it off as his own and made his disciples strictly follow them. All this was expressed in formalized prohibitions and taboos, in absolute obedience and blind trust to a teacher who imposed both patterns of thinking and patterns of behavior (up to diet). Plagiarism (real or imaginary) is not the most serious. Even if Pythagoras invented all this himself, for his students it would not have changed much. After all, they would be sure that by accepting some doctrine and *comprehending* it, one can join in divine wisdom. But the fact is that comprehending *other people's* doctrines is certainly the wrong way. Wisdom cannot be "borrowed" from others; it cannot be "copied" into one's head. Knowing ten wise doctrines will not make anyone a "tenfold" sage.

It would seem that, although much knowledge does not bring wisdom in the literal sense, at least it contributes to its emergence. However, there is one subtlety. How exactly is knowledge delivered? If as a material for memorization, then there is more harm than good. A sage can only *guide* a disciple by showing an example of his own search. Therefore, Heraclitus did not look for followers, realizing that simple *consent* would not yield anything, because his treatise is not only a pointer to the Way, it is the Way itself. And this is the path to immortality.

Often, by "immortality" one mean unlimited life; the gods have it, the human tariff is limited, so the former are called immortal, the latter – mortal. Today, most people, thinking about the possibility of their own posthumous existence, imagine their own I in some other shell. My soul = I. At the same time, it is implicitly assumed that the soul remembers its life on earth, is aware of its I and generally is not different from its current state in its thinking. Indeed, if my soul does not remember anything from my life experience, it will no longer be my I. How to implement this without a brain is a difficult question. If this is not just a fantasy, then one should assume the presence of a kind of informational double and an alternative resource in relation to the brain. However, this is a separate topic that I have already discussed previously (Halapsis, 2019).

However, for the ancient Greeks the ability to remember the past was by no means obvious. Moreover, this was an exception and a special case. Souls are immortal, but the Greeks called man mortal. Because the immortality of the soul means little when *there is no memory*.

The Orphics believed that the situation was not hopeless; Heraclitus was of the same opinion. But unlike the Orphics, he did not think that hymns, prayers, mysteries, or anything else matters. Heraclitus declares: "Immortal mortals, mortal immortals [or, 'immortals are mortal, mortals are immortal'], living the death of the others and dying their life" DK 22B62 (McKirahan, 2010, p. 121). It is this vague phrase that gives the key to Heraclitian anthropology.

Gods do not die of old age, diseases, they cannot be killed (at least in the usual sense of the word). But the gods live the life (and death) of their worshipers, they are strong and powerful,

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while they believe in them; with the disappearance of the faith immortal gods fade into oblivion. The great and terrible gods of antiquity at the best became characters of folklore, and at the worst, they completely disappeared. Who remembers those worshiped by Neanderthals?

As for people, they die physically, and there is no one who would not know about this empirical fact. However, does everything human disappear with the stop of breathing and heartbeat? Man is distinguished from other living beings by the ability to think, his mind, consciousness; he stands between animals and gods. At the same time, an intelligent man is closer to the gods, and a stupid one is closer to animals. Does human consciousness disappear with the death of the body? The answer to this question depends on the quality of the *soul*.

One of the key ideas of Pythagoras was the doctrine of metempsychosis, which involved regular incarnations of the soul on earth – a doctrine that is quite attractive, but requires a large number of admissions. In fact, his main justification was his confidence in the teacher, who said that he allegedly remembered his previous lives. Heraclitus considers Pythagoras a deceiver, making the statement that you cannot step twice into the same river as a counter-argument. And if we are talking about the prospects of a posthumous existence, then the choice of rivers is not so great.

The Greeks believed that after death, the soul goes to Hades, in which, according to most myths, five rivers flow: Styx, Acheron, Lethe, Cocytos and Phlegethon (Pyriphlegethon). Charon carries the soul – according to some information through Acheron, according to others – through the Styx. In any case, death in the minds of the Greeks was tied to the image of a river through which it was possible to cross one-way, for Charon under no circumstances would take anyone back.

Pythagoras claimed the possibility of return of the soul and its embodiment into a new body, and it is against him that Heraclitus makes the argument: you cannot step twice into the same river! Just as one cannot step twice in the same "ordinary" river, one cannot cross Acheron (Styx) twice. Pythagoras is a fraud because he gives deceptive hope, according to Heraclitus, there *will be no* second chance. Cratylus, who thought he had surpassed Heraclitus by claiming that it was impossible even to enter the river once, in fact, understood him too literally, and therefore – fundamentally wrong. Heraclitus was not at all interested in swimming, and even the doctrine of the world variability was only an illustration.

Life acquires *special value* due to the fact that we all enter the very same river only once. Therefore, he is not interested in the Ephesians' invitation to participate in the government of the city, and he rejects the offer of the Persian king Darius, who promised him a full board in return for philosophical conversations. He has no desire to recruit disciples, and even more so, to create an order like the Pythagorean. Time is too expensive to waste on trifles. He needs to prepare to meet the eternity, and therefore he is engaged in *self-knowledge* ("I searched myself" DK 22B101 (McKirahan, 2010, p. 115)).

However, these searches had little in common with the searches of Socrates, for whom self-knowledge was realized in the form of a dialogue with a comprehensive discussion of the problem and the results that were most understandable to those around him. Heraclitus considered knowledge to be the province of a few, and since the majority does not show interest in it, they cannot be allowed to the results obtained. Only a person of high intellectual and moral qualities will be able to follow the path of Heraclitus, and that is why he used the *cipher*, for the gods do the same: "The Lord whose oracle is at Delphi neither speaks nor conceals but gives a sign" DK 22B93 (McKirahan, 2010, p. 116). The example of the gods means not so much the aristocratic

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esotericism of knowledge, but the need for active participation in the cognitive process. The one who knows will understand, but the unreasonable cannot have access to divine secrets. And the central point of this mystery is the doctrine of the Logos.

Since the Logos is the highest cosmic principle, standing above the world and over the gods, one would think that it has nothing to do with an individual person. However, the Logos of Heraclitus is not at all identical with the God of Aristotle, but not because the Logos is closer to man, but because man is closer to the Logos. "The soul has a self-increasing *Logos*" DK 22B115 (McKirahan, 2010, p. 123); "A person's character [or, 'individuality'] is his divinity [or, 'guardian spirit']" DK 22B119 (McKirahan, 2010, p. 124).

The idea of the soul's immortality also follows from the idea of the participation of the soul in the immortal Logos, which takes the discourse into a completely different direction. But the matter is not limited to a simple statement with which it could please fellow citizens like Zalmoxis convinced the Thracians that death does not exist. For immortality itself, oddly enough, gives little.

The human soul consists of fire, but it can be "dry" or "wet". A wet soul neglects its own essence, dampens; there is little fire in it, which means little Logos. But in this case, there is also little immortality in it.

Immortality is usually not considered in a quantitative sense: either one has it or has not, for even the phrase "that one is more immortal than this one" seems very strange and ridiculous to our ears. For Heraclitus, apparently this was so. And he is quite consistent. His mind turns out to be not just a characteristic of man, but an ontological factor (remember Anaxagoras with his concept of Mind). Only a dry soul follows the Logos, for it most closely corresponds to the fiery nature of the latter.

All this is good theoretically, but what is the practical sense in following the Logos? And here Heraclitus opens the veil of secrecy, claiming that in Hades the sages will arise and become vigilant guardians of the living and the dead DK 22B63 (McKirahan, 2010, p. 123). Later Plato (1997) developed this idea in *Phaedon* and *Cratylus* (p. 60, p. 116). By the way, one of the angelic hosts is called Guardians in the Book of Enoch and in the Dead Sea Scrolls (Lumpkin, 2010; Martínez, & Tigchelaar, 1999). Maybe this is a coincidence, but maybe not.

As David Shaw (2018) points out, the central element of Heraclitus' thought was the concept of divine justice, which for the Greek of his era meant the order of the universe. Therefore, a dry soul will be awakened not by the will of one or another deity, but by virtue of natural reasons, for the Logos cannot be dead. The soul is immortal, not by virtue of its numerical essence, as Pythagoras believed, but because it carries a particle of the Logos. But this is potential immortality. Actually, it is immortal in case it *awakens* this Logos in itself and understands the unity of the Logos, and does not seek its own. A wet soul would also wake up, but there is nothing to wake up there: the small presence of the Logos is enough for its immortality, but not enough for *self-awareness*. That is, a wet soul does not die, but exists as plant or animal in Hades.

Heraclitus did not share the teachings of Pythagoras on the transmigration of souls, so reverent about the time on earth, realizing that there *would be no second chance*. He was angry and surprised by people who spend their only chance on stuffing their belly and other forms of self-indulgence. The flesh is finite, it is mortal and decaying, and the soul – the daemon – is eternal, and pleasing the flesh, man misses his chance to gain eternal life in the kingdom of the Logos.

Naturally, they could not help but outrage him who tried to join the deity through phallic processions, Bacchanalias and other *unreasonable* actions. It was crazy for him. And blood purifica-

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tion from these positions was also crazy. And Pythagoras in his eyes was like a charlatan who was shrouded in mystery, passing off grains of truth for his teaching. According to Heraclitus he committed the main sin: he convinced his followers that ritual actions or dietary food somehow affect the posthumous existence of the soul. Therefore, he became for Heraclitus the founder of the sacrificial knives – a kind of priest – or even just an Egyptian priest on Hellenic land.

Heraclitus regarded the soul as participating not only in the Logos, but also in the body. There is a spark of the Logos in the soul, but there are also bodily desires. The more a man introduces him to the Logos, the less he becomes dependent on the body, and vice versa: the more bodily needs burden the soul, the less space remains for the Logos. Even the most exalted man has in his soul a share of the earthly and bodily, and even the most stupid has a particle of the Logos. One soul will be drier, the other wetter, but both dryness and wetness are present in each.

At the time of death, each soul loses a part of itself, for its connection with the body is not at all something secondary. But a dry soul loses a small part of its essence, and a wet soul – almost everything. In other words, during the life of the body, a dry soul formed a fiery body with a hint of moisture, and a wet soul could not do this. Accordingly, one needs a supply of dryness, or a supply of fire, so that having lost a body, the soul could retain consciousness and self-awareness. Eternity is inherent only in that part of the soul that is part of the Logos, and if it is the greater part, then the soul, having lost bodily moisture, will retain its self; if the latter almost entirely consisted of bodily desires, then there will be nothing to be retained. Its eternal part will continue to exist, but in a plant or animal form, the soul whose self-consciousness was formed from the fiery element can continue a rational existence.

Therefore, Heraclitus writes not about resurrection or rebirth, but about the awakening of the souls of sages. The souls of most people are doomed to dreamless sleep, their own logos was too weak to connect with the cosmic Logos. And when Heraclitus writes about those who gorge themselves like cattle, this is not just aristocrat's arrogance in relation to the crowd, it is a statement that these people miss their chance, becoming like cattle in life and doomed to bestial existence after death. Heraclitus did not see any opportunity to change this state of affairs, and grief was seen through his contempt, because it was no coincidence that his second nickname was Crying (besides the name Dark).

And the last one. An atheist, techie and pragmatist will never understand Heraclitus. Anyone who does not need a key will see his set of ambitions or assign him his own thoughts "in germ". Christian dogmatist who is convinced that he has a higher truth than even the greatest non-Christian thinkers could offer, will understand him even less. He who believes that the divine truth is in his pocket does not need Greek philosophy, but any philosophy in general.

Originality

The philosophical concept of Heraclitus is still a mystery for researchers of his work. I proposed an interpretation variant in which various elements of this concept fit into a consistent model. The latter also allows us to understand the special attitude to this philosopher in the ancient tradition both from other philosophers and from the authors of religious texts.

Conclusions

Although the anthropological turn in philosophy is traditionally associated with the activities of the sophists and Socrates, the previous philosophical thought was also not without anthropological ideas. Moreover, pre-Socratic philosophers posed problems, the interpretation of which

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brought the doctrine of man to the level of high-order abstractions, while surprisingly preserving the concreteness of the life-purpose questions he faced. And one of the brightest representatives of pre-Socratic anthropology was Heraclitus of Ephesus.

His religious beliefs are usually seen as a complement to natural science, ethics, and political views. I tried to show that for Heraclitus everything was exactly the opposite. Religion was the motivator that made him study the world, man, and society. He was looking for a key, and he found it. He was not interested in either the game of the mind, or empty reasoning. He faced a very specific task, but he understood that the gods limited knowledge with good reason. His esoteric doctrine of salvation opened the way to the Islands of the Blest only for the most worthy – not for the most pious, kind and tame, not for the richest and most notable, but for the wisest. This thought contrasted with both the Olympic religion and the Dionysian cult. Naturally, it could not be accepted by Christianity as well.

However, the doctrine of the Logos developed by Heraclitus had a tremendous impact on Plato and Philo of Alexandria, and through them on the author of the Fourth Gospel, who begins his story with a "Greek" rethinking of the mystery of the Incarnation. If Heraclitus claimed that a person carries a particle of the Logos, then John (or the one who wrote on his behalf) proclaimed that the Logos itself incorporated a particle of man. Despite all the differences between these approaches, each of them postulated the cosmic (divine) significance of human existence, which means it brought anthropology to the ontological level.

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ЛЮДИНА І ЛОГОС: ТАЄМНИЦЯ ГЕРАКЛІТА

Мета. Автор вважає, що головною темою філософських досліджень Геракліта були не природа, не діалектика і не політична філософія; він займався розробкою *філософської антропології*, а всі інші питання, що він підіймав, були в тій чи іншій мірі підпорядковані їй. Саме антропологія є найбільш "темною" частиною вчення цього філософа, тому метою даної статті є виявлення прихованого антропологічного меседжу Геракліта. У разі успіху стане зрозуміло і те, що змушувало його "темнити". **Теоретичний базис.** Методологічною основою статті є антропологічне осмислення фрагментів текстів Геракліта, представлене в історико-філософському контексті. **Наукова новизна.** Філософська концепція Геракліта до сих пір залишається загадкою для дослідників його творчості. Автор цих рядків запропонував такий варіант інтерпретації, в рамках якого різні елементи цієї концепції укладаються в несуперечливу модель. **Висновки.** У статті доводиться, що хоча антропологічний поворот у філософії традиційно пов'язують з діяльністю софістів і Сократа, філософська думка їх попередників також не була позбавлена антропологічних ідей. Більш того, досократівськими філософами були поставлені проблеми, осмислення яких вивело вчення про людину на рівень абстракцій високих порядків, дивним чином зберігши при цьому конкретність смисложиттєвих питань, які стоять перед нею. І одним з найяскравіших представників досократівської антропології був Геракліт. Релігія була тим мотиватором, який змушував його займатися дослідженням світу, людини і суспільства. Розроблене Гераклітом вчення про Логос справило колосальний вплив на Платона і на Філона Олександрійського, а через них – і на автора Четвертого Євангелія, який починає свою розповідь з "грецького" переосмислення таємниці Боготвілення. Якщо Геракліт стверджував, що людина несе в собі частинку Логосу, то Іоанн (або той, хто писав від його імені) проголосив, що сам Логос увібрав в себе частинку людини. При всіх відмінностях між собою цих підходів, кожен з них постулював космічну (божественну) значимість людського буття, а значить – виводив антропологію на онтологічний рівень.

Ключові слова: Геракліт; Логос; безсмертя; душа; самопізнання; божественність; антропологія; сенс життя; пам'ять

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ЧЕЛОВЕК И ЛОГОС: ТАЙНА ГЕРАКЛИТА

Цель. Автор считает, что главной темой философских исследований Гераклита были не природа, не диалектика и не политическая философия; он занимался разработкой *философской антропологии*, а все остальные поднимаемые им вопросы были в той или иной степени подчинены ей. Именно антропология является самой "темной" частью учения этого философа, поэтому целью данной статьи является выявление скрытого антропологического меседжа Гераклита. В случае удачи станет понятно и то, что заставляло его "темнить". **Теоретический базис.** Методологической основой статьи является антропологическое осмысление фрагментов текстов Гераклита, представленное в историко-философском контексте. **Научная**

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новизна. Философская концепция Гераклита до сих пор остается загадкой для исследователей его творчества. Автор статьи предложил такой вариант интерпретации, в рамках которого разные элементы этой концепции укладываются в непротиворечивую модель. **Выводы.** В статье доказывается, что хотя антропологический поворот в философии традиционно связывают с деятельностью софистов и Сократа, предшествующая философская мысль также не была лишена антропологических идей. Более того, досократовскими философами были поставлены проблемы, осмысление которых вывело учение о человеке на уровень абстракций высоких порядков, удивительным образом сохранив при этом конкретность стоящих перед ним смысловых вопросов. И одним из ярчайших представителей досократовской антропологии был Гераклит Эфесский. Религия была тем мотиватором, который заставлял его заниматься исследованием мира, человека и общества. Разработанное Гераклитом учение о Логосе оказало колоссальное влияние на Платона и на Филона Александрийского, а через них – и на автора Четвертого Евангелия, который начинает свое повествование с "греческого" переосмысления тайны Боговоплощения. Если Гераклит утверждал, что человек несет в себе частицу Логоса, то Иоанн (или тот, кто писал от его имени) провозгласил, что сам Логос вобрал в себя частицу человека. При всех отличиях между собой этих подходов, каждый из них постулировал космическую (божественную) значимость человеческого бытия, а значит – выводил антропологию на онтологический уровень.

Ключевые слова: Гераклит; Логос; бессмертие; душа; самопознание; божественность; антропология; смысл жизни; память

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I. O. KOVNIEROVA^{1*}^{1*}Donbas State Pedagogical University (Sloviansk, Ukraine), e-mail zhuravleva_1605@ukr.net, ORCID 0000-0002-8054-9647**ANTHROPOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE CONCEPT OF "CRIME" IN HISTORICO-PHILOSOPHICAL DISCOURSE**

Purpose. The paper considers the establishment of the paradigmatic determinants of the understanding of crime on the basis of fundamental changes in understanding of the essence of a man in ancient, medieval, Renaissance, modern and postmodern philosophy. **Theoretical basis.** The author determines that the understanding of the concept of crime is possible only in the combination of historical, philosophical, legal and sociological approaches. The interpretation of the essence of this concept dynamics and relevant legal practices is based on structuralist, post-structuralist and hermeneutical methodological principles. **Originality.** The author has proved that the concept of "crime" is not a constant but a historically variable category whose dynamics of meanings is linked to a change in philosophical anthropological paradigms. Its understanding is primarily related to the interpretation of the essence of a man and the imperatives of his behavior. This allows a new understanding of the philosophical foundations of modern criminology. **Conclusions.** The article establishes that in the history of Western philosophy, there are five anthropological paradigms that differ in a thorough rethinking of the essence of a man. The first cosmocentric regards man as a microcosm, his soul and actions must be in harmony with the harmony of the Cosmos. The second Theocentric considers a man the image and likeness of God, though he is at the same time burdened with original sin. In the era of early Modernism, the third paradigm, which we called cognitive-centric, becomes dominant, since the essence of a man is reduced primarily to his mind. It gradually changes to the fourth – sociocentric, which focuses on the social essence of a man. However, despite its continued existence in our time, at the end of the XX century, there is a transition to the fifth paradigm – postmodernist, which deconstructs the essence of a man, reducing it to the role of an element of power systems. These paradigms, with a certain synchronicity, create the corresponding concepts of "crime": from violation of polis-space laws to identification with sin, from non-observance of mental and moral standards to social deviance. Contemporary understandings of crime are, for the most part, relativistic and constructivist, which is consistent with the postmodern anthropological paradigm. However, the diversity of interpretations of the concept of "crime" that exists in the current scientific literature needs further comprehension.

Keywords: anthropological paradigm; crime; tort; sin; deviance; cosmocentrism; theocentrism; cognitocentrism; sociocentrism; postmodernism

Introduction

The relevance of the topic of the study is due to the fact that the phenomenon of crime, which was the result of objective (due to its rapid growth in the early XXI century in most countries) and subjective (due to popularization in the media, online resources, and film, television and television production) factors one of the urgent problems that excite humanity and requires constant scientific understanding of basic concepts, in particular the key concept, the concept of "crime". The criminal situation in Ukraine, strengthened by the armed conflict in the Donbass, adds particular relevance to the selected issues, since there are quite a few social phenomena that are criminal in nature but cannot be qualified as a crime (Bilous et al., 2017). This is that prompts us to resort to a deep philosophical analysis of the genesis of the very concept of "crime", and its interpretation in various philosophical paradigms.

The historical-philosophical accentuation of the work makes it possible to view crime not only as a criminal phenomenon, but also as a multidimensional social phenomenon in the broad context of the historical-civilization process. At various stages in its history, humanity has been ambiguous about what is considered a crime, depending on the social and cultural conditionality

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of its legal consciousness and understanding of the nature of the person himself. Therefore, without understanding the historical and philosophical thought it is impossible to understand adequately the contemporary understanding of the concept of "crime", which is defined in various ways in different criminological concepts.

The problem of comprehending the philosophical foundations of criminology is one of the leading topics in contemporary Western and national scientific literature. After the release in 2008, a somewhat provocative article of Jane Schneider and Peter Schneider (2008) "The Anthropology of Crime and Criminalization" in Western humanities there was a wide debate about the cultural and historical conditionality of criminalization of certain forms of human behavior. The most significant works in this area are as follows: an article by a Belgian researcher G. Bruinsma (2016), two fundamental collections of works "Philosophical Foundations of International Criminal Law: Correlating Thinkers", published in Brussels in 2018 and 2019, and materials from the 2017 "Philosophical Perspectives on Crime" Conference in the Romanian city of Timisoara, especially Joan Antoine Mallet's (2017) article "Crime and Retribution in Plato's Theology". Ukrainian philosophical and legal literature also lacks original intelligence on the problem of philosophical understanding of crime and criminality. In particular, in 2016, an interesting Conference "Modern Criminology: Achievements, Challenges, Prospects" was held in Kharkiv. Among the numerous reports and articles that were collected in the conference materials, we should mention those concerning our issues: articles of V. I. Poklad (2016) and T. V. Melnychuk (2016). Certain problems of the historical and philosophical basis for understanding crime have been reflected in other domestic and Russian studies. However, none of these works traces the general logic of the dynamics of interpretation of crime, depending on changes in philosophical and anthropological paradigms in Western history of philosophy.

Purpose

The purpose of the paper is to establish the paradigmatic determinants of understanding of crime on the basis of fundamental changes in understanding of the essence of a man in ancient, medieval, Renaissance, modern and postmodern philosophy.

Statement of basic materials

A crime is usually regarded as an unlawful act that is not only for the individual but also for the community, society or the state and is punishable by the state or other authority. However, understanding the essence of crime, its causes and consequences depends largely on the philosophical interpretation of the essence of man, his behavior and place in society and the world.

The ancient philosophical paradigm is defined as cosmocentric. It views the Cosmos (κόσμος) as a holistic universe, based on natural harmony. Famous specialist in ancient Greek culture J.-P. Vernant (1984) believed that in the VII-VI centuries BC "... the idea of a cosmic order is stood out, based now not on the relics of God, ... but on the notion of a law-governed cosmos, a rule (nomos). Nomos establishes the nature of elements ... order for all constituents" (p. 107). According to the idea of this French explorer, the cosmic order correlates with the legal: "It is ... the model of the social cosmos, regulated by law that is equal for all, was transferred by early Greek thinkers to the physical universe at the dawn of philosophy" (Vernant, 1984, p. 112).

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This is the secret of the similarities between the thoughts of Miletus natural philosopher Thales and the Athenian legislator Solon. The cosmic law (nomos) expresses the profound outlook of the ancient Greek – the harmony, proportion, proportionality that was reflected in Pythagoras' saying, "All is a Number".

Man was regarded as a certain "microcosm" (μικροκοσμος), that is, the universe in miniature, which should reflect the harmony of the surrounding world. The analogies of man and the universe are reflected in the treatises of the Hippocratic school, in the writings of Democritus and in the dialogue "Timaeus" by his opponent Plato. According to the latter, the harmonious Cosmos is the ideal for the human soul and the state, which must be similar to each other and based on the eternal and unchanging principles of the Law – νομός and Δίκη-Justice.

The ancient Greeks had no universally accepted notion of "crime". They used the words "έγκλημα" and "αίτια" to denote the stigmatization of a person's guilty of violating the rules and regulations of the policy. The word "έγκλημα", which in modern Greek is translated as "crime", in ancient Greeks meant accusation, complaint, reproach. But the term "αίτια" (guilt) was primarily associated with violations of the foundations of the world order, and these violations related, as the external order of the cosmos – murder, encroachment on other's people property, and inconsistency of human behavior with the laws of this cosmos. The traditional anthropological ancient paradigm is characterized by a belief in the inviolability of the Cosmos and the consideration of crime as a certain deviation from the fate, will of the gods and the inviolable laws of the polis. The punishment was seen to curb human transgressiveness and re-target it in a positive and creative way.

However, a deviation departure from this all-ancient anthropology of crime is relativistic sophistry, which essentially justifies the crime. Gorgias, for example, according to Plato, believed that the nature of morality and law lies in the desire of the weak to subordinate the strong to their will. Moreover, arguing any thesis, the Sophists argued for the absence of any absolute truth and, as a consequence, objective justice and good. And if there is no justice as a criterion of lawfulness, then there are no "true" laws, and crime becomes a concept so relative and inconstant that to speak of its ontological status makes no sense. A certain echo of this position is the Roman proverb: "Ex senatusconsultis et plebiscitis crimina exercentur" (crimes arise from Senate and people's decisions).

Socrates opposed the relativism of the Sophists. He tried to give a new meaning to ancient anthropological cosmocentrism. The harmony of the cosmos indicates that it has a reasonable beginning. Accordingly, a person can achieve harmony only on the basis of reason, which must determine its behavior. That is, the crime is, despite its short-term appeal, a deviation from the requirements of the Mind, mental "illness". By treating crime as a violation of reasonable law, the philosopher recognizes the existence of not only life sentences, but also other punishments. Punishments of "curable" criminals are regarded as having cathartic significance, and punishments of "incurable" are treated as a precaution to others.

Socrates himself is known to become a victim of an unjust decision of the Athenian court. But he believed that it was better to enforce an unlawful sentence than to neglect the law of the state. In this sense, his disciple Plato attempts, on the basis of Socratic teaching, to rethink Greek cosmocentrism in the spirit of ethical and legal rationalization. The Platonic ideal Polis is a total rationalization of human behavior under the control of philosopher sages. Crime is the least deviation from such regulation. In trying to find out the causes of the criminal behavior, Plato pointed to drawbacks in education that failed to control the destructive trains of the criminal's

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soul. He believed that measures that could deter people from criminal behavior should be their public condemnation, unwavering belief in the inevitability of punishment, the habit of decent behavior, and the encouragement of law-abiding citizens.

Aristotle deviates somewhat from the moral rigor of his teacher. Following the principle of moderation (the "golden mean"), which is a reflection of the numerical proportions of the cosmos, he considers the cause of crime ("injustice") or the lack or excess of certain passions.

However, Stagirite believed that

... not every act and every passion allows the middle, because in some [passions] the very name expresses poor quality (φασλότης), for example: gloating (επιχαιρεκακία), shamelessness (αναισχυντία), envy (ή φθόνος), and from acts – adultery (ή μοιχεία), theft (ή κλοπή), human killing (ή ανδροφονία). All these things and the things like these are considered bad in themselves, not for surplus or lack, and therefore they can never be done right... (Aristotle, 2002, p. 75)

However, the cosmocentric anthropological paradigm acquires its apotheosis in Stoicism, a philosophical trend that had a decisive influence on the formation of Roman law. This current that occurs in Athens in the III century B.C. (Zenon, Kleanf, Chrysipp) subsequently spread its influence to the entire Hellenistic world (Panetius, Posidonius) and flourished in ancient Rome (Seneca, Epictetus and Mark Aurelius). According to their views, nature is a majestic cosmos, a reasonable world order. Man is an integral part of nature, he must reasonably obey his laws, which are for him the fate, fatum. So Seneca argued: "Ducunt Volentem Fata, Nolentem Trahunt (Fate leads the willing and drags along the reluctant)".

The Stoics created a philosophical anthropology based on the recognition of the existence of the eternal highest natural law that governs the entire cosmos, one for all ages and peoples, which is a collection of laws of the mind consistent with the nature of the world. According to Cicero, who was strongly influenced by Stoicism, the basis of natural law is a lifelong, unwritten law that people inhale with the air. This natural law, based on cosmic Reason, forms the basis of law and justice, which must be based on justice (justitia). Written law (private and public) has its source as a natural right.

In ancient Roman law the concept of crime did not exist. Any deviation from the norms was reflected in the concept of "delictum" (offense), regardless of what rights were violated, whose interests it affected and how it was punished. The first attempt to unify torts was the lex Aquilia, proposed by the tribune Aquilius in 286 BC. But later in the Roman state institutions were created that dealt with criminal law practice. There is also a system of principles and norms that define certain offenses and means of punishment. Punishment is assumed by the state, determining the range of the most dangerous (in its view) offenses. There is a clear distinction between public torts (delictum publicum) and private offenses (delictum privatum). There is also the concept of crimen (crime) which means public torts that had a special public danger. Classical Roman law,

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in particular by the mouth of the famous Roman ruler of the II – early III centuries. Ulpian defines crimes (*crimen*) as an act of violence or deception. It is in the writings of Roman lawyers of the classical period (II-III centuries). Gaius, Papinian, Paul and already mentioned Ulpian formulate classic classifications of crimes, provide definitions of theft (*crimen furti*) and insults (*crimen falsum*), rape (*crimen raptus*) and other types crimes. A special place in Roman law is occupied by *crimen laesae majestatis* (treason) and *sacrilegium* (sacrilege or religious crime). By the way, the latter became the basis for persecution of the first Christians.

But later Christianity became the state religion of the Roman Empire, and in Justinian's Code, returning to a pagan religion from Christianity or spreading heresy was already considered a criminal offense. In the late Roman Empire and Byzantium, under the influence of Christianity, there is a radical rethinking of the concept of "crime", which leads to the convergence in the legal texts of the late Empire the concepts of "offense" (*delictum*), "crime" (*crimen*) and "sin" (*peccatum*).

The concept of sin is a key concept in the second European anthropological paradigm, the theocentric one, which prevailed in the Middle Ages and defined the principles of criminology of the time. The understanding of the Law as God's command (Torah) and sin as its transgression or deviation from fulfillment is laid down in ancient Judaism (Old Testament). Sin was seen as breaking the covenant with God, as deliberate disobedience to the categorical strict commandments received by the prophet Moses. The religious, legal and ethical requirements that can be followed in the Decalogue (the Ten Commandments) and the numerous decrees and prohibitions (the righteous Jews number 613 such decrees) were syncretically combined. The Torah, and especially the books of *Schmot* (Exodus) and *Dvarim* (Deuteronomy) can be considered as a kind of Criminal Code of ancient Judaism.

In Christianity, there is a radical rethinking of the Old Testament commandments, and sin is judged first and foremost from the standpoint of intention, personal choice, as evidenced by the preaching of Christ: Because from inside, from the heart of men, come evil thoughts and unclean pleasures, The taking of goods and of life, broken faith between husband and wife, the desire of wealth, wrongdoing, deceit, sins of the flesh, an evil eye, angry words, pride, foolish acts: All these evil things come from inside, and make the man unclean (Mk 7:21-23).

Under the influence of Christian preaching, a new understanding of the dual essence of man is formed: as created after the image and likeness of God and simultaneously burdened with original sin. If the Old Testament emphasizes the absolute transcendence of God, which renders impossible any resemblance between God and man, then the New Testament emphasizes that with the advent of Jesus Christ this gap can be overcome. At the same time, in the theocentric paradigm, God is seen as the center of the universe, the guarantor of the cosmic and social order. His decrees are seen as the primary basis of the Law, from which all religious, moral and legal norms flow. Divine intervention alone does not allow society to turn into chaos, the struggle of all against all, but inspires man to fight the "devilish temptations" that lead him to sinful transgressions and crimes.

In the teachings of the Church Fathers, the cosmocentric paradigm is finally overcome: a person from the "microcosm" becomes an "image and likeness of God", and since God is a Personality in Christianity, a person who is endowed with intellect and free will begin to be regarded as a person. Basil the Great, Gregory the Theologian, Augustine Aurelius, and especially Gregory of Nyssa made a major contribution to the creation of a new anthropological doctrine, which became the basis of the medieval paradigm for understanding the essence of man and the corresponding forensic doctrine.

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At the same time, the European Middle Ages are considered to be a period in history characterized by the most brutal treatment of human beings, the criminalization of society and the widespread use of corporal punishment and the death penalty as the main types of criminal punishment. Barbarian raids and constant military and social conflicts, famines and epidemics make violence a common occurrence, the more it gets legitimized. In the conditions of weakening of other social institutions, especially in Western Europe, the church assumes certain state-legal powers until the XIII century and it concentrates almost all criminal court under its direction. The identification of the concepts of "sin" and "crime" could not but be reflected in the criminal practices of the Middle Ages, and therefore the purpose of punishment was the atonement of sin. The latter is often accompanied by sophisticated cruel torture and usually ends in public execution.

The first among the medieval philosophers who tried to distinguish between "sin" and "crime" was the French thinker Peter Abelard. He drew the line between sin and crime, attributing only the violations required by law (no law – no crime). Separating sin from crime, according to the philosopher, also entailed various consequences of atonement. If punishment for sin can be redeemed by confession, repentance, sacrifice, the atonement for the crime involved the grave consequences of punishment for the person who committed it, up to the death penalty.

This distinction of sin and crime was continued by the scholastic Thomas Aquinas in his writings distinguishing the Eternal Law (*lex aeterna*), Divine (*lex divina*), natural law (*lex naturale*) and human law (*lex human*). Sin violates eternal law, crime violates human law, and brings them closer to one another – a violation of the law, deviation from its prescriptions. The Eternal Law determines the Divine world order, its violation must be eliminated, the order must be restored. The crime is only a fragmentary, partial violation of the existing order, which is regulated by law: it is primarily a violation of the regulations, not a state: "law gives rise to crime". Civil, ecclesiastical, or God's punishments, including all temporary punishments, are considered by Thomas to be curative because they are used to correct certain defects. That is, while civil punishments should be commensurate with the answers to the crimes committed (otherwise they would not be punishments), they are not aimed at either perfect revenge or perfect punishment. To know with all certainty what a person deserves is beyond the competence of human judgment. In matters of human action, Thomas Aquinas believed, we should be satisfied with the relative certainty and approximation of the punishments.

According to the Christian doctrine that prevailed in medieval Europe, earthly life is the short time given to humans to prepare them for the future of eternal life; it is a time of purification and restoration of its sinful nature. Death exists only for the body, for the soul it constitutes the transition from the life of the earth to the life of the true – otherworldly. That is why the medieval understanding of crime and punishment always meant that the final determination of the correctness of a person's behavior belongs to the Divine judgment of the soul after death, and in the future, after the second coming of Jesus Christ, to the World Court, which will ultimately decide the further destiny of each person.

Thus, medieval anthropology was an appeal for the preparation for a future posthumous existence, and in some ways neglected the troubles of daily life. Renaissance philosophy affirms the central place of man in the world, opposes religious asceticism, for the right of man to enjoy and satisfy all his needs. This in a way alters the medieval anthropological paradigm, creates a new image of a person in harmony with the then social reality, and alters approaches to understanding crime.

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Crime, on the basis of a new rethinking of ancient classics, acts, above all, as a violation of justice. Thus, the Italian humanist Leonardo Bruni (1985) interpreted the crime as a violation of justice, which, in his opinion, is ambivalent, that is, he acts in an individual and a social way (p. 63). The clearest thinker of this era, Niccolò Machiavelli, believed that the basis of crime is that man is inherently evil and always inclined to show his own perversity, only when the time will come. Therefore, for the common good, it is necessary to curb the evil deeds of the people, using the full force of the state institutions of prosecution and justice.

Thus, in the Renaissance, despite the emergence of the humanistic doctrine of man, there was no radical rethinking of the nature of the crime, which continued to be identified with sin, the only thing that was largely the prerogative of secular power. Moreover, crime and violence increased in this era of denominational conflicts, religious wars and increased royal power. Only in the middle of the XVII century, tired of religious and political conflicts, European philosophy turned to a secularized anthropological paradigm, in which man became not a bearer of sinfulness or righteousness, but above all a rational being, who was mostly capable to satisfy his own irrational desires.

This anthropological paradigm can be called cognitive-centric, since the essence of man is reduced primarily to his mind, he is defined primarily as a thinking being – *Homo sapiens*. Modern philosophy since the XVII century attached special importance to the mind as a specific feature of man. The defining features of a person are consciousness, the ability to think and have free will, which gives everyone responsibility for their own actions. For example, the founder of this paradigm, Rene Descartes, defined man as a thinking thing (*res cogitans*). Benedict Spinoza, Thomas Hobbs, and later Jean-Jacques Rousseau also substantiated the understanding of man as a natural body, endowed with passions, which must be curbed, and a mind that is the source of responsible, moral behavior.

This understanding of the person led to the relevant doctrines of the state, law, deeds and crime. First, the modern anthropological paradigm by the mouth of T. Hobbs completely differentiates between the concepts of "sin" and "crime". In his famous *Leviathan*, he proclaims: "Any crime is a sin, but not every sin is a crime. The intention to commit a crime is a sin, because God, who knows the thoughts of man, can put it to blame. However, until this intention is manifested in any act or word, it is not called a crime" (Hobbes, 1994, p. 278). That is, he defends a secularized view of crime, depriving the concept of "crime" of its religious component.

Secondly, crime is seen as a manifestation of unreasonable affect, a deviation from reasonable behavior. In his *"Tractatus politicus"*, published after his death in 1677, B. Spinoza wrote:

Usually, we call crime what is being done contrary to the command of common sense. This statement can be considered correct when we take into account that the mind teaches piety and teaches to maintain peace of mind and virtue, which is possible only in the state. Moreover, a nation cannot be guided by a single spirit unless it has a right established by the precepts of reason. (Spinoza, 1891)

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Thus, crime is irrational and generates unconscious and uncontrollable mental effects, said Spinoza. Hobbes (1994) is in solidarity with this: "The source of crime is a flaw in (lack of) understanding – ignorance, any error in thought – a mistake of thought, an unexpected power of passion" (p. 225).

Thirdly, in the modern anthropological paradigm, two models of primordial human essence were formed. According to T. Hobbes, from the beginning of its existence, man is an envious individualist and self-centered, and the system of state punishment is called upon to curb this potentially "criminal" nature of man. J.-J. Rousseau puts forward the opposite model of "good savage", which is ruined by private property and the state. Subsequently, these competing models, their hybrids and variations will become the basis of classical criminology.

Actually, the latter is in the bosom of this paradigm. Its founder, Cesare Beccaria, an Italian, in his work "On Crimes and Punishment" (1764) provided a classic material definition of crime: "The true measure of crime is the harm done to society". Representatives of this school, to which besides C. Beccaria also include the British J. Bentham and J. Howard, laid the foundations of criminology as a science. The main principles of their concept are the recognition that everyone should consciously control their own actions and the principle of appropriateness of punishment to the crime, but this punishment should be inevitable and able to deter a person from crime and even to overcome crime in general. This requires the will of the state, which must make the crime "unprofitable", education of all segments of the population and perfect education.

But the educational illusions of the XVIII century in the next XIX became a dream. The initial accumulation of capital, urbanization and the increase in population have led to an unprecedented increase in crime in Western Europe. In European philosophy, radical transformations are also taking place: the rejection of the classical philosophy of Liberty, Reason and Progress lead to the emergence of Marxism, positivism and the "philosophy of life", which create a new socio-centric paradigm of philosophical anthropology. It is based on K. Marx's postulate about man as "the totality of all social relations" and E. Durkheim's thesis about man as a "social being of complex type". In a peculiar way, this anthropological model is supplemented by F. Nietzsche's view of the future superhuman, which must overcome the narrow boundaries of mass society.

In particular, one of the founders of Marxism, F. Engels, believed that capitalist society necessarily produced crime. Analyzing the condition of the working class in England, he wrote: "Poverty gives the working class a choice: to die slowly from starvation, to commit suicide at once, or to take what he needs, where he can, that is, simply put, to steal. And here we should not be surprised if the majority favors theft rather than starvation or suicide" (Engels, 1955a, p. 348).

K. Marx and F. Engels emphasized that the elimination of capitalist relations would automatically lead to the eradication of crime:

We destroy antagonism between the individual and others; we counteract the social war with the social world; activities of administrative and judicial institutions. Property crimes will disappear where everyone gets everything, they need to meet their physical and spiritual needs, where social partitions and differences disappear. (Engels, 1955b, p. 537)

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However, as you know, their hopes were in vain. Despite the efforts of the socialist states (USSR, PRC, etc.) that adopted the Marxist criminological doctrine, they have not been able to overcome crime by eradicating social inequality and private property.

Perhaps E. Durkheim was closer to the truth, who considered the criminal component a necessary element of any developed society. Based on observations of the rapid increase in crime in Western Europe, he concluded that social growth itself gives rise to circumstances in which deviation from social norms is an adequate response to the situation. That is, crime is one of the prerequisites for existing of a healthy society which is developing. Thus, crime is a necessary, normal and useful phenomenon, which certainly accompanies the natural evolution of society. At the same time, too high or, conversely, a low crime rate is abnormal, because in the first case it threatens the collapse of society, and in the second, it impedes social development. Lawful or unlawful behavior arises from the ratio of aspirations and ways of achieving them. From such positions E. Durkheim proposed to set the necessary rate of crime and to overcome only its actual excess. A reasonable system of criminal penalties should help to overcome the actual excess of the normal crime rate. E. Durkheim's concept found its original continuation in the postulates of the American sociologist R. Merton, the essence of which is that the main cause of crime is the contradiction between the values, which are aimed at society, and the possibility of achieving them under the rules that society establishes.

The sociocentric paradigm of philosophical anthropology (with certain deviations in the form of psychoanalysis and biological anthropology by C. Lombroso and his followers) became the basis for understanding the essence of crime in the criminological concepts of G. Tarde, F. von Liszt, E. Ferri and R. Garofalo. It continues to exist in modern socio-philosophical, sociological and criminological studios. Thus, the American sociologist John Hagan (1985) defines crime as "a form of deviance that consists in such deviations from social norms that are prohibited by criminal law" (p. 49).

However, at the end of the XX century, there is a certain epistemological shift, based on certain contradictions of sociocentric approaches, which can turn into the birth of a new anthropological paradigm – postmodern. Jean-François Lyotard and Michel Foucault are usually considered the founders of postmodernism, though the latter did not consider himself a postmodern. Foucault's thesis of "death of man" and Lyotard's skepticism about metanarratives can be considered the main principles of this paradigm. Foucault states the "death" of the Cartesian subject as an anthropological model of subjectivity, transforming it into a point of intersection of imperative imperatives. The distrust of meta-narratives leads to total relativism in understanding the essence of man, transforming him into an object of manipulation by means of simulators producing modern media and social networks.

Postmodern criticism also extends to the concept of crime. Foucault's book "Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison" (1975) has become a kind of "bible" of modern postmodern criminology. Based on a radical critique of the Western classical concept of punishment as a means of correcting the criminal, the French philosopher argued that the government itself uses the punishment system as a tool for social control. This idea of the conventionalist definition of crime is reflected in other criminological concepts that emerge under the influence of postmodern anthropology.

Thus, according to the founders of constructivist criminology, S. Henry and D. D. Milivanovic (1996), "law is a gambling house of power, crime is its mousetrap" (p. 117). The Ukrainian researcher V. I. Poklad (2016) agrees with them. Crime is nothing more than a social and legal con-

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struct – a relatively definite dogma of conventional character as to what is considered a crime. There is a manipulation of the created "image" of crime – using the media a "convenient" pseudo enemy is created, and the struggle against him can divert from other social problems or elitist crimes, give the authorities the necessary legitimacy (Melnychuk, 2016). According to the well-known German criminologists N. Hess and S. Scheerer, crime is not an objective social phenomenon, but a mental construction that has a historical and changing character. Crime is almost entirely constructed by controlling institutions that set norms and attribute certain meanings to actions. Hence, the main conclusion of the postmodern doctrine: "crime is a social and linguistic construct" (Hess, & Scheerer, 1997, p. 154).

On the basis of the postmodern paradigm, other areas of modern criminology are emerging – "radical" criminology, the theory of stigmatization, abolitionism, criminological feminism, peacemaking criminology, cultural criminology, etc., which will become the subject of our further scientific explorations.

Originality

The author has proved that the concept of "crime" is not a constant but a historically variable category whose dynamics of meaningful sense are linked to a change in philosophical anthropological paradigms. First of all its understanding is related to the interpretation of the essence of man and the imperatives of his behavior. This allows a new understanding of the philosophical foundations of modern criminology.

Conclusions

Thus, five anthropological paradigms are distinguished by us in the history of philosophy which are characterized by a radical rethinking of the essence of man. The first cosmocentric paradigm regards man as a microcosm, his soul and actions must be in harmony with the harmony of the Cosmos. The second Theocentric one considers man as the image and likeness of God, though he is at the same time burdened with original sin. In the era of early Modernism, the third paradigm, which we called cognitive-centric, becomes dominant, since the essence of man is reduced primarily to his mind. It gradually changes to the fourth – sociocentric, which focuses on the social essence of man. However, despite its continued existence in our time, at the end of the XX century, there is a transition to the fifth paradigm – postmodernist, which deconstructs the essence of man, reducing it to the role of an element of power systems.

The above-mentioned paradigms, with a certain synchronicity, create the corresponding concepts of "crime": from violation of polis-space laws to identification with sin, from non-observance of morality and moral standards to social deviance. Contemporary understandings of crime are, for the most part, relativistic and constructivist, which is consistent with the postmodern anthropological paradigm. However, the diversity of interpretations of the concept of "crime" that exists in the current scientific literature needs further comprehension.

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АНТРОПОЛОГІЧНІ ЗАСАДИ КОНЦЕПТУ "ЗЛОЧИН" У ІСТОРИКО-ФІЛОСОФСЬКОМУ ДИСКУРСІ

Мета. Головною метою статті є встановлення парадигмальних детермінант розуміння злочинності на підставі докорінних змін розуміння сутності людини в античній, середньовічній, ренесансній, новочасній та постмодерній філософії. **Теоретичний базис.** Автор визначає, що розуміння концепту злочину можливо лише при поєднанні історико-філософських, правознавчих та соціологічних підходів. Тлумачення сутності динаміки цього концепту та відповідних правових практик базується на структуралістських, постструктуралістських та герменевтичних методологічних засадах. **Наукова новизна.** Автором доведено, що концепт "злочину" є не константою, а історично змінною категорією, динаміка змістовних сенсів якої пов'язана зі зміною філософських антропологічних парадигм. Його розуміння пов'язано насамперед з тлумаченням сутності людини та імперативів її поведінки. Це дозволяє по-новому осмислити філософські засади сучасної кримінології. **Висновки.** В історії західної філософії нами виокремлюються п'ять антропологічних парадигм, які розрізняються докорінним переосмисленням сутності людини. Перша – космоцентрична розглядає людину як мікрокосм, її душа і вчинки повинні бути суголосні гармонії Космосу. Друга – теоцентрична вважає людину образом і подобою Божою, хоча вона одночасно обтяжена перворідним гріхом. В епоху раннього Модерну пануючою стає третя парадигма, яку ми назвали когнітоцентричною, оскільки сутність людини зводиться насамперед до її розуму. Вона поступово змінюється на четверту – соціоцентричну, яка акцентує увагу на соціальній сутності людини. Втім, незважаючи на продовження її існування і в наш час, наприкінці XX сторіччя відбувається перехід до п'ятої парадигми – постмодерністської, яка деконструє сутність людини, зводячи її до ролі елемента владних систем. Перелічені парадигми з певною синхронністю створюють і відповідні концепти "злочину": від порушення полісно-космічних законів до ототожнення з гріхом, від недодержання розумно-моральних норм до соціальної девіації. Сучасні розуміння злочину здебільшого мають релятивістський та конструктивістський характер, що є відповідним постмодерністській антропологічній парадигмі. Втім, розмаїття інтерпретацій концепту "злочин", яке існує в сучасній науковій літературі, потребує подальшого осмислення.

Ключові слова: антропологічна парадигма; злочин; делікт; гріх; девіація; космоцентризм; теоцентризм; когнітоцентризм; соціоцентризм; постмодернізм

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АНТРОПОЛОГИЧЕСКИЕ ОСНОВЫ КОНЦЕПТА "ПРЕСТУПЛЕНИЕ" В ИСТОРИКО-ФИЛОСОФСКОМ ДИСКУРСЕ

Цель. Главной целью статьи является установление парадигмальных детерминант понимания преступности на основе существенных изменений понимание сущности человека в античной, средневековой, ренессансной, современной и постмодернистской философии. **Теоретический базис.** Автором указывается, что понимание концепта преступления возможно лишь при синтезе историко-философских, правоведческих и социологических подходов. Интерпретация сущности динамики этого концепта и соответствующих правовых практик базируется на структуралистских, постструктуралистских и герменевтических методологических принципах. **Научная новизна.** Автором доказано, что концепт "преступления" является не константой, а исторически изменчивой категорией, динамика смыслов которой связана с изменением философских антропологических парадигм. Его понимание связано прежде всего с истолкованием сущности человека и императивов его поведения. Это позволяет по-новому осмыслить философские основания современной криминологии. **Выводы.** В истории западной философии нами выделяются пять антропологических парадигм, которые различаются коренным переосмыслением сущности человека. Первая – космоцентрическая рассматривает человека как микрокосм, его душа и поступки должны быть созвучны гармонии Космоса. Вторая – теоцентрическая провозглашает человека образом и подобием Божиим, хотя он одновременноотягощен первородным грехом. В эпоху раннего Модерна господствующей становится третья парадигма, которую мы назвали когнитоцентричной, поскольку сущность человека сводится прежде всего к его разуму. Она постепенно переходит в четвертую – социоцентрическую, которая акцентирует внимание на социальной сущности человека. Впрочем, несмотря на продолжение ее существования и в наше время, в конце XX века происходит переход к пятой парадигме – постмодернистской, которая деконструирует сущность человека, сводя ее к роли элемента структур власти. Перечисленные парадигмы с определенной синхронностью создают и соответствующие концепты "преступления": от нарушения полисно-космических законов к отождествлению с грехом, от несоблюдения разумно-нравственных норм к социальной девиации. Современное понимание преступления в основном имеют релятивистский и конструктивистский характер, что соответствует постмодернистской антропологической парадигме. Впрочем, разнообразие интерпретаций концепта "преступление", которое существует в современной научной литературе, требует дальнейшего осмысления.

Ключевые слова: антропологическая парадигма; преступление; деликт; грех; девиация; космоцентризм; теоцентризм; когнитоцентризм; социоцентризм; постмодернизм

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ANTHROPOLOGY OF VISUAL SELF-OBJECTIFICATION OF THE PAINTER (BASED ON WORKS BY ARTEMISIA GENTILESCHI)

Purpose. Based on the anthropocentric approach to the analysis of visual self-presentations of Artemisia Gentileschi in paintings, to present the artwork as self-objectifications of the artist, which give rise to a new cultural reality and are at the same time a means of knowing the essence of man. **Theoretical basis.** The principles and methods of philosophical and anthropological research in combination with biographical, historical and comparative, iconographic, figurative and stylistic methods were used when writing the article. Among philosophical and anthropological methods the principle of anthropological reduction was used, based on which the works by Artemisia Gentileschi were analyzed as her self-objectification, principle of extrapolation of a separate fact (rape) of the painter's life and anthropological interpretation of art evolution, when an attempt is made to know their creator through a series of chronological consistent works as figurative objectification. The biographical method was used when working with data on the painter's life, iconographic and figurative stylistic (techniques of composition, narrative, color characteristics) – when analyzing the art visuals: self-portraits, allegories and narrative paintings. The analytical work was carried out in stages as transition from an iconographic interpretation of paintings with gradual elimination of art and style characteristics as extra-anthropological cultural constants with subsequent anthropological reduction of cultural image. **Originality** consists in the author's method of analyzing the works of visual art in terms of anthropocentric approach, as well as in considering the artwork by Artemisia Gentileschi as her self-objectification as such that give rise to a new cultural reality. **Conclusions.** The artworks by Artemisia Gentileschi in diachronic deployment can be seen as the painter's self-objectification, which traces the evolution of self-expression from a person with traditional self-perception by social gender stereotypes (1610) to the phenomenon of personal life, which will determine further evolution of her self-identification (rape in 1611) and extirpation of sense of shame through virtual revenge (self-expression in the cycle of Judith), repentance (cycle of Mary Magdalene), guilt (cycle of Lucretia), and formation of component of the painter's identity as exemption from social gender prejudices and stereotypes on roles and standards of behavior socially assigned to women (cycle of Susanna).

Keywords: Artemisia Gentileschi; painter's self-objectification; visual self-presentation in painting; anthropocentric approach; man; the principle of anthropological reduction; organon-principle; anthropological interpretation; the principle of "open question"

Introduction

The heuristic potential of philosophical anthropology is not fully reached yet. The traditional limitation of philosophical discourse as purely theoretical does not, in my opinion, contribute to the wider application of those possibilities, which, in particular, peculiar to anthropology as a methodology. Meanwhile, its application is able to open new horizons of knowledge of human dimension both of the present and the future, as well as of the past.

In contrast to the socio-philosophical approach, which seeks to explain the essence of man from external factors, philosophical anthropology seeks to analyse cultural reality, based on man as such.

Otto Bollnow, summarizing the methodology of anthropological research, formulated four principles.

The first is the principle of anthropological reduction. Its essence is to separate the objective spheres of culture from man, since "all branches of culture... must be understood as dependent

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on the human needs due to which they exist and which they satisfy in human life" (transl. by O. G.) (Bollnow, 1996, p. 103).

Warning against the one-sidedness in his interpretation, the philosopher adds: "But as a methodological principle of philosophical anthropology, reduction does not mean the abolition or discredit of reality, but the return of discarded objectivity, and in this case also in relation to man and culture, their meaningful interconnection" (transl. by O. G.) (Bollnow, 1996, p. 104).

According to the second principle, one must separate man from objective images because "man as creator is tied to his own creation and is subject to it" (transl. by O. G.) (Plessner) (Bollnow, 1996, p. 104). Bollnow calls the second principle an organon-principle of anthropological research. And notes that both principles are complementary and interdependent, that is why they should be used together:

In the course of this operation we try to define one of the objective images of human culture, based on the understanding of man as his creator; on the other hand, we strive to understand a person based on what causes his or her formation. We also ask: can a man and to what extent, by his or her own nature, create art, science, politics, etc., according to his or her own internal need? What do we know from these creations about their creator? (transl. by O. G.) (Bollnow, 1996, p. 105)

The third principle of anthropological research is to help answer these questions – the principle of anthropological interpretation of individual phenomena of human life (Bollnow, 1996, p. 106).

First of all, it is about isolating any manifestation of human life that, for one reason or another, attracts special interest (fear, joy, *shame* (highlighted by me. – O. G.), work, holiday, etc.), and then – an attempt, on these grounds, to reach understanding of human as a whole, to some extent by extrapolating these manifestations, whereby they acquire the values necessary and sufficient for their function. (transl. by O. G.) (Bollnow, 1996, p. 106)

Such a phenomenon, "giving sharpness to the subject, separates one's own human existence from everyday life; in view of this, there is only one single way – the way to the self through a radical break with the fluidity of daily existence". At the same time, the philosopher adds, "every single phenomenon has a direct relation to the understanding of man as a whole..." (transl. by O. G.) (Bollnow, 1996, p. 110).

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This provision implicates another principle of anthropological methodology, which another representative of philosophical anthropology (Helmuth Plessner) called "the principle of open question". The heuristic potential of the principle of open question is that it is a question "whose solution is not determined by its formulation; it is open to new unexpected and unpredictable answers" (transl. by O. G.) (Bollnow, 1996, p. 110).

Problem statement

Adhering to Dilthey's position that "one learns to know oneself not through direct self-observation but only through self-objectification" (transl. by O. G.) (Bollnow, 1996, p. 105), let us try to apply the methodology and theoretical statements of philosophical anthropology to the analysis of visual self-objectifications – an artist. Such self-objectifications for an artist are works of fine art.

The aphoristic statement of another representative of the philosophical anthropology Max Scheler (1988): "...man is a creature that transcends himself and the world" (transl. by O. G.) is the best suited to characterize an Italian artist of the seventeenth century, Artemisia Gentileschi, the first woman in history to become a member of the Florence Academy of Fine Arts, which was also the first art academy in the world.

Her life and work come under another remarkable statement by Scheler (1994) that "a woman had a long time to gain herself as an individual" (transl. by O. G.).

I assume that each work by Artemisia Gentileschi is in one way or another its self-objectification, and therefore the analysis of visual self-presentations in the artworks in diachronic dimension, which is carried out on the principle of anthropological reduction with the involvement of other principles of anthropological methodology, allows to trace the evolution of the artist's identity.

Analysis of the references used

The art of Artemisia Gentileschi (1593–1653) has become the object of much research in foreign art and cultural history in recent decades. Monographs, articles, and thesis papers dedicated to this extraordinary woman explored her life history and creativity. The intensity of the publications made it possible to speak of a kind of rediscovery after almost three centuries of her creative life.

Her works were analysed from the point of view of writing technique, in the context of creativity of the Caravaggesque painters, renaissance and baroque stylistics (Garrard, 1980, 1989; Locker, 2010, 2015; Robinson, 2017), attributions in the context of biographical data (Bissell, 1968, 1999; Cropper, 2001; Daugherty, 2015) (for example, the dedication of certain paintings to Galileo Galilei, with whom Artemisia Gentileschi was well acquainted and actively corresponded (Robinson, 2017, p. 130).

A. Gentileschi's work has been the subject of analysis from the perspectives of feminism (Barker, 2018) and psychoanalysis (Ferro, & Civitarese, 2013), which is explained by the peculiarities of the artist's biography: her rape by Agostino Tassi, dating to May 1611, when Artemisia was 17 years old, as well as public disclosure and trial in March 1612.

In such circumstances, it is logical that psychoanalysis emphasized sexual as the foundations of her work, and feminism emphasized the gender characteristics of the society to which Artemisia belonged and which influenced her creativity.

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Unlike the previous ones, anthropological analysis proceeds from anthropological reductionism, when, apart from the above narratives, it is possible to reveal the artist's self-identity and its evolution, since the visual objectifications of the artist are not simply a result of the stimulus-reaction principle (rape – a reaction to it) but the manifestation of a person who through self-objectification in the works of painting recognizes herself as one that could be identified with her "self".

Purpose

Based on the anthropocentric approach to the analysis of visual self-presentations of Artemisia Gentileschi (paintings), to present her artwork as self-objectifications of the artist, which give rise to a new cultural reality and are at the same time a means of knowing the essence of man.

Methodology

The principles of philosophical and anthropological research were used when writing the article. Guided by the principle of anthropological reduction, the art of Artemisia Gentileschi was analysed as her self-objectification, the principle of extrapolation of an individual fact of the artist's life to the interpretation of her creativity, and the principle of anthropological interpretation of the evolution of creativity, when an attempt is made to know their creator through a series of chronological consistent works as figurative objectifications.

Iconographic and figurative stylistic methods (composition techniques, narrative, color characteristics) were used in the analysis of the art visuals and its classifications.

The analytical work was carried out in stages as transition from an iconographic interpretation of paintings with gradual elimination of art and style characteristics as extra-anthropological cultural constants with subsequent anthropological reduction of cultural image and anthropological interpretation of artwork evolution.

Statement of basic materials

Based on the theoretical and methodological stance of philosophical anthropology that creativity can always be seen in direct connection with the essence of man as a whole ("What do we learn from these creations about their creator?") (transl. by O. G.) (Bollnow, 1996, p. 105), let us try, through the analysis of creativity, to see the evolution of this essence, given the sometimes exceptional role of particular phenomena of the artist's life, which "can be viewed in direct connection with the essence of man as a whole" (transl. by O. G.) (Bollnow, 1996, p. 107).

Such a life fact of the Italian artist of the 17th century, the first woman to become a member of the Florence Academy of Fine Arts Artemisia Gentileschi, is undoubtedly a dramatic story of her rape.

In May 1611, when Artemisia was 17, she was raped by artist Agostino Tassi. In March 1612, the trial of Tassi began, lasting seven months.

Archival data regarding the trial of Tassi have been studied and partially published in the English translation by Mary Garrard (1989, p. 12). Also archival court documents were collected, researched and published by Patricia Cavazzini (2001).

It is known that Tassi was one of the artists who worked with Artemisia's father, Orazio Gentileschi. He undertook to teach the daughter of his colleague and friend a linear perspective. Under this guise, Tassi had the opportunity to be at Gentileschi's house. Although, according to

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court documents, in the absence of the father getting into the house was excluded: it was closed and it was possible to get into it if the door was opened by a member of household.

The testimony is a transcript of the court hearing, in which it was stated that in the father's absence Tassi was admitted into the house by one Tuzia, who lived with the two young children in the same house and who was either a friend, or a servant of Artemisia. On his admission, Tuzia led him to Artemisia, who at that time was drawing one of Tuzia's sons. Agostino Tassi told Tuzia to get out, while to Artemisia he said that she was not painting in the right way, he took her brushes away and offered to look at the painting, as an example, hanging in the bedroom.

As revealed during the investigation, Tuzia's role in this story was not limited to this episode. Earlier, she had invited Artemisia with her for walks, during which Tassi "unexpectedly" appeared and joined them.

In court, Tuzia stated that Tassi tortured her (?) until he was able to get to the part of the house where Artemisia lived.

Trying to get rid of the uninvited guest, Artemisia said she was feeling sick and had a fever. To which Tassi replied that his fever was even greater... Telling Artemisia that he wanted to look at the painting next to the bedroom, Tassi pushed her into the bedroom, locked the door from the inside, tossed her on the bed, closed the girl's mouth for her not to scream, and raped. Artemisia tried to defend herself: she scratched Agostino's face and head. After being raped, Artemisia freed herself, ran to the table where the knife was lying, and, with the words "I'll kill you for dishonouring me", struck Tassi with a knife into the chest. Although the blood came from the blow, no serious harm was done to the rapist.

Seeing that Artemisia was chaste, Tassi promised to marry her. Artemisia learned that he was already married only during the trial. Not only was Tassi married, but he had been serving a prison sentence twice. One for raping his wife, the other for raping her sister. When Tassi's wife suddenly disappeared, it was suggested that Tassi had hired the bandits to kill her.

Tassi's promise to marry kept Artemisia for some time from reporting the rape to her father (Artemisia's mother died when her daughter was 2 years old). However, Tassi was in no hurry to keep his promise. In doing so, he interfered with Artemisia's marriage with one Modenese, hiring men to spy on Artemisia almost round the clock, for he was very jealous of her without having any rights to her. Tassi's passion came in such wild forms that he told many people that he had poisoned Artemisia (details about this episode are unknown).

Finally, Orazio learned of the rape of his daughter and in the beginning of 1612 petitioned the Pope asking for legal proceedings. Not only Tassi, but also Cosimo Quorli, who also tried to court Artemisia, was indicted in court. In addition, Cosimo stole paintings from Artemisia's home, and was also accused of aiding Tassi to break into Gentileschi's house.

The trial was widely publicized. Tassi, trying to deflect the next prison sentence, initially denied not only the fact of Artemisia's rape, but also the fact that he had been in the Gentileschi's house. When, under pressure from evidence and testimony, he was forced to admit that it was untrue, he began to claim that he had visited the house and even followed Artemisia to "protect her honor." When this was denied, Tassi changed the tactics. He began to slander Artemisia, her dead mother, calling them all whores. Tassi claimed that Artemisia was sleeping with five different men at the same time, that she had an incest with her father, that he had somehow sold her for a loaf of bread, that there was a real brothel in the house. Tassi also attracted six men, his friends, who testified against Artemisia. These false witnesses were a match for Tassi himself.

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They "testified" that Artemisia's father sold her to men, that she served as a nude model to male artists, that she wrote erotic letters to various men and was a prostitute in general.

The slander and lies of Tassi were so horrific that, as the transcript of the trial shows, the judge, indignant at his slander, repeatedly interrupted the rapist and his crooks. Tuzia also testified in favour of Tussi; however, her testimony was only that Artemisia behaved too seductively.

There were also testimonies against Tassi. Giovanni Battista Stiattezi, who was a confidante of Tassi and Cosimo Quorli, which made his testimonies important, showed that Cosimo was very angry with Artemisia, who rejected his courtship. And also that he, Stiattezi, personally helped Tassi plan his break-in at Gentileschi's house when Orazio was not there.

The testimony of the virtue of Artemisia and the entire Gentileschi family was given by many people.

Artemisia herself testified under the tortures. In order to prove that she was telling the truth, she was subjected to physical tests by the so-called sibilli (thumbscrews) – a screw with ropes fastened to it, which bound the fingers of Artemisia. During the torture, the ropes were progressively wound onto the screw, tightening and actually breaking the fingers. Artemisia endured all the torture, during which she repeatedly said: "This is true", when asked whether Tassi had raped her. It is hard to imagine how painful these tortures were, it is known that they severely damaged her hands. But the moral pain of public humiliation from her abuser and the lawsuit itself was far greater.

On May 14, 1612, when Tassi had been imprisoned for more than a month, the judge heard Artemisia reiterating that she had trusted Tassi and would have never believed that Tassi, being a friend of her father, would have raped her.

The trial ended in October 1612, but due to the loss of the last part of the transcript of the court hearing, it is unknown what Tassi's sentence was.

Some authors believe that he was sentenced to spend eight months in prison after the trial, but was presumed to have been pardoned by a judge with an obligation to go to exile from Rome (the practice of punishment in the form of exile from the city was quite common in those times). But whether Tassi left Rome and for what period is not known for sure. He was known to be back in Rome soon.

Artemisia's father, Orazio, also sued six people for perjury, but the outcome of those lawsuits is unknown.

Even if the fact of rape was unknown, an analysis of the artist's works would suggest that the paintings with a recurring story (let us call them "lines" for this article) – appeared not simply to order, but are a form of the author's self-objectification, and their characters act as figurative carriers of the artist's self-identification.

The first "line" is five paintings on a biblical story about Judith and Holofernes. Most researchers interpret the paintings of this cycle as a manifestation of the artist's anti-masculine position, as symbolizing the motive of women's revenge on men. Unlike the biblical narrative, according to which a woman takes revenge not for herself, her honor and dignity, but for the interests of her people, and killing a man is not an act of revenge as on her personal abuser, but the destruction of a state or ethnic enemy.

In the painting "Judith beheading Holofernes" the personal color and actuality for the artist of this first version of the painting look obvious (the picture was painted just after or even during Tassi's trial). Judith decisively and even calmly cuts off with the sword Holofernes' head, supported by her maid, whose red dress creates a disturbing contrast to her mistress's blue dress.

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Blood from the neck of Holofernes flows down to the white sheet of the bed on which the death has found a sleeping man. R. L. Robinson draws attention to the artist's inexperience, which is manifested even in the elements of narrative visible in the genre scene. The composition reveals a significant physical inability of the woman to handle the weapon (Robinson, 2017, p. 151).

The second variant of the painting, with the same composition, but with a slightly modified modeling of the image of the main character and a different coloristic solution and much more "bloody" naturalism, was written in 1620. The "tragic" coloration (dress of the heroine of rich blue color, maid's red dress, brown background) of the first painting turns into a bright and almost festive one: a golden dress of Judith, a light olive-colored dress of the maid, white pillows and sheets, a bright red blanket covering Holofernes, whose blood this time is not just flowing on the sheets but spouts in different directions.

This is the apotheosis of revenge, so it is a joy and almost a holiday. (Which leads to the idea that even after eight years the artist's thirst for revenge did not go away). The festive nature of the event is emphasized even by the gold bracelet on the hand of Judith, whose face, unlike the first painting, acquires a more focused expression along with the resemblance to the face of the artist herself. Remembering that during the Middle Ages, gold symbolized holiness, the character of Judith acquires an additional positive semantics: the righteousness of her deed.

This variant – when the moment of decapitation of Holofernes is depicted – is rare in paintings. Usually, artists chose the moment after the decapitation of Holofernes. This is how Judith is represented by Giorgione, Botticelli, Mantegna, Cristofano Allori, Rubens, Klimt. Or until the beheading – "Judith" and "Judith and Holofernes" by Franz von Stuck.

Compositions of the subject post factum in the works of Artemisia Gentileschi are also presented: the first version was written almost immediately after the trial in 1613-1614, another one – 12 years later: in 1625. "Judith and her maid Abra with the head of Holofernes" (1650) in Capodimonte – moment after this bloody event.

Along with this cycle, another "line", not quantitatively less, is represented by works that objectifies the other side of the artist's "self". One that can be defined as sacrificial. It is a side of Artemisia's identity, which identifies her as a victim of sexual abuse.

It is about four paintings on the biblical story "Susannah and the Elders" on the courtship of the elders to a virtuous woman, whom they, having slandered, led to the threat of execution. Traditionally, the plot is interpreted as a total dependence of women in the male world: the shyness and weakness of women in front of men. Like her salvation, which also depends not on herself, but on another man.

An analysis of the "Susanna" line by Artemisia in chronological order reveals the evolution of the artist's personality in the direction of increasing her self-esteem.

In the 1610 painting, Susanna is full of shame, as evidenced by her posture. Trying to cover her naked body as fully as possible from the eyes of the brazen elders, she is bent almost in a circle, and the face expresses suffering, caused by feelings of shame and fear. It all shows that this woman is a victim.

Susanna in 1622 is also closed, but the circle is open: her head is raised, although the face retains the expression of torment. Unlike the previous two, Susanna in 1649 is active: she repels an arrogant old man. Her figure is three-quarter straightened to the abusers, and she does not burden herself with hiding her nakedness. The face expresses aversion and anger rather than shyness and fear.

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Susanna in the painting of 1652 is fully straightened to the elders, her left hand raised to the level of their faces as if she was ready to push them away. There is no shame on her face, rather anger and indignation. This Susanna is no longer ashamed and ready to physically stand up for herself.

In these paintings, not only the semantics of the image of Susannah itself evolves, the semantics of the composition as a whole changes. If in the first picture men hang over Susanna, which is a spatial sign of dominance, in the latter, Susanna's figure is almost on par with them, reducing their dominance.

For forty-two years, the artist was reproducing the story of Susanna and the Elders, constantly changing it in such a way that it gives grounds to argue: the evolution of the composition of the paintings and the treatment of the heroine poses objectify eliminating by Artemisia of psycho-trauma, overcoming shame and fear as the ones, becoming external to herself and therefore liberation from them.

Some of the artist's self-portraits, including the "Self-Portrait as a Female Martyr" in 1615, should also be regarded as conditionally "sacrificial".

Self-portraiture as an artist's self-presentation is potentially the most informative about an artist's personality. However, like any self-presentation, self-portrait contains a significant social layer, reflecting the break through the author's identity of social excitations, assessments, specific historical ideas about the social status of man, etc.

The mentioned self-portraits of Artemisia Gentileschi were painted in the early years after an existential event, rape and trial, in the artist's life. They are dominated by the martyrdom motif, as evidenced by the names themselves, – the reflection of her own feelings that pervaded the young woman during this period.

The artist also portrayed herself in the image of Mary Magdalene. The Mary Magdalene motif is a repentance motif, and it is intensely objectified in the paintings for two decades after the notorious event in the artist's life: for example, in the 1620 painting.

This theme testifies that along with the motif of revenge (the semantics of the image of Judith as the punishment of a man) in the mind of Artemisia, the motif of repentance is not less important (the semantics of the image of Mary Magdalene as repentance of the woman herself).

The motif of guilt and its atonement is objectified in the images of Lucretia, in which it is not difficult again to recognize Artemisia herself: 1645. Lucretia (the semantics of Lucretia's image as punishment of the woman herself) is a symbol of atonement for sin, which was not initiated by the woman. At the same time, it is "refraction" in the self-awareness of the artist of a socially imposed evaluation stereotype.

However, if the first two paintings portray the image of Lucretia, who would immediately commit suicide for the sake of restoring her good name, then the 1645 version is written on the story of the rape itself, emphasizing the innocence of the woman and shifting social condemnation to the man.

All the analyzed lines of artistic objectification of Artemisia Gentileschi's personality can be considered milestones in the transformation of her anthropological essence, they represent the gradual liberation from juvenile psycho-trauma and the formation of a new identity of the artist, who went through the gradual suppression of the revenge motif and the removal of feelings of shame, guilt and repentance imposed by the social evaluation stereotypes.

Originality

Originality consists in the author's method of analysing the works of visual art in terms of anthropocentric approach, as well as in considering the artwork by Artemisia Gentileschi as her self-objectification as such that give rise to a new cultural reality.

Conclusions

The artworks by Artemisia Gentileschi in diachronic deployment can be seen as the painter's self-objectification, which traces the evolution of self-expression from a person with traditional self-perception by social gender stereotypes (1610) to the phenomenon of personal life, which will determine further evolution of her self-identification (rape in 1611) and extirpation of sense of shame through virtual revenge (self-expression in the cycle of Judith), repentance (cycle of Mary Magdalene), guilt (cycle of Lucretia), and formation of component of the painter's identity as exemption from social gender prejudices and stereotypes on roles and standards of behaviour socially assigned to women – shyness and fear in relation to a man (cycle of Susanna).

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АНТРОПОЛОГІЯ ВІЗУАЛЬНОЇ САМООБ'ЄКТИВАЦІЇ ХУДОЖНИКА (НА МАТЕРІАЛІ ТВОРІВ АРТЕМІЗІЇ ДЖЕНТІЛЕСКІ)

Мета. На основі антропоцентричного підходу до аналізу візуальних самопрезентацій Артемізії Джентілескі у творах живопису представити художню творчість як самооб'єктивації мисткині, що, породжуючи нову культурну реальність, виступають водночас засобами пізнання сутності людини. **Теоретичний базис.** При написанні статті використано принципи і методи філософсько-антропологічного дослідження у поєднанні з хронологічним, іконографічним і образно-стилістичним методами. З поміж філософсько-антропологічних використовувався принцип антропологічної редукції, керуючись яким аналізувалась творчість Артемізії Джентілескі як її самооб'єктивація, принцип екстраполяції окремого факту життя художниці та антропологічної інтерпретації еволюції творчості, коли крізь низку хронологічно

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послідовних творів як образних об'єктивацій, здійснюється спроба пізнання їхнього творця. Іконографічні та образно-стилістичні методи (прийоми композиції, сюжети, колористичні характеристики) – при аналізі художнього відеоряду: автопортретів, алегорій і сюжетних картин. Аналітична робота здійснювалась поетапно як перехід від іконографічної інтерпретації картини з поступовою елімінацією художньо-стильових характеристик як позаантропологічних культурних констант із подальшою антропологічною редукцією культурного образу. **Наукова новизна** полягає в авторській методиці аналізу творів візуального (образотворчого) мистецтва з точки зору антропоцентричного підходу, а також у розгляді художньої творчості Артемізії Джентилескі як її самооб'єктивацій як таких, що, породжуючи нову культурну реальність, виступають водночас засобами пізнання сутності людини. **Висновки.** Творчість Артемізії Джентилескі в діахронічному розгортанні можна розглядати як самооб'єктивацію художниці, в якій простежується еволюція самовиявлення від особистості з традиційним самосприйняттям за соціальними гендерними стереотипами (1610 р.) до феномену особистого життя, який визначатиме подальшу еволюцію її самоідентифікування (згвалтування 1611 р.) та викорінення почуття сорому через віртуальну помсту (самовиявлення в циклі Юдиф), каяття (цикл Марії Магдалини), провини (цикл Лукреції) та формування складової ідентичності художниці як звільнення від соціальних гендерних забобів і стереотипів щодо соціально приписаних жінці ролей і стандартів поведінки (цикл Сусанни).

Ключові слова: Артемізія Джентилескі; самооб'єктивація художника; візуальні самопрезентації в творах живопису; антропоцентричний підхід; людина; принцип антропологічної редукції; органон-принцип; антропологічна інтерпретація; принцип "відкритого питання"

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АНТРОПОЛОГИЯ ВИЗУАЛЬНОЙ САМООБЪЕКТИВАЦИИ ХУДОЖНИКА (НА МАТЕРИАЛЕ ПРОИЗВЕДЕНИЙ АРТЕМИЗИИ ДЖЕНТИЛЕСКИ)

Цель. На основе антропоцентрического подхода к анализу визуальных самопрезентаций Артемизии Джентилески в произведениях живописи представить художественное творчество как самообъективации художницы, которые, порождая новую культурную реальность, выступают одновременно способами познания человека. **Теоретический базис.** При написании статьи использовано принципы и методы философско-антропологического исследования в соединении с хронологическим и образно-стилистическим методами. Из философско-антропологических использовался принцип антропологической редукции, руководствуясь которым анализировалось творчество Артемизии Джентилески, как ее самообъективация. Принцип экстраполяции отдельного факта (изнасилования) жизни художницы и антропологической интерпретации эволюции творчества, когда через ряд хронологически последовательных произведений как образных объективаций осуществлялась попытка познания их творца. Биографический метод использовался при работе с данными о жизни художницы, иконографический и образно-стилистический (приемы композиции, сюжеты, колористические характеристики) – при анализе художественного видеоряда: автопортретов, аллегорий, сюжетных картин. Аналитическая работа осуществлялась поэтапно как переход от иконографической интерпретации картин с постепенной элиминацией художественно-стилистических характеристик как внеантропологических культурных констант с последующей антропологической редукцией культурного образа. **Научная новизна** заключается в авторской методике анализа произведений визуального (изобразительного) искусства с точки зрения антропоцентрического подхода, а также в рассмотрении художественного творчества Артемизии Джентилески как ее самообъективаций, порождающих новую культурную реальность. **Выводы.** Творчество Артемизии Джентилески в диахроническом развертывании можно рассматривать как самообъективацию художницы, в которой прослеживается эволюция самовыявления от личности с традиционным самовосприятием, согласно социальным гендерным стереотипам (1610 г.) до феномена личной жизни, который будет определять дальнейшую эволюцию ее самоидентификации (изнасилование 1611 г.) и изживания чувства стыда через виртуальную месть (самовыявление в цикле Юдифи), раскаяния (цикл Марии Магдалины), вины (цикл Лукреции) и формирования составных идентичности художницы, как осво-

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бождения от социальных гендерных предрасудков и оценочных стереотипов относительно социально предписанных женщине ролей и типов поведения (цикл Сусанны).

Ключевые слова: Артемизия Джентилески; самообъективация художника; визуальные самопрезентации в произведениях живописи; антропоцентрический подход; человек; принцип антропологической редукции; органон-принцип; антропологическая интерпретация; принцип "открытого вопроса"

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CARTESIAN PERSONAL METAPHYSICS

Purpose. To consider the personal nature of Cartesian metaphysics. Its implementation involves: a) outlining methodological changes in the philosophy of the twentieth century; b) analysis of ways to interpret anthropological component of philosophizing in Descartes studies; c) appeal to Descartes' texts to clarify the authentic form of his interpretation of metaphysics. **Theoretical basis.** I base my view of Descartes' legacy on the conceptual positions of phenomenology, existentialism and hermeneutics. **Originality.** Based on Descartes' own concept of teaching, the author substantiates the personal nature of Cartesian metaphysics. Important prerequisites for its comprehension are attention to the ethical motive as the driving force of philosophizing and recognition of the importance of the poetic worldview. The idea of the basic role of poetics finds its meaningful confirmation in the texts of the philosopher, who interprets the main areas of philosophy (science, morality and medicine) as the forms of art. **Conclusions.** Based on his own vision of anthropology and metaphysics as the forms of completion of the revolution initiated by Copernicus, the author defends the idea of the constitutive presence of personality in Descartes' metaphysics. In the process of studying the research literature, methodological guidelines are outlined in the form of the importance of personal determination of the search for truth, the key role of ethical motive and art as components of philosophizing. The thesis about the poetic form of presentation of metaphysics by Descartes as a form of fixation of its personal dimension is substantiated.

Keywords: metaphysics; Descartes; anthropology; reductionism; science; ethics; art

Introduction

Today, humanity is acutely in need of new worldviews. First of all, it is about realizing the consumption of the image of the world as the objective – reduced and impersonal one. Awareness of the demand for the world as a world of culture – of human values and meanings – comes to the fore. This condition is especially important for metaphysics as a basic sphere for fixing their metahistorical dimensions. In other words, it is about developing a modern version of metaphysics that is personality-oriented and rooted in personal experience. In this context, I draw attention to the axiom that underlies the assessment of the current state of culture. This refers to determining the influence on the way of its formation of Descartes' philosophical project. Its striking embodiment is the concept of Descartes' metaphysics as an apology of science (Moore, 2012). But in the process of in-depth understanding of this influence, it is difficult not to notice the contradiction between impersonal metaphysics and the demand of modern culture for personal meanings. On the surface there lies the contradiction about the impossibility of reconciling the existence of metaphysics and personality. But here it is necessary to take into account that, firstly, the appearance of simplicity and unambiguity is deceptive and, secondly, it is dangerous for humanity, because metaphysics is a form of preservation and reproduction of metahistorical values and meanings. A careful and unbiased vision of Descartes' legacy testifies to the importance and key significance of his personality for philosophy in general and metaphysics in particular. Until recently, in the research literature, Descartes was perceived as a meaningful continuation of the Plato and Aristotle's teaching concerning the vision of metaphysics as a set of depersonalized truths. Until recently, it was believed that this guideline was significantly strengthened in modern times due to the powerful influence of the doctrine of impersonal nature. That is why the vision of the incommensurability of modern metaphysics with anthropolo-

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gy seems convincing. For a long time, this incommensurability remained marginal, but in the twentieth century it came to the fore again and is the subject of intense debate. In recent years, attempts have been made to understand the role of the biographical factor in the philosophizing of Descartes, but the results achieved are not satisfactory to me. In particular, the obtained results need meaningful clarification and specification. The issue is the statement: "The axiomatics of Descartes' metaphysics are the foundations of his own faith" (transl. by A.M.) (Khoma, 2012, p. 32). The research literature that has appeared in recent years provides sufficient grounds for this. These are a collection of articles on Descartes' Treatise on Man (Antoine-Mahut, & Gaukroger, 2016) and The Oxford Handbook of Descartes and Cartesianism (Nadler, Schmaltz, & Antoine-Mahut, 2019). New perspectives are opened by my own conception of Cartesian metaphysics as metaphysical anthropology, based on the anthropologisation of his conception as the completion of the Copernican revolution (Khmil, & Malivskyi, 2018; Malivskyi, 2019). I assess the current situation as a request for a constructive rethinking of the notion of the incompatibility of metaphysics and personality and the identification of the way of philosophizing that is its most complete embodiment. Therefore, my intention in this article is to consider the first philosophy of Descartes as a synthetic combination of metaphysics and the personality of the thinker.

Purpose

To consider the personal nature of Cartesian metaphysics. Its implementation involves a) outlining methodological changes in the philosophy of the twentieth century, b) analysis of ways to interpret anthropological component of philosophizing in Descartes studies and c) appeal to Descartes' texts to clarify the authentic form of his interpretation of metaphysics.

Statement of basic materials

Anticipating possible objections to the true significance of Descartes' legacy and the artificiality of his promotion to a number of great thinkers, I believe it appropriate to focus on the revolutions in Cartesian studies and its authoritative researcher Jean-Luc Marion. He emphasizes the key importance of the personality of his great countryman, whose legacy was studied by him for over forty years. In particular, Marion rightly points to the existence in European philosophy of a powerful tradition that has not received its verbal fixation yet. This refers to the movement "back to Descartes", which takes place at the turning points of European history. The researcher rightly emphasizes the connection between the fragmentary understanding of the father of modern philosophy and the desire of well-known thinkers to return to Descartes in the process of redefining the own coordinate system of philosophical thinking: "... great thinkers – from Kant to Heidegger, from Nietzsche to Wittgenstein – have always tried to go back to Descartes, to his questions, his answers, and his aporiae, in order to discover their own path of thought" (Marion, 2018, p. xxxii).

A significant obstacle is due to the fact that the thinker himself successfully hid his anthropological interest from the general public (Malivskyi, 2019). This fact prompts me, in the process of turning to his texts and research literature, to distance myself from their naive perception, because the image of the "mask" is often ignored. In this context, there grows the importance of those publications, the authors of which emphasize the key importance of personal guidance for the thinker. In particular, if for Hegel in the history of philosophy the paramount are the depersonalized forms of manifestation of the Absolute Idea, then for Dilthey – the personality of the

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thinker. Qualifying the originality of Cartesian metaphysics, Dilthey emphasizes the basic role of creative individuality, because his "metaphysics is an expression of his personality." It is difficult to resist the temptation to give a fuller Dilthey's emphasis on the originality and uniqueness of the creative figure of Descartes, which is expressed in his metaphysics. He "transfers his inherent heightened consciousness of the dignity and free power of the individual into sovereign self-confidence... Everything harmonizes in this amazing person. His haughtiness. The proud seclusion of his life. The nobility of his language and the majestic, almost dramatic style of his works, completely permeated with the happiness of knowledge" (transl. by A. M.) (Dilthey, 2000, p. 260). As a meaningful concretization and deepening of these observations, I perceive the emphasis on the fact of the living presence of Descartes in his texts, which belongs to the poet and the thinker's compatriot – Paul Valéry. The latter emphasizes: «I love Descartes because of the simple and grandiose purity of his being, his firm thinking, the general impression of honesty and order, which is visible in his every action... attracts my mind ... his own presence in this 'prelude to philosophy'» (transl. by A. M.) (Razumovsky, 2014, p. 164).

To what extent is the fact of Descartes' living presence in his teaching taken into account by modern thinkers? Considering the question of how Descartes' philosophical revolution is interpreted in the literature of recent years, it is appropriate to focus primarily on postmodernism. This direction demonstrates the naive version of the answer to the question of the nature of the determining influence of the scientific revolution, which is still, to a large extent, uncritically setting priorities. In my opinion, postmodernism is important primarily as a representation of gains and losses on the path of long-term search for European anthropology. Its radical break with the Modernity age is axiomatic, and therefore it is appropriate to pay attention to the general denominator of the way postmodernists treat the vision of man by the representatives of Modernism. Ukrainian researcher Olga Sobol (2000) emphasizes their unanimity in the ironic attitude to the ambitious achievements of the previous era, namely – "to the ambitions of the metaphysics of Modernism as the only legitimate philosophy" (transl. by A. M.) (p. 90). The inflated claims of Modernity metaphysics are assessed as artificial and unfounded, because for them it is one of the many possible types of philosophizing that have been artificially privileged. The result is a problematization of the concepts of "reason" and "humanism" as key categories of European metaphysics. Concretizing the ways of expressing the phenomenon of man, postmodernists pay special attention to "ratiocentrism" and "anthropocentrism", supported by the "destructive *self-confidence of modern man*" (transl. by A. M.) (Sobol, 2000, p. 98). It is significant for us that they connect the significant flaws of this period with the figure of R. Descartes. I believe that one of the most fateful assumptions that made it possible to "get out of the game" the way of philosophizing of the New Age is the man-made civilization demand. Its consequences include the absolutization of natural science rationality, an example of which is the technomorphic understanding of the metaphysical doctrine of Cartesius. Evidence of the prevalence of such a vision is its particular uncritical reproduction by the representative of postmodernism W. Welsch (2004): "with Descartes, a new type of instrumental mind came to power" (transl. by A. M.) (p. 90).

It is important for me to note that manifestations of uncritical reproduction of this reductionism in the interpretations of Descartes' philosophical revolution still take place. An example of their effectiveness in the literature of recent years is the monograph by Hanoch Ben-Yami "Descartes' Philosophical Revolution: A Reassessment". He notes in particular the paramount importance of the technological vision of the demand of the era (Ben-Yami, 2015, p. 8). A similar view is reproduced by the author of the "Descartes Dictionary" J. Cottingham (1993), who inter-

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prets physics as "the driving force of Descartes' philosophy" (p. 145). And since there are many such examples, it is advisable to pay attention to those stereotypes that still continue to define the spiritual landscape of our era. As noted above, among those significant obstacles that seem insurmountable is still the stereotype of the incompatibility of metaphysics with the doctrine of man.

This is a representative circumstance, the significance of which grows due to the authority of the prominent thinker. This refers to the fact mentioned by Heidegger in the first half of the twentieth century as the existence of dramatic tension between traditional metaphysics and philosophical anthropology. The eminent German philosopher, like his contemporaries Scheler and Cassirer, speaks not only of the absence in the modern age of answers to the fundamental question of what man is, but also of the absence of a methodology for understanding thereof. At the same time, he does not deviate far from Scheler's thoughts: "From no epoch has a man been so little hidden as from today..." (transl. by A. M.) (Heidegger, 2016, p. 32). In my opinion, there is an indisputable heuristic and constructive potential for his interpretation of metaphysics (or rather the impossibility to limit himself to the "school" vision of its nature and the insurmountable difficulties of its development on the basis of anthropology), which is fundamentally incapable of acting as a cornerstone: "And if real philosophy is metaphysics, then anthropology is completely incapable of laying the foundations of metaphysics" (transl. by A. M.) (Heidegger, 2016, p. 58).

Analysing the issue concerning the forms of reflection in the narratives of twentieth-century thinkers of anthropological intention and personality of Descartes, we must keep in mind, first, a narrow stereotype about its focus on the ideal of science, and secondly, its negative consequences in the form of reductionism. Among their manifestations are the identification of philosophy and science, fragmentary vision of man, the displacement of ethics, bias towards the personal dimensions of philosophizing.

In the process of meaningful overcoming of these shortcomings, the reasoning of well-known thinkers of the previous century on the essential differences between philosophy and science bear the heuristic value and significant methodological potential for me. It is especially valuable to emphasize the importance of the heuristic potential of art in the process of understanding the genesis of a new picture of the world. Let me remind you that among the heuristic positions there are the ideas of K. Jaspers on the existential nature of art:

Philosophical metaphysics opens the philosopher an opportunity to see the truth in art forms..., ... Art itself becomes an existential function. Instead of being confined to a special world along with existence, it becomes a factor of self-enlightening unconditionality in a world of human openness. (transl. by A. M.) (Jaspers, 2012a, p. 374)

He emphasizes the consumptive use of metaphysics as a science and the impossibility of thus satisfying the need of modern man for philosophizing. It is extremely important that when considering what today's metaphysics might be like, Jaspers is one of those profound thinkers who appeals to the realm of art. Self-critically evaluating his own originality, he draws attention to

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Schelling's hitherto underestimated idea of art as a philosophical organon. The result of its deepening are the pages of the three-volume Jaspers' work "Philosophy", which deals with thinking in art as the only possible form of comprehension of transcendence. "Metaphysics, as the philosophy of art, is thinking in art, not about art; contemplation of art becomes for thinking an eye with which it looks at transcendence" (transl. by A. M.) (Jaspers, 2012b, p. 238). Later, Jaspers emphasizes his vision of metaphysical need as an attribute of human nature. It is important that the latter takes the form of man's need for art: "The urge of man's metaphysical thinking is towards art" (Jaspers, 2012b, p. 241).

And since one of the components of philosophizing in the last century was the "ethical vacuum", the origins of which are associated with the expansion of Descartes' reductionist teaching, the task of finding ways to overcome them constructively comes to the fore. The sound position is that of Hans Jonas (2001), the author of "ethics for technological civilization", who emphasizes the importance of overcoming this reductionism and restoring the category of "sacred" as an essential component of the human spirit (p. 45). Warning against the uncritical reproduction of naive-optimistic illusions, he also points to the danger of using "anthropocentric reduction" because it "contradicts the immanent purpose and the notable dignity of his [human] essence" (transl. by A. M.) (Jonas, 2001, p. 206). As it is evident from the previous statement, this refers to the expediency of deconstructing the established stereotypes about Descartes' teachings.

Successful attempts to constructively overcome the above-mentioned flaws of Descartes' philosophizing are demonstrated by the texts of the revolution participants in Cartesian studies, and foremost those by the above-mentioned Marion. For him, as a deep connoisseur of the legacy of his great countryman and the historical and philosophical process, his determining influence on the current philosophical landscape is axiomatic. Therefore, he considers it his priority to deconstruct the wide range of stereotypes that accompany the image of the great Descartes. For me, it is fundamental that in the process of realizing this task, Marion comes to understand the phenomenon of man. In particular, it relates to a distorted reception of the guidelines for a holistic vision of man by Descartes, which is perceived as a dualism of mind and body. The result of Marion's efforts to rehabilitate Descartes' legacy is a non-dualistic phenomenological conception of human existence that opens up new perspectives for philosophic historians.

Another version of the reconstruction of the anthropological and ethical motive of Descartes' philosophizing, hidden from the general public, which enables its reception as meaningfully related to the current demands, belongs today to Noa Naaman-Zauderer. In her monograph "Descartes' Deontological Turn: Reason, Will, and Virtue in the Later Writings" of 2010, she ambitiously declares a intention "to open up a new way of approaching a wide cluster of long-debated issues in Descartes' epistemology and ethics" (Naaman-Zauderer, 2010, p. 6). The subject of her critical rethinking is the established tradition of epistemology of Descartes' philosophizing, in which ethical views are understood as marginal, i.e. retrospectively added to epistemology and metaphysics. And since this deformation is unacceptable, the attempt of Naaman-Zauderer to turn this idea upside down is commendable. Rightly pointing to the priority of ethics for Descartes, the researcher in Chapter Six outlines the deep connection between epistemology and ethics in the second half of the forties. The originality of the position of the father of modern philosophy is associated with the ethical problem of the proper use of will. And since for Descartes the will, not the intellect, is the most important moment of human rationality, the main task is "the right use of free will". Among the most important derivatives is the recognition of the key role of faith in human nature, to which one of the main paragraphs is devoted

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(Naaman-Zauderer, 2010). Here the priority of faith over the natural light of the mind is substantiated both in the process of cognition and in the process of solving the problem of salvation. The innovation of the researcher's approach is especially obvious in the last two chapters, which deal with the concepts of "happiness" and "virtue" as the main purpose of our actions. At the same time, the thinker's priorities are quite strongly associated with virtues, because he "considers virtue not merely a means to happiness but rather our supreme good". Concretizing the Cartesian understanding of the human will as a manifestation of his godlikeness, Naaman-Zauderer (2010) emphasizes its intention as a focus on good and defends the thesis of unconditional dominance for the thinker of the supreme good (p. 175, p. 179), which is very reminiscent of Plato's "idea". As you can see, this emphasizes the importance of anthropological intent for the Descartes' searches. Herewith, the personal moment is ignored.

That is why Lawrence Renault's (2019) position on the importance of the personal basis of Descartes' ethics, recently published in the new Oxford Handbook in "Descartes' Moral Philosophy", is meaningfully close to me. There is no objection to the author's emphasis on the basic orientation of Descartes' philosophizing on the search for a reliable foundation for moral teaching. In the process of understanding the latter, the researcher's attention is drawn to the problem of the relationship between physics, metaphysics and ethics. A particularly valuable achievement of his publication is the attention to the main stages of the evolution of Descartes' philosophizing as the strengthening of personal motives. This is Lawrence's attention to the second half of the 1940s, which involved building a perfect ethic. The increasingly complete expression of the personal vision of ethics is expressed in the form of the transition from adoration of God to the moral based on virtue-passion of generosity, which manifests itself as the proper use of free will and "greatness of human being".

I see the undeniable heuristic potential in Lawrence Renault's innovative approach, which involves going beyond the notions of Descartes' subjectivism and recognizing the importance of the problem of "the other". Caring for the other, for his well-being and happiness is qualified by the researcher as a priority for the ethics of the great Frenchman. Here it is difficult not to see a meaningful refutation of the common thesis about Descartes' solipsism. As for the form of expression of morality and nobility, Renault justifiably evaluates it as altruism. And since the greatness of free will is qualified as the basis of Cartesian metaphysics, "the morality of generosity is rooted in metaphysics and represents its extreme development" (Renault, 2019). In the author's thoughts, it is easy to recognize both the indirect dialogue with Husserl on the originality of his claims to the development of the problem of intersubjective significance of human thinking, and the meaningful deepening of Marion's ideas.

One of the variants for emphasizing the importance of anthropological intention and personal choice as the basis of Descartes' philosophical legacy and the illusion of its reduction to the narrow framework of the naturalistic paradigm has been repeatedly voiced in recent years. This refers to an important problem for today in Cartesian reduced interpretations of the thinker's teachings and the emphasis on the basic role of freedom. In particular, J. Cottingham (2008) draws attention to the possibility of seeing a seeker and lover of truth behind the deceptive simplicity of the philosopher's texts in the traditional sense (p. 45). He also draws attention to the fact that his ethical provisions (in contrast to Kant) lack the imperative nature. It is a question of the need bequeathed to us of the personal choice of our own priorities between recourse to previous morality and belief in the unlimited possibilities of our mind. In the latter case, we have a great power over the world of nature and our own nature. And so the dramatic problem is, "whether we can

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hope to survive as a species without the help of a moral vision". In outlining it, the researcher goes beyond the instrumental reception of Descartes' teachings and emphasizes the meaningful rootedness of his morality in the previous tradition. "For Descartes, the requisite kind of moral vision was generated by Christian metaphysics, the objectivity of whose value system, for all his vaunted programme of doubt, he never seriously questioned" (Cottingham, 2008, p. 49). It is difficult to deny the legitimacy of this tension between the two outlined scenarios of future development in the teachings of Descartes. For me personally, the key opposition in this article between metaphysics and anthropology can be seen in this tension. To what extent is it overcome in the transition to the confrontation between science and art?

The recent opposition in the form of tension between the scientific and poetic components of the thinker's worldview has been the subject of research by Andrea Gadberry. She considers attention to the key role of the poetic principle in the work of the thinker to be a necessary precondition for going beyond the scientific reception of the "Cartesian cogito". The object of her close attention is the meaningful connotations of the Cartesian cogito, which remain unnoticed in the conditions of the dominance of its reduced image. Analysing the neglected forms of meaningful rootedness of cogito in sensuality, corporeality, human desires, the author emphasizes the importance of a holistic vision of Descartes' philosophical project. Therefore, as opposed to the teaching on extrasensory objectivity, Gadberry (2017) defends the key role of the poetic principle. It is, as she writes, about «the centrality of poetics to the project of the 'Meditations'» (p. 749).

In the process of searching for forms of a holistic vision of Descartes' inner world, it is important to pay attention to, as a rule, the neglected drama of human existence. Emphasizing the constitutive role of the poetic in the process of understanding the scientific revolution of the New Age, the author rightly warns against the dangers of simple solutions. It would seem that these include the literal perception of Descartes' words about his complete overcoming of sensuality and poetic vision of the world. But Gadberry, bearing in mind the authentic position of Descartes, rightly emphasizes the constitutive presence of the thinker in the outlined picture of the world. In particular, she rightly emphasizes the importance of "studying Cartesian poetics seriously", i.e. perceiving his strategy as a "poet-in-chief" (Gadberry, 2017, p. 749). Consistent with these ideas is the position of Kyo Lee, who, referring to the manifestations of human nature in Descartes works (about dreams, images, passions), argues the poetic worldview as a basic version of the interpretation of his philosophical project. It is, she writes, about the "Cartesian poetics of imagination" (Lee, 2013, p. 145).

But for me, these statements are still not convincing enough arguments about the key place of poetics in Descartes' worldview, because there are doubts about its significance for Descartes personally. Therefore, I think it is appropriate to draw attention to the connection between the analysis of the role of art in the way of philosophizing Descartes and his vision of the subject of philosophy. It is a proof of the existence of an immortal soul and the existence of God. Given the axiomatic inability of the methodology of the natural sciences to contribute to a meaningful clarification of the connection between God and the human soul, J.-L. Marion rightly emphasizes the meaningful kinship of poetic language and theology. And since Descartes' vivid identity, associated with the dominant status of poetry in his way of philosophizing, is still underestimated, he showing his respect for poets endows them with authority because "they bear witness to initial freedom of God in the encounter with the Fates". Emphasizing the originality of the heuristic and constructive potential of poetry, the modern French re-

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searcher notes that "in making new arguments, the conceptualization itself admit metaphors, images, and even theological arguments, which it had first rejected or of it had simply been unaware" (Marion, 2007, p. 115).

When considering the ways of interpreting Descartes' aesthetic views in modern literature, it is important to refrain from the temptation to consider them insignificant for him. Convincing arguments in favour of this thesis are the disproportionately small number of pages devoted to it and the neglected fact of their key significance for Descartes' worldview. Frederick de Buzon (2019) did not resist the ostensibility of these arguments in his article "The Compendium Musicae and Descartes's Aesthetics". But within this approach, the researcher ignores the importance of art and music for the thinker, as evidenced in particular by Cartesius' letter at the end of the article: "And if I die only of old age, I still would like some day to write on music theory" (Descartes, 1996, AT IV: 791). For me, these lines are strong evidence of the unconditional significance for Descartes of poetics as a form of presentation of his own metaphysics.

The opportunity to see the key significance and pervasive nature of the poetic project for Descartes' philosophizing provides an appeal to the way in which the basic provisions of his position are formed. Already the study of "Early Writings" testifies to the existence in the worldview of the thinker of paradoxical features that do not agree with the traditional vision of his determinism by the scientific revolution. This is about the openness to the world, a modest assessment of the possibilities of the theoretical mind, a high appreciation of image and art in the attainment of truth (Malivskyi, 2019). In the "Discourse on Method" a meaningful addition to the thesis of the key importance of art in the teachings of the thinker is the hierarchy of knowledge outlined by him, where the foundation is knowledge of man, while knowledge of nature is hypothetical. The outlined paradoxical vision of Descartes' worldview is still unconvincing and debatable in the current conditions. That is why the deep insight of one of the outstanding mathematicians and mechanics of the 19th century, Carl Gustav Jacobi, on the anthropological orientation of Descartes' search cannot fail to arouse admiration. It refers to his outlining the evolution of the inner world of the thinker, where the prominent place of anthropology largely determines his isolation and solitary way of life. "Noticing, however, to how few people he can report on these works, he turns from them to what he considers the supreme: to the study of man: but it turns out that most people know man even less than geometry, that is why he shrinks more and more into himself" (transl. by A. M.) (Jacobi, 1999, p. 1333).

It is important to me that the results obtained on the importance of poetics for the way of Descartes' philosophizing are confirmed in the pages of his works. Specifically, a careful attitude to them allows us to see that the widespread perception of the determining influence of science on the way of philosophizing and displacing art distorts his position. In particular, the pages of a famous letter to a French translator, published as a preface to the "Principles of Philosophy" of 1647, testify to the fact that he repeatedly used as synonymous the concepts of "knowledge" and "art" (*le savoir, les arts*) (Descartes, 1996, JSC IX: 2, 18). Convincing evidence of the importance of this moment for Descartes is the designating as art of "medicine and mechanics, and all the other arts" in one of the last paragraphs of the "Principles of Philosophy" (Descartes, 1996, AT VIIIA: 327). Outlining and meaningful understanding of these deep insights of the father of modern philosophy is beyond the scope of this article. The appeal to poetics as a form of understanding of Descartes' metaphysics opens new possibilities for understanding the first philosophy outlined by him as a synthetic combination of metaphysics and the personality of the thinker, where the latter is the cornerstone of the former.

Originality

Based on Descartes' own concept of teaching, the author substantiates the personal nature of Cartesian metaphysics. Important prerequisites for its comprehension are attention to the ethical motive as the driving force of philosophizing and recognition of the importance of the poetic worldview. The idea of the basic role of poetics finds its meaningful confirmation in the texts of the philosopher, who interprets the main areas of philosophy (science, morality and medicine) as forms of art.

Conclusions

Based on his own vision of anthropology and metaphysics as the forms of completion of the revolution initiated by Copernicus, the author defends the idea of the constitutive presence of personality in Descartes' metaphysics. In the process of studying the research literature, methodological guidelines are outlined in the form of the importance of personal determination of the search for truth, the key role of ethical motive and art as components of philosophizing. The thesis about the poetic form of presentation of metaphysics by Descartes as a form of fixation of its personal dimension is substantiated.

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ОСОБИСТІСНА МЕТАФІЗИКА КАРТЕЗИЯ

Мета. Основною метою статті є дослідження особистісної природи картезіанської метафізики. Її реалізація передбачає: а) окреслення методологічних зрушень в філософії ХХ століття; б) аналіз способів тлумачення в декартознавстві антропологічної компоненти філософування; в) звернення до текстів Декарта для уточнення автентичної форми тлумачення ним метафізики. **Теоретичний базис.** Свій погляд на спадщину Декарта я заснову на концептуальних положеннях феноменології, екзистенціалізму та герменевтики. **Наукова новизна.** Виходячи з власної концепції вчення Декарта, автор обґрунтовує особистісний характер картезіанської метафізики. Важливими передумовами її осягнення є увага до етичного мотиву як рушійної сили філософування та визнання значущості поетичного світосприйняття. Ідея базової ролі поетики знаходить своє змістовне підтвердження в текстах філософа, який тлумачить основні сфери філософії (науку, мораль та медицину) як форми прояви мистецтва. **Висновки.** Спираючись на власне бачення антропології та метафізики як форм завершення розпочатої Коперником революції, автор обстоює ідею конститутивної присутності особистості в метафізиці Декарта. В процесі вивчення дослідницької літератури окреслюються методологічні орієнтири у вигляді важливості особистого виміру шукань істини, ключової ролі етичного мотиву та мистецтва як компоненти філософування. Обґрунтовується теза про поетичну форму складу метафізики у Декарта як форму фіксації її особистісного виміру.

Ключові слова: метафізика; Декарт; антропологія; редукціонізм; наука; етика; мистецтво

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ЛИЧНОСТНАЯ МЕТАФИЗИКА КАРТЕЗИЯ

Цель. Основной целью статьи является изучение личностного характера картезианской метафизики. Ее реализация предполагает: а) фиксацию методологических сдвигов в философии ХХ века; б) анализ способов интерпретации антропологической составляющей философствования в декартоведении; в) обращение к тек-

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стам Декарта для уточнення аутентичної форми изложения им собственной метафизики. **Теоретический базис.** Свой подход я базирую на концептуальных положениях феноменологии, экзистенциализма и герменевтики. **Научная новизна.** Исходя из собственной концепции учения Декарта, автор обосновывает личностный характер картезианской метафизики. Важными предпосылками ее постижения являются внимание к этическому мотиву как движущей силе философствования и признание значимости поэтического восприятия. Идея базисной роли поэтики находит свое содержательное подтверждение в текстах философа, который истолковывает основные сферы философии (науку, мораль и медицину) как формы проявления искусства. **Выводы.** Опираясь на собственное понимание антропологии и метафизики как форм завершения революции Коперника, автор обосновывает идею конститутивного присутствия личности в метафизике Декарта. В процессе изучения исследовательской литературы обрисовываются методологические ориентиры в виде важности личностного измерения искания истины, ключевой роли этического мотива и искусства как компонента философии. Обосновывается идея важности для нас поэтической формы изложения метафизики как способа фиксации личностного измерения метафизики Декарта.

Ключевые слова: метафизика; Декарт; антропология; редукционизм; наука; этика; искусство

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